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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This study presents an application of sociological theory to the events that occurred in 
an ethnically diverse community of Detroit known as Poletown. Significant results not 
previously explored in the literature will be presented. Firstly, there has been no 
comprehensive study applying Simmel's exchange theory to organizations at the community 
level. Simmel's exchange theory had been neglected until recently mainly because of its late 
translation. Although his name is not listed among the major exchange theorists, he laid much 
of the foundation of contemporary exchange theory. This study deals with economic 
exchange. Exchange theorists distinguish between social exchange and economic exchange, 
however, the study of economic exchange in organizational studies has been neglected. 
Secondly, the Poletown case creates an opportunity to apply Mills' power elite theory to 
power structures of a community. Although there is a difference between the study of power 
at the national level and the conmiunity level, if one takes a conununity as an autonomous 
entity, we might find the same levels of power — power elite, middle level of power and 
masses—within the community. This study will not be testing whether Mills' theory is 
correct or incorrect, but rather examining how his description of the characteristics of the 
power elite is reflected in this case. Much of the debate regarding power in the United States 
has been concerned with the structure, and previous applications of Mills' power elite theory 
were studies of power on the national level. However, using Mills' theory to interpret a 
comprehensive newspaper content analysis of a community conflict is an area that has to date 
not been extensively explored. This positional analysis is appropriate since this study uses 
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printed public information available (Domhoff, 1987), mainly from two Detroit area 
newspapers. 
Methodologically, the study was conducted not only through a newspaper content 
analysis but also examined through a questionnaire administered to several scholars of the 
Poletown conflict and individuals personally involved in the dispute in order to clarify points 
not clear from available sources. 
This study deals with a neighborhood which was involved in an economic exchange 
between General Motors (GM) and the city of Detroit. In June of 1980, GM and the city of 
Detroit announced the GM plant redevelopment project (Central Industrial Park Project) 
which covered approximately 46S acres of inner city land, almost one square mile, and which 
extended into the city of Hamtramck (a city within the city of Detroit). It was the biggest 
industrial renewal project—the largest urban land assemblage and clearance project — in 
U.S. history (McGill, 1985). The project entailed relocating approximately 1,500 families and 
a major part of the project area lay in a neighborhood some residents referred to as Poletown. 
Some of the Poletown residents organized the Poletown Neighborhood Council (PNC) and 
confi-onted GM when they heard that a new $700 million Cadillac Plant would be built in the 
center of Detroit — on a site that included the northern one-third of Poletown. In order to 
secure the site, Detroit had to move 3,438 residents, 1,362 households, 143 institutions or 
businesses — including 16 churches, a hospital and 2 schools — and demolish 1,176 
buildings. PNC's major goal was to fight the use by the city of the power of "eminent 
domain," a legal principle that permits the government to use private property for the public 
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benefit. At the time, GM and the dty of Detroit were experiencing economic hardship. After 
a tremendous effort on the part of the PNC and other opposition groups, the commuiuty was 
thoroughly defeated and the GM plant was built. 
In summary, the purpose of this study is to examine the nature of the exchange carried 
out among the three parties of the Poletown case from the view point of both exchange and 
power elite theory. The Poletown event involved three parties — GM, the city of Detroit, and 
Poletown residents. Georg Simmel's exchange theory and C. Wright Mills' power elite theory 
are used to analyze and interpret the case. 
This is a non-traditional dissertation in that there are no chapters exclusively dedicated 
to the literature review and findings of the study. Instead, convenience and ease of reading 
dictated mer^ng the traditional literature review and findings into a single chapter for each 
theory applied to the interpretation of the Poletown case. Chapter 2 presents the historical 
background of the three parties prior to the event including Census data of Poletown. 
Chapter 3 presents the methods. Chapter 4 presents a review of Simmel's exchange theory 
and includes the research questions posed during this investigation. The findings are then 
presented for each research question. Chapter 5 contains a literature review of Mills' power 
elite theory as well as the related research questions. The research findings follow and reveal 
the nature of the power elite in the Poletown case. Chapter 6 includes the summary and 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter examines the historical background of the Poletown events and its three 
parties — GM, the city of Detroit, and Poletown. It is important to understand what 
motivated each party involved; Why did GM want its new plant? Why did the city of 
Detroit/Hamtramck accept GM's request? What kind of neighborhood was Poletown? In 
particular this chapter will attempt to focus on these questions by examining the economic 
statuses of GM and the city of Detroit and will present Census data to understand the 
demography of the city in general and the Poletown neighborhood in particular. 
A. GM's situation 
By 1980, GM was experiencing the first financial loss, a net loss of $763 million that 
the company had experienced since 1921 (Wylie, 1989). Detroit, Flint, and Pontiac are 
known as the automobile cities of Michigan, and Detroit is a hometown of the Big Three — 
General Motors, Ford and Chrysler Corporation. Between 1979 and 1980, the car production 
of U.S. fell 31.7 percent and the truck production was down 54.8 percent. As one in every six 
workers in the nation was engaged in auto-related industries at that time, it was not an 
exaggeration that a collapse of Detroit's Big Three could have crippled the country (Wylie, 
1989). Therefore, the state of Michigan was depending on automotive manufacture. For 
example, in 1978 there were about 750,000 automotive-related manufacturing jobs in 
Michigan which was about 19 percent of the state's total employment (excluding 
nonmanufacturing jobs which were dependent on the auto industry). According to a study of 
supplier firms in southeast Michigan, 82 percent were directly linked to the automotive 
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industry. In 1978,64 percent of all manufacturing jobs in Michigan related to automotive or 
automotive-linked firms. Even in 1980, the percentage was still over 61 percent (Jones and 
Bachelor, 1993). At the time, the profile of GM as a multi-national corporation was described 
as follows: 
One company, General Motors, had more revenue in 1978 than all television and 
radio broadcasters, newspaper, periodical and book publishers combined. In fact, 
three manufacturing companies had greater sales than the publishing and 
broadcasting industries. This includes such "giants" as NBC, CBS, Knight-Ridder, 
Times Mirror, Reader's Digest, ABC and Time Inc. (Compaine, 1979:1). 
However, in 1979 GM was facing a severe recession in the automotive industry. Previously, 
American auto makers could make profits fi-om big-car sales, however, by 1980 nearly one 
out of three Americans was buying imported small and fuel-efficient cars. As Auerbach says; 
In 1980 Chrysler, Ford, American Motors, and General Motors all reported the 
largest financial losses in their histories. Keeping costs down and competing 
effectively with foreign producers was vital to the future of these U.S. companies. 
They concluded that to be competitive they must redesign their products and 
manufacture lighter, more fuel-efficient automobiles. To do so meant making 
production design changes and constructing new manufacturing facilities 
(Auerbach, 1985:94). 
Because of the collapse of big-car sales, the industry's profit structure was devastated. 
According to Business Week (March 24, 1980:79): 
Industry observers estimate that GM, for example, makes as much as $1,000 on a 
large car and only $200 to $300 on a small car. In the last year the market share of 
big cars — so-called full-size and intermediate models — has plummeted from 
42% to 33%. Unless there is a miraculous recovery of larger-car sales, Detroit's 
profits will be wretched, to say the least. For example, even though GM is selling 
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a record 63% share of U.S.-built cars this year, it is expected to earn only $6.25 a 
share, half of1978 earnings (emphasis added). 
What GM needed was a smaller car with front-wheel-drive and more automated production 
lines. Responding to the 1979 crisis, GM announced a $40-billion five-year plan of capital 
spending through 1984, which would enable the company to produce more than six million 
front-wheel-drive cars world-wide by 1983 (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). Because this design 
change was necessary for stajdng competitive with foreign auto makers, the remodeling of old 
factories was judged by GM to be out of the question. One major reason for that was the 
front-wheel-drive cars employed integral body frames instead of the separate body-frame 
design used on previous cars. Therefore, GM had started to replace old plants with new 
plants. 
B. Situation of the city of Detroit 
Detroit experienced its greatest growth because of its automobile production, 
however, by the 1970s the city was facing a severe economic depression. With its auto-
dependent economy, the unemployment rate in the city averaged around 10 percent in 1970s. 
During 1980, unemployment in Detroit soared to an all time high of 18.3 percent by June 
while the national average was 7.8 percent. This unemployment rate was accompanied by a 
steady decline in the number of employees who worked in Detroit. For example, in 1970, 
there were approximately 519,000 workers in the city while in 1977 the total was 460,000 
(representing a 21% decrease). The decreased activity in manufacturing had a negative 
impact on the city's retail, wholesale and service sectors. Several factors — among them 
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aging and obsolete production facilities, a paucity of inexpensive land for expansion and 
changing markets — were the cause of continued gradual reduction in industrial production 
(City of Detroit Community & Economic Development Department, 1980). Between 1970 
and 1980, the number of jobs held by Detroit residents dropped from 561,184 to 394,707 — 
a 30 percent decrease (Bukowczyk, 1986), and the United Auto Workers (UAW) reported a 
loss of40,000 auto jobs since mid-1979 and a $100 million budget deficit (Moberg, 1981). 
According to the city of Detroit: 
Prior to World War II, manufacturing provided almost half of all jobs in the area 
and much of the City's tax base. This position of strength eroded over the years 
but most dramatically during the past decade. The inefficiencies of aged plants at 
first resulted in extended worker layoffs, then permanent terminations of portions 
of a plant's workforce as entire plants closed (City of Detroit Community & 
Economic Development Department, 1980). 
Along with the decline of manufacturing was the decline of the retail, wholesale, 
service sector and the population. Between 1970 and 1980, the population of the city 
declined from 1,514,063 to 1,192,222 (21% decrease). At the same period, the percentage of 
black population increased from 44 percent to 63 percent (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). The 
people who left Detroit moved to the suburban fringe. The whites who left Detroit were 
predominantly middle-income, educated, and taxpaying citizens. The population left in the 
city was older, less well educated, and less able to generate either income or tax resources 
than their suburban counterparts (Anton, 1981). 
The lack of an industrial tax base and workforce led Detroit to a disastrous fiscal 
position. City documents stated; 
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Detroit... has been forced to lay off essential police, fire and other service 
workers to the lowest level in fifty years, to cut back City services and to forgo 
much needed capital improvements in the aging infi-astructure of the City. The 
seriousness of the City's fiscal position has captured the attention of Wall Street, 
where the two major bond rating firms, Standard and Poor's and Moody's, have 
lowered the City bond rating to a rate below investment grade (City of Detroit 
Community & Economic Development Department, 1980; II-3). 
The median household income of Detroit had fallen below the national median, and was more 
than $5,000 below the median for the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) by 
1977. Furthermore, more than one-third of Detroit's residents had incomes of less than 
$7,000 which was no more than one-fifth for the SMSA and one-quarter for the nation as a 
whole (Anton, 1981). Anton argued; 
Part of the explanation for high levels of poverty and welfare caseloads in Detroit, 
of course, is the city's dependence on a single industry, which is itself 
extraordinarily sensitive to fluctuations in the national economy. Only five firms 
— Chrysler, GM, Budd, Uniroyal, and Massey-Ferguson — provided nearly 24 
percent of the city's 425,000 jobs in 1977. All five are engaged in auto or truck 
manufacturing or related industries. Historically, even a moderate economic 
decline or a slight drop in auto sales has had a severe impact in the city (emphasis 
added) (Anton, 1981:7). 
The city's dependency on a single industry was severely affected by the car business — auto 
sales were in proportion to the city's employment rate. In 1977, Detroit mayor Coleman A. 
Young called the city's situation the worst budget crisis in Detroit since the 1930s and crafted 
a strategy to deal with this problem. On the one hand, he aggressively pursued aid fi-om both 
the state and local government. On the other hand, he invested heavily in economic 
development (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). For instance, GM was looking for land for a 
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Cadillac transmission plant, and Detroit and other cities were bidding for it. Although Detroit 
wanted the plant in the city, and since the city could not move in time, the plant was built in 
Livonia, Michigan. After this incident Mayor Ycung received a promise from Thomas A. 
Murphy, chairman of GM, that "the next time GM planned to build a new plant, he would 
give me time to come up with a site" (Young and Wheeler, 1994: 239). The problem the city 
faced at this loss was that eminent domain was a very slow legal process and the automobile 
industry could not wait for years. Therefore, Mayor Young petitioned the state legislature to 
provide for the quick-taking of land by local government. The "quick-take" law, which enable 
municipalities to acquire the title to property and take possession of it under the eminent 
domain law before a purchase price is negotiated with the previous owner, passed in April 
1980 and Michigan's quick take law became the only one of its kind in the country at the time 
(Young and Wheeler, 1994). With this new law, Detroit was ready for the next time GM 
came around. 
C. Situation of the city of Hamtramcic 
There were similar problems to Detroit's in the city of Hamtramck. The city had been 
losing its population and manufacturing enterprises—which means loss of industrial tax base 
— since the 1960s. For instance, there were 34,137 people living in Hamtramck in 1960, 
however, by 1970 the population decreased to 26,783 (22% decrease) and by 1977 the 
population had dropped to 23,400 (68% of 1960). The population loss was largely attributed 
to the loss of jobs within the community. Chrysler Corporation's Hamtramck Assembly Plant 
(Dodge Main), which lost its workers from 30,000 in 1950's to less than 6,000 (80% loss) by 
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1980, was the largest industrial employer in the city. Not only additional unemployment but 
the annual loss of $17S million in payroll and $2.3 million in the local property tax 
contribution was created when Chrysler closed the Dodge Main in 1980. The Chrysler 
corporation paid taxes to the city which comprised 10 percent of the real estate taxes and 34 
percent of the income taxes. Because of this revenue loss, the city's net tax income was 
reduced approximately 25 percent. Also the closing of the Dodge Main plant affected the 
reduction of the commercial activity which flowed from the plant (City of Detroit Community 
& Economic Development Department, 1980). 
D. Poletown's situation 
Before the announcement of the project, The Detroit Free Press had begun an 
occasional series of stories about neighborhoods in and around Detroit, and Poletown was the 
first neighborhood to be profiled in the paper. Poletown extends from E. Grand Boulevard on 
the north down to Mack, and from the Grand Trunk Railroad Tracks east of 1-75 over to Mt. 
Elliott (Figure 1). In the paper, one of the Polish residents described the area as follows; 
This area is very good to live in, very comfortable, but it needs a renaissance. I 
wouldn't want to live in the suburbs. There it's quiet, like village life. People live 
too much by themselves, separately. I think people who are living here have more 
communication (Jhe Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1980:11 A). 
The Rev. Francis Skalski, pastor of St. Hyacinth, one of six Polish churches in the area, said 
that Poletown has strong homes and good homes, it is really a rallying point. He said we 
cannot build homes like these in suburbia, people are trying to make it so young people — not 
just Poles — will be attracted here. According to city figures, the 1978 average appraised 
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Figure 1. Historical Poletown area 
Source; The Detroit Free Press, June 23,1980:3A 
valuation for single family homes in the area was $9,000, among the lowest in the city (The 
Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1980). 
An interesting portrait of the neighborhood was its ethnic diversity. St. Hyacinth 
school had 400 students — about 30 percent of the children were Polish Americans, 30 
percent were Yugoslav and Albanian, 20 percent were black, and 20 percent were Spanish, 
Korean, Lebanese, Thai, Filipino and Nigerian immigrants. In comparison. Ferry Elementary 
School (within walking distance of St. Hyacinth's) had 900 students — 70 percent black and 
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30 percent white (most of them are children of Eastern European immigrants) {pie Detroit 
Free Press, June 23,1980). About the population of Poletown, it can be said that; 
No precise population figures are available for Poletown. According to 1976 city 
figures, however, about 19,200 people live in the slightly larger area bounded by 
the railroad tracks, E. Grand Blvd., Mt. Elliott and Gratio (below Mack). Of 
those, 68 percent are black and 31 percent are white (The Detroit Free Press, June 
23, 1980:1 lA). 
"It is the Eastern European element residing within the shadows of the six churches — the 
parishes are contiguous — that has reclaimed the area as Poletown" said The Detroit Free 
Press (June 23,1980:11 A). According to The Detroit Free Press, while most Detroiters had 
heard of Hamtramck, few knew anything about Poletown. Poletown's history could be traced 
back to the late 19th century, when thousands of Polish immigrants had flooded Detroit. 
Poletown, however, was not an affluent neighborhood. According to Wylie: 
By 1980 Poletown's homes were selling for an average of $9,000, among the 
cheapest in Detroit. Half the area's residents were young, black families, the 
majority of whom were renters. Most of Poletown's black families had incomes 
below $6,000 a year. Only one-half of the area's white residents still owned their 
own homes. Poletown was being undermined by a lack of employment, an aging 
population, crime, the increasing poverty of people on fixed incomes, a decline in 
private and public services and deteriorating housing stock. Nearly two thirds of 
the people living in northern Poletown moved out during the 1970s (Wylie, 
1989:23, 26). 
Thomas Olechowski who grew up and lived in the area said of the area's future: 
We are the ones who have the roots to attract people back. We only started 
organizing Poletown as a redevelopment project in 1978, and we are not, I repeat, 
we are not, trying to displace anyone black. But this old neighborhood is still 
intact. It's ours, and we have a viable base for restructuring. 
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This is Poletown, and there isn't anything that can change that (The Detroit Free 
Press, June 23, 1980:11A). 
Prior to the announcement of the Poletown project, the area had shown healthy signs 
of community organization (Bukowczyk, 1984). For instance, the Poletown area was already 
under a revitalization plan. The six Polish Roman Catholic parishes in the area had formed the 
North Eastside Community Organization in the mid-1970's, and the Poletown Inter-Parish 
Council had been formed in 1978. In 1977, the Poletown Area Revitalization Task Force 
(PARTE) had been organized, and when the GM plan was announced, the redevelopment was 
just getting off the ground. PARTE had secured grants from the Economic Growth 
Corporation and from neighborhood businesses, and had received the approval for a grant of 
$100,000 from the city of Detroit's Neighborhood Opportunity Fund (with the mayor's 
approval), a program that steered Community Development Block Grant funds to community 
organizations. They also succeeded in persuading Detroit Renaissance (a private business 
roundtable of Detroit's chief executives) to match up to $15,000 to analyze the potential of 
the nineteen-block Chane Street commercial strip (Wylie, 1989). Tom Olechowski, a resident 
of southern Poletown, and Richard Hodas, who was small landlord in northern Poletown, 
were working together for Poletown. By 1978, Olechowski managed to persuade the head of 
the city's Community and Economic Development Department (CEDD), Emmett Moten, to 
take a tour of Poletown. Hodas and Olechowski had a meeting with Moten in March of 1980, 
after which Hodas related; 
Moten told us that he would work with us all the way in revitalizing this 
neighborhood, that it had excellent potential, that neighborhoods like this, Detroit 
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needs. His attitude at the time seemed to be that this was the kind of thing that 
they were looking for, for neighborhoods in Detroit to initiate programs and to 
work with them and coordinate them with the city (Wylie, 1989:27). 
In order to rehabilitate the community, the Poletown Development Corporation was formed in 
1978. Therefore, at least in the eyes of some, there was a promising future for Poletown prior 
to the GM's plant announcement. 
£. Review of census data' 
1. Population and age 
Studying the demographic characteristics of population and age is often the first step in 
describing a community. The total population in Poletown has been decreasing since 1960 (Figure 
2). In 1960, there were 13,966 people living in the project area. In 1970, the population decreased 
to 13,477 (15.6% decreased fi-om 1960), and in 1980, the total population went down to 4,893 
(64% decrease of 1970)—overall city's population decreased 21 percent between 1970 and 1980. 
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Figure 2. Age distribution of Poletown 
Source: 1960 and 1980 Census 
1960 
' Since the Census data was not specifically provided for the project area, figures were taken from the tracts 
which contain the project area. 
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Figure 3 shows percentage of the total Poletown population in different age groups taken 
from Census data. As for the component of the work-force (age 15 to 64), the population of aged 
20 to 34 increased, however, the population of aged 35 to 54 deaeased significantly. The 
population of aged over 75 increased over the decades. 
Figure 3. Normalized age distribution of Poletown 
Source; 1960 and 1980 Census 
2. Race 
As for the racial breakdown in 1980, in Poletown 1, 56.9 percent were white and 37.5 
percent black. In Poletown 2,39.2 percent were white and 57.0 percent black, while in 
Hamtramck, 70.1 percent were white and 25.3 percent black. In the total area, the percentage of 
white was 51.2 percent and the percent of black was 44.1 percent. 
 ^Geographically, tract 5527 was located in the city of Hamtramck and tracts 5110 and 5182 in Detroit, and 
these three tracts were in Wayne County. The terms "Hamtramck" for tract 5527, "Poletown 1" for trart 5110, 
and "Poletown 2" for tract 5182 were u .^ 
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3. Mean income 
Figure 4 shows that the average family income over the entire project area was 
$12,457, a level of income 58 percent of that for Wayne County and 51 percent of that for the 
standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA). The lowest income area, Poletown 2, had a 
mean income 53 percent of that for Wayne County and 47 percent of that for the SMSA. 
These figures clearly show that the project area was a low-income community. 
4. Income below poverty level 
Figure 5 shows the percentage of families below the poverty level for the three areas in 
project site. The number of families with incomes below poverty level in Poletown was higher 
than the figures of both the SMSA and Wayne County, and especially in Poletown 1 and 2, 
24310 
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poverty was noticeable. The percentage of income below the poverty level in Poletown 1 was 
28.0 percent which was about three times higher than the figure of the SMS A and more than 
two times higher than the percentage of Wayne County. In Poletown 2,42.5 percent of 
families were living with reported income below poverty level, which was about five times 
higher than the percentage of the SMSA and about four times higher than Wayne County's 
figure, showing that many families in the project area were poor, especially in the Detroit sites 
(Poletown 1 and 2). In Poletown 2, almost half of the families had income below the poverty 
level category. The percentage of families with income below poverty level for all tracts was 
35.4 percent, which was four times higher than the percentages of both the SMSA and Wayne 
County. The data shows that Poletown was economically depressed. 
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5. Educational bacl^round 
The rate of high school graduates was used to determine the level of educational 
attainment by people in Poletown. Figure 6 shows the percentage of high school graduates. 
The percentage of high school graduates in Poletown was low (around 30%). By comparing 
this figure with that of the SMSA and Wayne County, one finds the figures in Poletown to be 
SMS^ WayneComty Hamtranck PoleUnml PoletaTml 
Figure 6. Percent high school graduates 
Source; 1980 Census 
lower by more than 50 percent of the figures of both the SMSA and Wayne County. The data 
shows that about two-thirds of Poletown population did not receive high school education 
suggesting a low level of educational achievement in the area. 
6. Labor force 
The size of a community's labor force is often used as one measure of economic 
vitality. Figure 7 shows the fi-action of a district's population that was part of its labor force. 
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Figure 7. Percent of population in labor force 
Source: 1960,1970 and 1980 Census 
The proportion of the population in the labor force in Poletown was lower than that of both 
the SMSA and Wayne County, this being especially noticeable in Poletown 1 and 2 (in Detroit 
site), where the labor force was far lower than the corresponding figures for the SMSA and 
Wayne County. The total percentage of the labor force in all tracts decreased from 69.7 
percent in 1960 to 40.4 percent in 1980. The percentage of employed workers decreased in 
each area, especially in Poletown 1 (36.8%) and Poletown 2 (40.4%). In Hamtramck, the 
labor force was down to 76 percent of that of 1960 while in Poletown 1 and 2, the figures 
were 53 percent and 58 percent, respectively. 
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Overall, the employed percent of labor force decreased drastically, especially in 
Pol stown 1 and 2, where the labor force decreased by almost SO percent within two decades. 
These figures show a marked lack of employment in the area and suggest a declining 
community. 
7. Polish ancestry 
Despite the name and whatever historical associations existed, "Poletown" was not, in 
fact, dominated by people of Polish ancestry by the time of the land dispute. From Figure 8, it 
is clear that though in 1960 nearly one person in four was of Polish origin, by 1980 only one 
in sixteen was of Polish ancestry. 
Hamtramck 
Poletown 1 
Poletown 2 
All tracts 
Figure 8. Polish ancestry 
Source: 1960,1970 and 1980 Census 
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In Poletown 1, the percentage shows that the number of Polish stayed steady, though, this 
was not so in Hamtramck and Poletown 2, where the decrease was large. From these figures, 
excluding Poletown 1, one could say that "Poletown" was not a dominantly Polish community 
by the date on which GM announced the project and neighborhood charged that claimed GM 
was abolishing a Polish community. 
8. Year householders settled in Poletown 
Finding out how long residents have lived in an area is a good way to measure the 
continuity of the community, with Table 1 showing that about half of the householders in the 
project area had lived in their homes more than two decades. 
In Poletown 1, 58.9 percent of the homeowner residents had been living there since 1959 
or earlier (the highest percentage in Poletown). As far as renter-occupied housing units went, 23.6 
Table 1. Year householders moved into unit 
Hamtramck Poletown 1 Poletown 2 
Owner-occupied Housing Units 94 333 168 
1979 to March 1980 0( 0.0) 30 ( 9.0) 0( 0.0) 
1975 to 1978 30(31.9) 34 (10.2) 0 ( 0.0) 
1970 to 1974 7(7.4) 30 ( 9.0) 31 (18.5) 
1960 to 1969 15 (16.0) 43 (12.9) 45 (26.8) 
1959 or earlier 42(44.7) 196 (58.9) 92 (54.8) 
Renter-occupied Housing Units 164 416 529 
1979 to March 1980 61 (37.2) 100 (24.0) 189(35.7) 
1975 to 1978 70(42.7) 135 (32.5) 146 (27.6) 
1970 to 1974 18(11.0) 83 (20.0) 89 (16.8) 
1969 or earlier 15(9.1) 98 (23.6) 105 (19.8) 
Source: 1980 Census 
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percent in Poletown 1 and 19.8 percent in Poletown 2 of people had been living there before 1%9 
or eariier. The data shows that in Poletown, over half of the people had been living in the area 
more than twenty years, indicating the high degree of continuity in the community, and helping to 
expl w Poletown readents' attachment to the area. 
9. Year white householders settled in Poletown 
It is interesting to know the year in >^ch white householders moved into Poletown, given 
that the area was percdved to be dominantly Polish, and while not all whites were of Polish 
extraction in Poletown—in fact in some tracts in Poletown, the percentage was less than 10 
percent Polish—Table 2 shows that the percentage of white householders living in Poletown in 
1959 or eariier was higher than the overall figure (Table 1). 
Table 2. Year white householders moved into urut 
Poletown I Poletown 2 
Owner-occupied Housing Units 198 103 
1979 to March 1980 25 ( 8.4) 0( 0.0) 
1975 to 1978 29 ( 9.7) 0( 0.0) 
1979 to 1974 17 ( 5.7) 7( 6.8) 
1960 to 1969 38 (12.8) 33 (32.0) 
1959 or earlier 189(63.4) 63(61.2) 
Renter-occupied Housing Units 213 160 
1979 to March 1980 50(23.5) 33 (20.6) 
1975 to 1978 51 (23.9) 46(28.8) 
1970 to 1974 55 (25.8) 20(12.5) 
1969 or eariier 57 (26.8) 61 (38.1) 
Source: 1980 Census 
Note; No information about Hamtramck 
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In overall figures, the percentage of home-owners v/ho moved into units in Poletovm 1 was 
58.9 percent compared to 63.4 percent among whites, and in Poletown 2 the percentage was 54.8 
percent compared to 61.2 percent of >^tes. The pattern of renters was conastent with that of 
homeowners. The percentage of white home-owner residents living in Poletown prior to 1959 
was agnificantly high showing the continuity of the community. The data shows the people's 
attachment to Poletown. 
In summary, Poletown was a multiethnic community, roughly half white and half black, 
with its total population clearly in a state of decline. In Poletown, the woildng age range (35 to 
44) was also drastically decreasing, suggesting there was a smaller and younger work force than 
had existed in the past. The mean income of Poletown's residents was about half the mean income 
of the larger Detroit SMS A and Wayne County, and the number of families with income below 
poverty level was high. About two-thirds of the Poletown population did not recdve a high school 
education indicating the lower educational achievement in the area. The total percentage of the 
labor force and the percentage of Polish ancestry in the area had decreased over the decades, 
though more than half of the population had been living in the area over twenty years. In short, it 
was a weakened but not a dying community, which may have made it ripe for external threat fi-om 
the city and GM. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS TO BE USED 
In this study, a content analysis was carried out, using data from two newspapers The 
Detroit News and TTte Detroit Free Press, both of which were major newspapers during the 
Poletown events. Other publications, including Final Environmental Impact Statement: 
Central Industrial Park, were also used to examine the case. In some areas, information 
available from the newspapers and the publications was limited and was not able to shed a 
light on some aspects of the case, and therefore, questionnaires were sent to seven people 
who were involved in the Poletown case directly or indirectly to clarify some unanswered 
questions. 
The information obtained was from the following samples. The informants were 
selected because of their knowledge of the case. Since additional information apart from the 
newspaper story was needed to answer some questions, a purposeful selection was made. 
Two of them were Catholic priests whose names appeared in the newspapers. The other five 
people published materials regarding the case. The data was collected by a mailed 
questionnaire. One of the informants was interviewed by phone. Five out of seven people 
responded to the questionnaire. 
The data analyzed are mainly during the period from June 1, 1980, the month the 
project was announced, to May 2,1981, the day after the site was sold to GM, however, 
some information was collected before or after this period. The data gathering focused on the 
way the Poletown neighborhood was sold to GM, and not on the process by which 
Immaculate Conception Roman Catholic Church was demolished. Some of the Poletown 
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residents fought vnth GM and the city of Detroit to save their neighborhood at the beginning 
but changed their focus to save their church after the area was sold out. 
All of the newspaper articles related to the Poletown project were collected — major 
headings sought were Poletown, GM plant, Cadillac, GM plans, GM, Nader, Young, court, 
Hamtramck, city council, and city. The unit of analysis was Poletown and the unit of 
observation was Poletown residents, the city of Detroit, and GM. 
Georg Simmel's exchange theory and C. Wright Mills' power elite theory were used to 
interpret and analyze the data. The study examined whether the exchange in the Poletown 
case followed Simmel's exchange elements and principles. Mills' major ideas, especially the 
characteristics of the power elite were examined. To examine both Sinunel's and Mills' 
theories, the following research questions were used. The term "research question" was used 
instead of "hypothesis" since this study's focus was not to test whether or not the theories 
were correct, but to use these theories to help understand the case. Research questions ask 
whether a relationship exists between variables while hypotheses states predicted relationships 
(Sproull, 1988). 
Research questions one through eighteen presented below relate the mun points of 
Simmel's exchange theory and Mills' power elite theory to the Poletown case. They will be 
answered in the chapters 4 and 5 where both theorists' concepts are introduced and analyzed, 
and are listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Research questions 
1. Did each of the three parties desire some object? 
2. Could each of the three parties identify the possessor of the valued object? 
3. Did each of the three parties have anything to offer which others valued? 
4. Did each of the three parties compare the value of both objects? 
5. Did each of the three parties obtain an acceptance of the offer by the other party? 
6. Did each of the three parties recognize the higher value of the offered object over 
that of the value of the possessed object? 
7. Did each of the three parties experience satisfaction for the exchange? 
8. Was each of the three parties attracted by another's resources? 
9. Did each of the three parties value a desired object because of its high demand and 
scarcity? 
10. Did each of the three parties perceive more value in an object belonging to another, 
have alternatives, and was there any differentiations regarding resources each party 
had? 
11. Did the power elite in the Poletown case rest on institutions? 
12. Did the power in the Poletown case rest on higher positions? 
13. Did the power elite in the Poletown case share the same interest? 
14. Did the power elite in the Poletown case have associations with other power elite? 
15. Did the power elite manipulate other individuals? 
16. Did the power elite in Poletown engage in secrecy? 
17. Were the power elites in the Poletown reachable for the Poletown residents? 
18. Did the Poletown residents see democracy through the case? 
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CHAPTER 4. POLETOWN AS A PROBLEM OF EXCHANGE 
A. Exchange theory 
One view which can be helpful in understanding the Poletown case is that of Georg 
Simmel's exchange theoiy. Sinunel believed that "society" exists wherever a number of 
individuals enter into social interaction. Exchange theoiy became a prominent theoretical 
approach in the 1960s. Although Simmel's exchange theory has not been extensively used in 
the literature, he offered the first sociological exchange theory which still has relevance in The 
Philosophy of Money (Turner, 1991a, 1991b). As a result, there is recently much interest in 
Simmel's exchange theory (Aronowitz, 1994). Turner, Beeghley and Powers (1995) state: 
Although Simmel's analysis of exchange processes is not oflen cited in this revival 
of exchange theory, German-speaking proponents of the exchange approach, such 
as Peter M. Blau, probably received some inspiration fi-om his pioneering efforts. 
Other exchange approaches were inspired by Simmel's emphasis on "form" over 
"content." These approaches, best seen in the work of Richard Emerson, Karen 
Cook and various collaborators, and David Wilier and John Skvoretz, emphasize 
that it is the nature of the exchange relation rather than the actor (whether an 
individual person or collective unit) that is important. Exchange is thus about the 
form of the relationship among actors, whatever their nature, rather than about the 
properties of actors. Such an approach clearly has its roots in Simmel's advocacy. 
Another approach that was inspired by Simmel's emphasis on form over content is 
network analysis, some of which overlaps with exchange theory (Turner, Beeghley 
and Powers, 1995: 280-281). 
Simmel contributed to modem sociological theory in the area of exchange, and differentiation 
is his recognition that the user of money as a medium of exchange accelerates the process of 
social differentiation, while altering the basis of social integration (Turner, 1991a). According 
to Simmel, people are always engaging in reciprocal relationships. Thus, he focused on the 
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form which reciprocal relations between human beings take, with exchange being one 
important form of interaction. For Simmel, the fundamental economic phenomenon is 
exchange (Poggi, 1993), and Frisby states that "exchange is at the very heart of Simmel's 
economic theory of value" (1992:90). Simmel distinguished social exchange from economic 
exchange which mainly involves the use of money, and one of his most characteristic and 
incredibly rich themes is how the money economy becomes a form of life — money as a 
source of cultural creation, and a new style of life. Simmel concluded that money is 
constitutive of the economy and itself becomes a form of life (Aronowitz, 1994). 
In the section which follows, the terms used in Simmel's theory will be defined, and 
the elements and principles relevant to this study will be explained in detail. Findings of the 
Poletown case wall be presented with the research questions. 
1. Definition of exchange 
Exchange, for Simmel, can best be understood as a form of social interaction, for 
according to Simmel, "most relationships between people can be interpreted as forms of 
exchange. Exchange is the purest and most developed kind of interaction, which shapes 
human life when it seeks to acquire substance and content" (Simmel, 1991:82). For Simmel, 
every interaction has to be regarded as an exchange. For instance, every conversation, every 
affection — even if it is rejected — every game, every glance at another person is exchange 
(Simmel, 1991). Simmel described exchange in the following manner: 
. . .  e x c h a n g e  i s  a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p h e n o m e n o n  sui generis, an original form and 
function of social life. It is in no way a logical consequence of those qualitative 
and quantitative aspects of things that are called utility and scarcity which acquire 
their significance for the process of valuation only when exchange is presupposed. 
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If exchange, that is the willingness to sacrifice one thing in order to acquire 
another, is precluded, then no degree of scarcity of the desired object can produce 
an economic value. The significance of the object for the individual is always 
determined by the desire for it, and its utility depends upon the qualities that it has; 
if we already possess the object, then its significance is not affected at all by 
whether there exist many or few or no other specimens of its kind (Simmel, 1991; 
100). 
For Simmel, exchange is one of those relations through which numbers of individuals become 
a social group and society is identical with the sum total of these relations. Simmel saw 
exchange as one of the functions that creates an inner bond between human beings. The 
concept of exchange helps to reveal relationships and economic values among social groups. 
In addition, Simmel expluned how people who are engaged in an exchange are filing to 
sacrifice one thing in order to acquire another, and how valuable an exchange would be for 
them: 
It is of no concern to the economic subject whether he invests his property or 
labour power in the land or transfers them to another person, if the result for him is 
the same. This subjective process of sacrifice and gain in the individual mind is in 
no way secondary to, or imitated from, exchange between individual; on the 
contrary, the interchange between sacrifice and acquisition within the individual is 
the basic presupposition and, as it were, the essential substance of exchange 
between two people. Exchange is only a sub-variety in which the sacrifice is 
brought about by the demand of another individual (Simmel, 1991:83). 
Value in exchange is an internal matter. According to Simmel; 
Exchange takes place not for the sake of an object previously possessed by another 
person, but rather for the sake of one's own feeling about an object, a feeling 
which the other previously did not possess. The meaning of exchange, moreover, 
is that the sum of values is greater afterward than it was before, and this implies 
that each party gives the other more than he had himself possessed (Simmel, 
1971 ;44). 
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In an exchange, each individual compares the values he/she attributes to two objects, of which 
each person controls one. 
2. Society 
Simmel saw exchange as one of the most basic forms of social existence (Frisby, 
1984). He saw society everywhere, where a number of human beings enter into interaction 
and form a temporary or permanent unity. He acknowledged that one cannot start out from a 
more specific definition of society than that society exists wherever several individuals stand in 
reciprocal relationship to one another. In Simmel's words: 
. . .  s o c i e t y  i s  a  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  t r a n s c e n d s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  b u t  t h a t  i s  n o t  a b s t r a c t .  
Historical life thus escapes the alternative of taking place either in individuals or in 
abstract generalities. Society is the universal which, at the same time, is concretely 
alive. From this arises the unique significance that exchange, as the economic-
historical realization of the relativity of things, has for society; exchange raises the 
specific object and its significance of the individual above its singularity, not into 
the sphere of abstraction, but into that of lively interaction which is the substance 
of economic value (Simmel, 1991:101). 
Here Simmel explicitly pointed to the relevance of exchange for society, which is composed of 
interactions. For Simmel, the interaction between individuals is the starting point of all social 
formations, and he described the social interaction which constitutes society in the following 
manner: 
Society is not an absolute entity which must first exist so that all the individual 
relations of its members... can develop within its framework or be represented by 
it: it is only the synthesis or the general term for the totality of these specific 
interactions. Any one of these interactions may, of course, be eliminated and 
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'society' still exist, but only if a sufficiently large number of others remain intact. 
If all interaction ceases there is no longer any society (Sinunel, 1991:17S). 
Although Simmel stated that every interaction has to be regarded as an exchange, in his 
conception of society, both social interaction and exchange are also constitutive for society. 
Sinunel laid emphasis on the individual action in society and said that what the individual does 
means exclusively to society (Atoji, 1984). Thus, for Sinunel, society is functional; 
Society strives to be a whole, an organic unit of which the individual must be mere 
members. Society asks of the individual that he employ all his strength in the 
service of the special function which he has to exercise as a member of it; that he 
so modify himself as to become the most suitable vehicle for this function. Yet the 
drive toward unity and wholeness that is characteristic of the individual himself 
rebels against this role. The individual strives to be rounded out in himself, not 
merely to help to round out society. He strives to develop his full capacities, 
irrespective of the shifts among them that the interest of society may ask of him. 
This conflict between the whole, which imposes the onesidedness of partial 
function upon its elements, and the part, which itself strives to be a whole, is 
insoluble (Simmel, 1950:59). 
In Simmel's view, there are two denotations in the concept of society: 
The concept "society" has two denotations which scientific treatment must keep 
strictly distinct. The first designates society as the complex of socialized 
individuals, the societally formed human material as it has been shaped by the 
totality of historical reality. The second denotes society as the sum of those forms 
of relationship by virtue of which individuals are transformed into "society" in the 
first sense of the term. In a parallel way, we use the word "sphere," first to 
designate material of a certain form, and second to designate (in mathematics) the 
shape or form by virtue of which material is transformed into a "sphere" in the first 
sense. When using "society" in the first sense, the social sciences indicate that 
their subject matter includes everything that occurs in and with society. But when 
using the term in the second sense, social science indicates that its subject matter is 
the forces, relations, and forms through which human beings become sociated 
(Simmel, 1959:318-319). 
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The first denotation of "society" implies socializations of individuals and the second 
denotation implies the sum of these socializations. 
3. Differences between social exchange and economic exchange 
Simmel saw exchange as the source of economic values. This is because exchange is 
the representative of the distance between subject and object which transforms subjective 
feelings into objective valuation. Therefore, exchange involves a change of ownership. 
Money, according to Simmel, is the prototypical symbolic medium for economic exchange 
(Turner, 1991b). Simmel argued economic exchange can best be understood as a form of 
social interaction (Coser, 1977). Social exchange, for Simmel, does not sacrifice goods and 
does not reduce oneself in the exchange. Moreover, social exchange does not involve a 
balancing of gain and loss. Simmel argued that: 
It is above all the exchange of economic values that involves the notion of 
sacrifice. When we exchange love for love, we have no other use for its inner 
energy and, leaving aside any later consequences, we do not sacrifice any good. 
When we share our intellectual resources in a discussion, they are not thereby 
reduced; when we display the image of our personality, and take in those of other 
people, our possession of ourselves is not at all reduced by this exchange. In all 
these cases of exchange the increase of value does not involve a balancing of gain 
and loss; either the contribution of each party lies beyond this antithesis or it is 
already a gain to be able to make it, and we accept the response as a gift which is 
made independently of our own offering. But economic exchange—whether it is 
of objects of labor or labor power invested in objects — always signifies the 
sacrifice of an otherwise usefiil goods, however much eudaemonistic gain is 
involved (Simmel, 1991:82-83). 
According to Simmel, the value of economic exchange would never have developed if 
every desire could be satisfied completely without a struggle. Regarding economic value. 
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utility appears as the absolute part of economic values, and its degree has to be known so that 
the objects can enter into economic exchange. Simmel described an example of economic 
value in the following words: 
Wild grain, which can be harvested without effort and immediately consumed 
without any exchange, is an economic good only if its consumption saves some 
other expenditure. But if all the necessities of life could be obtained in this way 
without any sacrifice there would be no economic system, any more than in the 
case of birds or fish or the inhabitants of the land of mild and honey. No matter 
how the two objects A and B have become values, A becomes an economic value 
only because I have to exchange it for B, and B only because I can acquire A in 
exchange for it (Simmel, 1991:88). 
Sinmiel believed that economic objects have significance if the exchange occurs between two. 
Turner, Beeghley and Powers (1995) summarize Simmel's economic exchange as follows: 
Economic exchange involving money is only a special case of this more general 
social form. But it is a very special case. For when money becomes the 
predominant means for establishing value in social relationships, the properties and 
dynamics of social relations are transformed. This process of displacing other 
criteria of value, such as lo^c, ethics, and aesthetics, with a monetary criterion is 
precisely the long-term evolutionary trend in societies. This trend is... both a 
cause and an effect of money as the medium of exchange. Money emerged to 
facilitate exchanges and to realize even more completely human's basic needs 
(Turner, Beeghley and Powers, 1995:271). 
In a social exchange, the increase of value does not occur through the calculation of 
profit and loss, while in contrast, economic exchange always entails the sacrifice of some good 
that has other potential uses (Simmel, 1971). Simmel believed that economic exchanges 
guarantee the reciprocal relationship. In The Sociology of Georg Simmel (1950), Simmel 
explained his view in the words that follow; 
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All contacts among men rest on the schema of giving and returning the 
equivalence. The equivalence of innumerable gifts and performances can be 
enforced. In all economic exchanges in legal form, in all fixed agreements 
concerning a given service, in all obligations of legalized relations, the legal 
constitution enforces and guarantees the reciprocity of service and return service 
— social equilibrium and cohesion do not exist without it. But there are also 
innumerable other relations to which the legal form does not apply, and in which 
the enforcement of the equivalence is out of the question. Here gratitude appears 
as a supplement. It establishes the bond of interaction, of the reciprocity of service 
and return service, even when they are not guaranteed by external coercion 
(Simmel, 1950:387). 
Social exchange does not involve money directly, does not have a guaranteed future return, 
and does not entail the sacrifice of goods, whereas economic exchange does on all counts. 
In the Poletown events, the exchanges were quantified by money; involved a balancing 
of gain and loss; guarantied a reciprocal relationship. Therefore, the exchanges in the 
Poletown case were economic exchanges. 
4. Elements of the exchange process 
According to Sinmiel, exchange is characterized by several steps. First, one has to 
desire a valued object which one does not have. Second, one has to identify the possessor of 
that object. Third, one has to offer an object which is desired by another person to receive the 
desired object. Fourth, one has to compare the value of both objects. Fifth, one has to obtain 
an acceptance of the offer by the other person. Sixth, one has to recognize the higher value of 
the offered object over that of the value of the possessed object. Lastly, one has to experience 
satisfaction for the exchange. Figure 9 shows a model of how an exchange develops. Person 
35 
Object Object Person 
sacrifice 
gain 
recognition 
sacrifice 
gain 
'erson 
Figure 9. Process of exchange 
A, who possesses object A, sacrifices to gain object B from person B, and subject B goes 
through the same process simultaneously with A. 
a. Desire for an object that one does not have 
According to Simmel, an actor has to desire valued objects which the actor does not 
possess in order to enter an exchange. In desiring what one does not yet own or enjoy, one 
places the content of desire outside oneself In the quote below, Simmel explained his 
concept of desire; 
We desire objects only if they are not immediately given to us for our use and 
enjoyment; that is, to the extent that they resist our desire. The content of our 
desire becomes an object as soon as it is opposed to us, not only in the sense of 
being impervious to us, but also in terms of its distance as something not-yet-
enjoyed, the subjective aspect of this condition being desire (Simmel, 1991: 66). 
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Thus, according to Sinimel, one has to have a desire to possess an object which one does not 
have and which one can see the value of. Simmel said of the first step of an exchange: 
At first, the object exists only in our relationship to it and is completely absorbed in 
this relationship; it becomes something external and opposed to use only in the 
degree that it escapes from this connection. Even the desire for objects, which 
recognizes their autonomy while seeking to overcome it, develops only when want 
and satisfaction do not coincide. The possibility of enjoyment must be separated, 
as an image of the future, from our present condition in order for us to desire 
things that now stand at a distance from us (Simmel, 1991 ;71). 
The significance of the object for the individual is always determined by the desire for it, and 
its utility depends upon the qualities that it has. If an object is remote from us we desire it 
more, and this desire is the first step in approaching the object. This evaluation stage is the 
first step toward an exchange. If one has a strong desire to have the object, one is likely to 
engage in an exchange. However, according to Simmel, desire by itself cannot bring value 
unless it encounters obstacles. If every desire is absolutely satisfied without any struggle, the 
economic exchange of values would never have developed, and the desire itself would never 
have reached a high level. Simmel argued: 
Only the deferment of satisfaction through obstacles, the fear of never attaining the 
object, the tension of struggling for it, brings together the various elements of 
desire; the intense striving and continuous acquisition. But even if the strongest 
element of desire came only from within the individual, the object that satisfies it 
would still have no value if it were abundantly available (Simmel, 1991: 89). 
Thus, desire requires obstacles and without those, there is no value. 
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In the Poletown case, three parties — GM, the city of Detroit and Poletown residents 
—were involved in the exchanges. The land of Poletown was transferred from the residents 
to the city and then to GM. The exchange was in two steps, occurring at different times— 
one was between Poletown residents and the city (exchange 1) and another was between GM 
and the city (exchange 2) (Figure 10). In each exchange the city played the role of mediator 
between GM and the residents. 
Exchange 2 Exchange 1 
plant (job, tax;> ^ relncatinn henefit—• 
GM 4 City 4 Poletown residents 
land land & homes 
Figure 10. Exchange in Poletown project 
In exchange 1, the city offered the relocation benefits to the Poletown residents, and in 
return they offered their homes and land. In exchange 2, GM offered the new plant, which 
brought jobs and tax revenues to the city, and the city offered the Poletown site to GM in 
return. Simmel's views lead us to ask: 
Research question 1. Did each of the three parties desire some object? 
In the Poletown case, GM was trying to solve its economic problems, and one of the 
strategies was to replace all inefficient assembly plants to upgrade products and plants. GM 
desired to build its new plant within the city limits. "General Motors Corp. says it wants to 
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replace its aged Cadillac Clark Avenue assembly plant and companion Fisher Body plant with 
a massive, modem facility within Detroit — if the city can find a suitable site" {The Detroit 
Free Press, June 24,1980:1 A). GM was looking for plant sites of about 500 acres in order to 
construct a mammoth, three-million-square-foot assembly plant. GM needed a site of proper 
size and shape — the size of about 465 acres and roughly square shape. According to a GM 
spokesman, "the site will have to be cleared, utilities will have to be available and 
transportation facilities would have to be at least under construction to make the site usable" 
(The Detroit Free Press, July 1, 1980: lOA). According to The Detroit Free Press (June 24, 
1980:4A). 
GM described the new plant study as parts of its massive capital spending program to 
modernize its facilities and offer more fuel-efficient, competitive cars. Cadillac is 
reported to be working on a subcompact model for introduction in 1982, but the firm 
won't confirm or deny that. "We're looking at all our assembly facilities to make sure 
that, among other things, they meet air quality standards, improve productivity and 
efficiency to better meet the growing competition from foreign manufactures and 
provide the best facilities possible to meet our future product program needs in the 
'80's," a GM spokesman said. 
The proposed plant would be used to build a new generation of small, more 
economical Cadillacs and was likely to be highly automated. Since the rules and tax laws 
made it economically unreasonable to renovate and maintain the existing plant building, a new 
plant was less costly. According to GM, one of the reasons for building a new facility was the 
more stringent air pollution requirements made it cheaper to construct a new plant than to 
refit an old one. Also, a single-story plant would be more efficient than the existing multistory 
plants even though it would require a larger site. GM announced its desire on June 24,1980, 
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and GM spokesmen said that "We do need a new assembly plant, and we want to use our 
existing work force here" {The Detroit Free Press, June 25, 1980:6A). According to GM's 
spokesman, GM wanted a new plant as close to existing plants as possible to use the existing 
work force. Therefore, GM's desire was land within Detroit to built a new update plant. 
The city needed a redevelopment and reindustrialization program which brings jobs for 
the dying downtown, and new private investment was crucial to long-term recovery (Anton, 
1981; Bukowczyk, 1986). Automobile industry was a vital part of the revenue for Detroit. 
The editorial of The Detroit News (February 1,1981:7B) expressed the city's situation as 
follows: 
. . .  o u r  c i t y  f a c e s  n o t  o n l y  h a r d  t i m e s  b u t  p o s s i b l e  e x t i n c t i o n  a s  a  c o r p o r a t e  e n t i t y .  
Long lacking economic diversity, Detroit would be in jeopardy even if the domestic 
auto business were strong. Many plants have left for the suburbs and the seductions of 
the Sun Belt. Chrysler, our largest employer, is at death's door. And Michigan is 
having trouble enticing new industry because it is famous worldwide for high taxes and 
high pay scales — for being a very expensive place to do business. 
Therefore, keeping existing corporations and retaining jobs and increasing tax revenues was 
the strong desire of the city (Jones, Bachelor and Wang, 1981). 
Prior to the GM plant announcement, some of the Poletown residents were planning to 
redevelop the area. For instance, Tom Olechowski (became a president of PNC later), an 
administrative assistant to State Sen. David S. Holmers Jr., D-Detroit, begun forming 
Poletown community groups in an effort to revitalize the area. The city accepted "a $100,000 
grant last spring for housing rehabilitation in the neighborhood and has invited Chane street 
merchants to join in a revitalization program, for which the merchants have already raised 
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$10,000" {The Detroit News, August 5,1980:1A). Therefore, it is clear that some residents 
of Poletown had a desire to revitalize the area prior to the announcement of the GM plant. 
On the other hand, some people were hoping to move from the area (City of Detroit 
Community & Economic Development Department, 1980). Mrs. Faur said; 
"This has been a bad place to live for lot of years," she said, "We had no money. 
That trapped us here or we'd have gone long ago." She and her husband, Abe, 
live on Social Security benefits and his small disability pension from a factory 
accident years ago that left him permanently crippled. Mrs. Faur has lived in the 
neighborhood on and offall of her life. Her father also was raised there. She can 
remember when things were good there, when Dodge Main was employing 
30,000, before the Hupp Co. and other smaller factories shut down, before money 
stopped coming to the workers in Poletown. She can't place the exact year when 
things began going bad. She's not good at remembering dates anymore. 
However, she knows that one day a long time ago she and her husband looked 
around, wanted to get out but knew they couldn't. {The Detroit News, February 
17, 1981: IB). 
Some residents saw Poletown as a declining neighborhood. Mrs. Sliweska expressed that 
"You used to be able to walk everywhere—to the store, the church, the kids' activities, the 
movies. Now, I can't even go to church as much as I want to" {The Detroit News. December 
25, 1980:14A). Poletown had a number of urban community problems. They were, for 
instance, crime, boarded-up and abandoned structures, dogs running loose, run-down 
buildings, and poorly maintained yards, heavy traffic and street or highway noise (Umted 
States General Accounting Office, 1989). 
In summary, it was easy to identify the desired objects among three parties in the 
Poletown events. GM had a desire to build a new plant to compete as an automaker, and 
since GM wanted to replace its two plants within the city, the company desired to stay close 
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to a supply of experienced workers. The city of Detroit had a desire to keep corporations 
from leaving the city since they could bring large amount of money to the city's economy. 
Some of the Poletown residents had a desire to revitalize the area prior to the announcement 
of the GM plant project. At the same time, there were residents who wanted to leave 
Poletown for nicer areas. 
b. Identify an owner of the possession 
According to Simmel, after an actor desires valued objects, he/she has to identify the 
possessor of the valued object for the exchange. All economic transactions rest upon the fact 
that a person A wants something that someone else owns, and that the other person will 
transfer it to A if person A gives him something A owns that he/she wants. By being 
exchanged, each object acquires a practical realization and measure of its value through the 
other object. This is the most important consequence and expression of the distance 
established between the objects and the subjects. To exchange one object for another object, 
the object has to be identified as valuable not only by the owner, but also by the other party. 
This leads us to ask the next question. 
Research question 2; Could each of the three parties identify the possessor of the valued 
object? 
In the Poletown case, the idea formed when GM chairman Thomas A. Murphy told 
Detroit's mayor Coleman A. Young that he would like to relocate a major auto plant within 
Detroit's city limits (TJie Detroit Free Press, June 24, 1980). GM did not have specific land 
in mind, and Detroit did not own the Poletown site at the beginning, however, GM identified 
the city of Detroit as a holder of the potential land, and approached the mayor. When GM 
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announced the plant project, the city had possible sites. The most likely location was an east-
side site, north of 1-94 and just south of the abandoned Dodge Main plant in Hamtramck {The 
Detroit Free Press, June 24, 1980). This area was the north end of Poletown, and the area 
was a mixture of vacant land and dilapidated buildings {The Detroit Free Press, June 24, 
1980). The following day of the GM plant armouncement, a source close to the city council 
disclosed that; 
. . .  t h e  p r i m e  s i t e  b e i n g  c o n s i d e r e d  b y  t h e  c i t y  i s  a  p a r c e l  b o u n d e d  b y  E .  G r a n d  B l v d .  
and Griffin on the north, Mt. Elliott on the east, the Ford Freeway on the south and St. 
Aubin on the west. The parcel is about 400 acres, and could be extended northward 
toward the now vacant Dodge Main plant in Hamtramck. According to the source, 
about 1,500 families would be displaced if GM builds on the site. The source said two 
other locations — one near Chrysler's Lynce Road Assembly Plant and another near 
City Airport—were rejected because even more families would be uprooted {The 
Detroit Free Press, June 25,1980:6A). 
In total, nine sites were compared. The site selection and review team consisted of 
representatives of the city of Detroit, Community and Economic Development Department 
(CEDD), and GM's Real Estate Division and Plant Engineering and Construction Division 
(City of Detroit Community & Economic Development Department, 1980). These nine sites 
were examined for their size, configuration, railroad access, freeway access, ready availability, 
and other related deficiencies. GM selected the Poletown site and sedd that it would build a 
massive auto assembly plant on 575 acres in Hamtramck and Detroit if city officials could 
have the site ready for construction by about July 1981 {The Detroit Free Press, July 1, 
1980). Here, Hamtramck was also identified as a potential possessor of the land. According 
to the Hamtramck mayor; 
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"Hamtramck was losing the ball game 10-0. This ties the score. Hamtramck will see a 
new day because of this," said Hamtramck Mayor Robert Kozaren. Robert Wack, 
vice-president of the industrial division of the Detroit Economic Development Corp., 
said no plan has been devised to acquire the property for GM. He said there is a 
possibility that state or '"sderal aid for the project might be available. "What this is, in 
effect, is official recognition of the project by both cities," he said. "It's a conceptual 
agreement to work together. But the game plan has yet to be articulated" {The 
Detroit Free Press, July 1, 1980:1OA). 
As Detroit was experiencing economic hardship, Hamtramck had the same problems. 
The proposed site, encompassing about 200 acres in Hamtramck, included Chrysler 
Corp.'s abandoned Dodge Main plant, and the rest of the site was in Poletown in Detroit. For 
making room for GM's plant project, "3,438 residents, 81 businesses, 33 existing industries or 
warehouses, a home for the aged, a home for the retarded, St. Joseph Mercy Hospital, and 16 
churches, including Immaculate Conception, one of the six historic churches of Poletown" 
(The Detroit News^ December 26, 1980:12A) would have to be removed. Therefore, two 
cities identified their residents in the proposed site as possessors of a valuable piece of land. 
In summary, GM and the city of Detroit/Hamtramck identified the possessor of the 
valued object. GM identified the city of Detroit and Hamtramck as potential possessors of 
land while both cities identified GM as the provider of potential economic rejuvenation. The 
city of Detroit identified the Poletown residents as possessors of the land. At this point, the 
Poletown residents had not identified a possessor of a desired object, because the 
neighborhood as a whole was not interested in entering into an exchange. It is noteworthy to 
mention that although the city did not own Poletown, GM identified the city as a mediator of 
the land acquisition from Poletown residents. Therefore, at this point, the flow of exchange 
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was established between GM and the city and another between the city and the Poletown 
residents. Also, what the Poletown residents wanted did not unify them. 
c. Offer an object in return for the desired object 
At the third stage, an actor has to offer an object which is desired from another person 
to receive his/her desired object. "The fact that the object has to be exchanged against 
another object illustrates that it is not only valuable for me, but also valuable independently of 
me; that is to say, for another person" (Simmel, 1991: 81). Value, according to Simmel, 
depends on the cost of a sacrifice by giving up an object which appears as a valuable object 
for the other party. Economic value is seen through exchange. No matter how the two 
objects A and B have become values, A becomes an economic value only because I have to 
exchange it for B, and B only because I can acquire A in exchange for it (Sinunel, 1991). 
According to Simmel; 
Within the economic sphere, this process develops in such a way that the content 
of the sacrifice or renunciation that is interposed between man and the object of his 
demand is, at the same time, the object of someone else's demand. The one has to 
give up the possession or enjoyment that the other wants in order to persuade the 
latter to give up what he owns and what the former wants (Simmel, 1991:77-78). 
Simmel believed that a value has to be offered in order to acquire a value. There is, therefore, 
a reciprocal determination of value by the object. This leads us to ask. 
Research question 3; Did each of the three parties have anything to oiTer which others 
valued? 
In the Poletown case, GM proposed a massive auto assembly plant straddling the 
Hamtramck-Detroit border, including the old Dodge Main site, on the condition that the city 
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come up with $126 million in grants to repay the federal loan and cover the demolition and 
work on railroads, highways and utilities {The Detroit News, August 21,1980). The editorial 
of The Detroit News described GM's offer as follows; 
One can imagine the reaction in Iowa, or, for that matter, in New York or California, 
if a big corporation announced a five-year investment of $10 billion there. The state 
would be awash in euphoria. Roger B. Smith, chairman-elect of General Motors, 
announce last week the company will spend that sum over five years in Michigan for 
the construction of new plants and the renovation of older ones {The Detroit News, 
October 19,1980; 14A). 
Certainly GM's new plant offered a lot of economical gain to the city of Detroit and 
Hamtramck. GM planed to spend about $500 million to build the plant {The Detroit News, 
March 17, 1981), and pay the cities $6.47 million for 359.5 acres of land and a $600,000 
deposit to insure the company will actually build the plant {The Detroit Free Press, April 15, 
1981). GM said it would offer jobs {The Detroit Free Press, September 5,1980) — expected 
to employ 6,000 people, 4,000 temporary construction jobs, over 20,000 jobs created by the 
multiplier effect of the plant (Bukowczyk, 1984). 
The city of Detroit and Hamtramck had joined forces in urging GM to locate a new 
Cadillac assembly plant on a 500-acre site that includes the abandoned Dodge Main assembly 
plant {The Detroit News, July 1, 1980). This Poletown site was the only area which met GM's 
requirement and the company wanted to have it. The GM plant project forced the relocation 
of about 150 businesses, 1,500 residents, several churches and St. Joseph Mercy Hospital. It 
also would close part of East Grand Boulevard and reroute Jos. Campau {The Detroit News, 
July 1, 1980). The city of Detroit was willing to make offers for the homes and the 
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institutions of the area {The Detroit Free Press, September 5, 1980). To provide the site for 
GM, the city planned to spend about $200 million to acquire the 4S6-acre site astride the 
Detroit-Hamtramck boundary, raze houses and other buildings, relocate about 3,500 residents 
and 150 businesses and prepare the site for new construction (The Detroit News, March 17, 
1981). This site was planned to be transferred to GM in seven phases between May 1, 1981 
and June 1,1982 (The Detroit Free Press, April 15, 1981). 
When the beginning of exchange 2 (Figure 10) was in process, exchange 1 had not 
even occurred. Exchange 2 started early summer of 1980 and exchange 1 began the end of 
October 1980. The city started sending out offers to the owners of homes and businesses in 
Poletown after the city councils of both cities decided on October 31,1980 that the plant was 
a public necessity (JJie Detroit News, November 4,1980). The residents in Poletown had 20 
days to respond before city attorneys filed a case in Wayne County Circuit Court to acquire 
title to all the parcels in the plant site. Russell Chambers, real estate administrator for the 
Community and Economic Development Department, said: 
. . .  h o m e  o w n e r s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  m o v i n g  e x p e n s e s  a n d  t h e  p r i c e  t h e y  r e c e i v e  f o r  t h e i r  
homes, can be eligible for up to $15,000 in additional aid when they purchase 
replacement housing. Renters in the area can be eligible for up to $4,000 in aid over 
and above moving expenses, he said. The rationale for that additional aid, he said, is 
that state law takes into account the fact that housing in site-clearance areas is often 
substandard. The extra aid is intended to make it possible for people living in 
substandard housing to move to better quarters (The Detroit Free Press, July 2, 
1980:3A). 
Residents were eligible to receive the relocation benefits (up to $15,000 for 
replacement housing of homeowners, up to $4,000 for replacement rental housing of tenants. 
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and up to $300 in moving expenses and a $200 dislocation allowance, for total of up to $500) 
under the Uniform Act. Besides the relocation benefits, the city also offered the additional 
benefits to home-owners and tenants — $1,000 bonus for relocating within 90 days after 
notification to vacate and $1,500 to homeowners if taxes in the new house exceeded that of 
the old dwelling (the $1,500 was a one-time amount) (United States General Accounting 
Office, 1989). At this point, the Poletown residents did not have consensus to offer their 
houses and land to the city of Detroit in return. This fact can be explained that some of the 
residents did not desire to exchange their neighborhood for something else. Secondly, it is 
important to note that the city's offer of relocation benefits was somewhat vague, and as such 
many residents did not find the offer compelling enough to consider relocating their homes. 
In summary, GM and the city of Detroit had something to offer which the other party 
valued. GM offered a new plant which would provide jobs to the city, and Detroit and 
Hamtramck offered a potential plant site to GM. The city offered relocation benefits to the 
residents, however, there was no offer from the residents to the city at this stage. It is 
noteworthy that although the city did not own Poletown land, it offered the land to GM. Also 
the Poletown residents had not reached the stage of offering their land and homes in return. 
d. Value comparison 
According to Simmel, the value that is attached to any object, person, relationship or 
happening demands recognition. For Simmel, two things can only be of equal value if each of 
them has a value of its own. For instance, two lines can be equally long only if each of them 
has a definite length. A line gains its length only in comparison to others. Other lines also 
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gain their length by comparison with some other lines. Simmel called this "objective value 
judgment." Like Simmel argued, Thibaut and Kelley's proposition that people make 
comparisons between their present outcomes and other possible alternatives presents the same 
idea (Deaux, Dane, Wrightsman and Sigelman, 1993). According to Simmel; 
. . .  l e n g t h  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  o n l y  b y  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  c o m p a r i s o n  a n d  i s  n o t  i n h e r e n t  i n  
the individual object on which length depends, because we have abstracted from 
particular relative lengths the general concept of length 
—which excludes the 
definiteness without which specific length does not exist. In projecting this 
concept onto objects we assume that things must have length before it can be 
determined individually by comparison. Moreover, definite standards have grown 
out of the innumerable comparisons of length, and they form the basis for 
determining the length of all tangible objects (Simmel, 1991:86). 
Simrnel applied this to economic value as follows: 
If we were to assume that there is only a single line in the whole world, it would 
not have any specific length since it lacks any relation to others. It is impossible to 
measure the world as a whole, because there is nothing outside the world in 
relation to which it could have a specific size. This is true of a line so long as it is 
considered without being compared with others, or without its own parts being 
compared with each other; it is neither short not long, but lines outside the whole 
category. This analogy makes clear the relativity of economic value rather than 
disproving it (Simmel, 1991:86). 
Therefore, objects have existing objective value by themselves. In an exchange, one compares 
the value of the desired object and that of the given object. This leads us to ask the next 
question. 
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Research question 4: Did each of the three parties compare the value of both objects? 
In the Poletown case, when GM compared the value of staying in Detroit and the 
value of moving out, the company had two crucial reasons to stay within Detroit : "GM wants 
to retain a trained work force and Mayor Coleman A. Young — under state law — could 
prevent the auto maker from getting a tax break anywhere else in Michigan" (The Detroit 
News, June 24, 1980:2A). The new plant was proposing 3,800 hourly workers which was 
about the same figure working at Fleetwood (2,000 workers) and in Clark Avenue's assembly 
operations (1,800 workers) {The Detroit Free Press, June 24, 1980). GM could transfer 
those employees from the two existing GM plants to the new plant. Because of the strong 
relationship between Detroit and GM, it was more convenient for GM to deal with Detroit 
than with other cities. 
Regarding Detroit, the city had alternatives; one was to let GM go somewhere else 
and the other was to accept GM's offer with its conditions. If the city let GM move out of the 
city, the corporation would have taken its money and jobs elsewhere (Bachelor, 1982a). The 
city, however, because of its economic situation and high rate of unemployment, could not 
afford to lose the jobs that GM offered (Bachelor, 1982a; Auertjach, 1986). GM's new 
assembly plant was needed to bolster the city's economy and provide jobs (The Detroit News, 
February 22,1981). According to the City Council President Erma Henderson: 
. . .  t h e  6 , 1 5 0  j o b s  t h a t  t h e  c i t y  e x p e c t s  t o  b e  s a v e d  b y  t h e  n e w  p l a n t  m a d e  t h e  p r o j e c t  
necessary. "We have to save an economic situation in their city," she said. "We have 
to guarantee people will have jobs in the future." She also said that the project could 
have positive effects on surrounding neighborhoods, and that she thinks "it's a 
beginning of a renaissance for the east side" (The Detroit Free Press, November 1, 
1980;3A). 
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Keeping GM's new plant in Detroit meant millions of dollars of real estate and income tax 
revenues to the city and possibly the state (Auerfoach, 1986). On the other hand, the loss of 
the GM plant meant not only the loss of jobs but also to be a possible end to the hope that the 
city could ever recover as a vita! center of automobile industry and employment (Fasenfest, 
1986). Therefore, Detroit offered the Poletown site with a 50 percent, twelve-year tax 
abatement. 
The city also compared the value of Poletown with the value of GM's offer. For 
Detroit, the value of having GM's new plant in the city was extremely valuable as previously 
mentioned. For the city the interests of those living in the Poletown area were insignificant 
compared with the economic forces propelling the city into the deal. For instance the director 
of Economic Development Department saw the area in the following way: 
"You've got to look at the area's history," Moten said. "I mean, you can't put a 
value on any neighborhood, but when you take into account the vacant lots, the 
abandoned houses, out of the whole area, the viability of what is out there is only 
about 200 acres" {The Detroit Free Press, October 6, 1980: 21A). 
According to the city's study, Poletown was facing many problems. Employment 
opportunities had continued to decline. The population continued to age, and crime remained 
an ever present problem. Many of the residents who were on fixed income suffered from 
inflation. Availability of both public and private services to the residents continued to decline. 
The number of vacant lots, abandoned and dilapidated housed continued to grow. Regarding 
the demographics, there were 3,438 persons, 899 families (480 Blacks, 407 Whites, 11 
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Orientals, and 1 American Indian) and 463 individuals (206 Blacks, 250 Whites, 5 Orientals, 
and 2 American Indians) in the area. About 34 percent of the population were individual 
residents and another 44 percent were represented by a family size of two to three persons. 
Of the total population, 39 percent were homeowners and 61 percent were tenants. The 
tenancy rate was higher for blacks (75%) than for the white population (47%) compared to 
home ownership. In terms of the income, 72 percent of the population made less than 
$10,000 a year (City of Detroit Community & Economic Development Department, 1980). 
Corinne Gilb, Detroit's planning director put the case even more strongly; 
"One after another, industries have been leaving this city," she said. "We have 
more than 130,000 unemployed. If we didn't move to keep General Motors in 
Detroit, we would have lost the anchor and magnet for all our major job providers. 
It would have been the height or irresponsibility to cater to a tiny handful of people 
when you realize what is at stake: the lifeblood of the city" (Gaines, 1981:20A). 
Although the city of Detroit cared about existing industries in the city, businesses in Poletown 
were ignored. For instance, as early as December 1981,49 out of 162 businesses in Poletown 
had discontinued operations (Bachelor, 1985). According to the Mayor Young, when he 
made a determination to take down houses, "it was not as if it was a neighborhood where 
people live cheek to jowl" (Alderman and Kennedy, 1991: 195). Mayor Young viewed the 
GM plant as a community project of grand and urgent proportions (Young and Wheeler, 
1994). Therefore, for the city, Poletown was a declining neighborhood where there was no 
'use value' but 'exchange value' as DomhofF(1986) pointed out. 
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Some of the Poletown residents valued the relocation benefits more highly than others. 
A major reason was that they saw themselves as able to relocate to better area or buildings 
and upgrade themselves {The Detroit News, July 1,1980). According to the city's study: 
Some residents have been hoping to move from the area and welcome this 
opportunity to get economic assistance and (in the case of homeowners) to avoid 
abandoning their houses. (One resident said, "I am really not proud to be living 
here; I want to live in a better area." Another said, "The [proposed] project is a 
blessing. Never agdn will homeowners get an opportunity like this to relocate 
fi'om this deteriorating area." A third viewed relocation as no more than 
inconvenience: "There will be some inconvenience to some people, but life is full 
of inconveniences and people have to adjust." Some of the much-maligned renters 
eagerly look forward to receiving relocation grants; others simply want an 
opportunity to get out of what they perceive to be a high-crime area and into a 
relatively safe neighborhood (City of Detroit Community & Economic 
Development Department, 1980: V-57). 
For the residents who longed to move out to a better area but did not have the money, this 
offer sounded like a great deal. According to the mayor, "To homeowners, many of whose 
houses were so deteriorated that they were worth only $2,500 to $5,000, we offered market 
value and moving expenses plus $15,000" (Young and Wheeler, 1994: 243). Most people 
valued the progress through GM's new plant higher than no plant building in the city although 
giving up their neighborhood was a different issue. 
On the other hand, some people did not want to move out since they knew a design 
change of the plant would save their neighborhood. According to The Detroit News, (July 1, 
1980: 4A), "If a capsule survey holds true, project promoters can count on support from 
businessmen — even those 150 firms facing relocation — but the promoters can expect 
resentment, even hostility, from the 1,500 families who may face an unwanted move." Some 
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people who had lived in the area a long time valued the area more than anything. The 
proposed GM plant would lie in the heart of an area called Poletown which was the cradle of 
Polish culture in the Detroit area {The Detroit News, July 22,1980). Many of the ori^nal 
Poles settled here before there was even a Hamtramck (The Detroit News, July 22,1980). 
The PNC fought to save their ethnic, cultural and historic preservation from destruction. It 
was hard for people who had lived in the area for so many years to move; 
"Where will I go in my old age?" That's a question 92-year-old Josephine Krajewski 
worries about a lot lately. She might lose her home and her beloved church to make 
way for a proposed plant to build Cadillacs. That's not a small matter for Mrs. 
Krajewski, a native of Poland. She joined Detroit's Immaculate Conception Roman 
Catholic Church more than 57 years ago and has faithfully attended mass and 
devotions at the congregation, four blocks from her home. Her three children were 
baptized there and they attended Immaculate Conception to receive first communion 
and the sacrament of confirmation. Her husband was buried from the church in 1934 
Razing such memories is difficult for Mrs. Krajewski. Leaving them behind is worse. 
"It's a tragedy," she said. "I don't know where I will go. The pastor doesn't know 
where I will go" {The Detroit News, July 7, 1980:3A). 
According to a city survey, most of the 1,000 homes in the project area were small frame 
homes which were built between 1900 and 1919. Many were deteriorating faster than their 
owners could fix them, but a significant number was lovingly cared for by senior citizens who 
grew up in the neighborhood and did not care to move {The Detroit Free Press, October 6, 
1980). Although the majority of Poletown residents were low-income and elderly, the area 
continued to exhibit a resiliency, reflected by a strong, sometimes fierce, attachment to it by 
some residents (City of Detroit Community & Economic Development Department, 1980). 
The Detroit Free Press described some of these people in the quote below; 
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Karen Appolonio, 34, said she does not want to live in any home other than the one on 
Nfitchell, where she and her father have spent most of their lives. "The city is too 
eager for this," she said. "I hope we win it. I want to stay. I love the old 
neighborhood." Don Giannini, 48, said he, too, has spent his life in the same 
neighborhood, going to the same church and knowing the same streets and homes 
(JTte Detroit Free Press, September 29,1980: lOA). 
Some people felt helpless since they wanted to support progress, but did not know what they 
could do for their homes. According to one of the residents; 
Miss Londeck, 77, moved to Detroit from Pennsylvania in 1928. She still lives in the 
same home—a neat, white frame house on East Grand Boulevard — with her 
brothers, 76 and 79. She's proud of her modem kitchen, finished basement and attic 
and polished hardwood trim. And while she doesn't want to stand in the way of 
progress. Miss Londeck feels helpless. She sat on her front porch and discussed her 
prospects: "We have a big home — four bedrooms upstairs. We'll never get one like 
this again. Where do you go when you're up in age? What do you do? Start all over 
again?" {The Detroit News, July 7, 1980:3A). 
Some residents thought GM's plant could be built without destroying their neighborhood. 
One such resident expressed herself as follows: 
One 77-year-old woman sat flimbling with a handkerchief while awaiting the start of 
yesterday's hearing. She said she has owned a home on East Grand Boulevard for 60 
years, in the center of the proposed 465-acre plant site. "The church we belong to, the 
bingo, my friends, everything we know is in that neighborhood," she said. "I own that 
home free and clear, and they come along and tell you you've got to get out. I'm here 
to fight." Her friend, a 78-year-old widow, put a comforting arm around her. "It's 
nothing against General Motors," she said. "I'm all for progress, but there has to be 
another way around this. It's hard on the elderly people" {The Detroit News, March 4, 
1981:6A). 
Regarding the size of the plant site, one resident expressed his concern in the following words: 
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We are all in favor of building the plant, but not on top of 16 churches, 1,500 homes, 
143 businesses, schools and a hospital. Building multi-deck parking garages rather 
than parking lots is one of several alternatives that would resolve the issue. We could 
save jobs and the neighborhood {The Detroit News, March 5,1981:18A). 
The Gray Panthers' leader Maggie Kuhn, who was also a national advocate of rights 
for the elderly, came to Poletown's support. She said that it is possible to build GM's plant 
without wiping out the neighborhood. According to her, "designs by experts show that 
construction alternatives exist which would make massive clearance of Poletown property and 
relocation of its people unnecessary" (The Detroit News, March 9, 1981:2B). 
Relocation benefits for residents included up to $15,000 per homeowner and $4,000 
per tenant to enable them to move. Residents could also receive a $1,000 bonus per dwelling 
unit for moving up to 90 days after receiving an official Notice of Displacement {The Detroit 
Free Press, October 6, 1980). According to a questionnaire which was distributed to 1,500 
of the area residents, 31 percent of 550 respondent said they would prefer to stay where they 
are, but 72 percent said they would move if the city pays them enough money for their homes" 
{The Detroit Free Press, October 6, 1980). However, some people thought the relocation 
money was insufficient since they valued their properties more than the city offered. One of 
the residents in the area said; 
"Where will they go?" Mrs. Dockery asked. "What can they buy with the money they 
get? It won't be a fi-action of what they have here." Her home has 11 rooms. Her 
mother's has nine. "They get $14,000 to $21,000 for their homes, $1,000 bonus for 
leaving in 90 days and up to $15,000 adjustment allowance," she said. "Sounds good, 
doesn't it, $30,000? Well, it isn't as good as it seems. You can't buy a 10-room. That 
difference, $10,000 is the most they'll get as an adjustment allowance {The Detroit 
News, February 17,1981:2B). 
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Another resident named Kaczynski said the city offered him $11,500 for his home, however, 
with that money he did not think it would buy an equivalent house. Olechowski said a door-
to-door survey showed at least 300 families who would be displaced by the plant have this 
attitude {The Detroit News, March 14,1981). City officials refused to discuss the offers, but 
many residents said they were dissatisfied. Some took their complaint to the development 
department offices {The Detroit Free Press, November 9,1980). The residents wanted full 
replacement value for their homes and subsidies for renters. 
As for the businesses in the area, they received no relocation benefits, only whatever 
the city chose to pay them for their property (The Detroit Free Press, October 6, 1980). Like 
the homeowners, some of them received a fair deal while some of them did not. For instance, 
Edward Nedbala, who owned a small market in the area and was the state's biggest seller of 
lottery tickets, called the $34,000 offer he received for his business a 'joke.' According to 
Nedbala, he originally paid $50,000 for the Chane Trombly Market and $10,000 for another 
building next door (The Detroit Free Press, November 9, 1980). 
In summary, each party compared the value of both objects. GM valued the existing 
experienced work force in Detroit and the attractive tax breaks offered by the city of Detroit. 
The city valued the possibility of bolstering the city's economy and providing jobs from GM's 
new plant. Some residents received a fair deal from the city and therefore did not mind 
moving out, while others valued their homes and neighborhood more and refused to move. 
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e Acceptance of the offer 
According to Simmel, after an actor compares the value of the desired object with that 
of the given object, he/she has to get an acceptance of any offer by another person. 
Exchange, according to Simmel, is the causally connected double event in which one subject 
now possesses something he did not have before and has given away something he did possess 
before. Exchange would materialize since the empty place of what we gave away is filled by 
an object of higher value. In Simmel's theory; 
. . .  e x c h a n g e  b r i n g s  a b o u t  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  a b s o l u t e  n u m b e r  o f  v a l u e s  
experienced. Since everybody offers for exchange only what is relatively useless to 
him, and accepts in exchange what is relatively necessary, exchange effects a 
continuously growing utilization of the values wrested fi'om nature of any given 
time (Simmel, 1991:292). 
Every exchange becomes equally advantageous to both parties since one party receives the 
needed object while the other receives something that anyone in general desires, leading us to 
ask; 
Research question 5; Did each of the three parties obtain an acceptance of the ofTer by 
the other party? 
In the Poletown case, GM accepted the Poletown site among other options. GM 
signed an offer to buy a site for its new Cadillac assembly plant along the Detroit-Hamtramck 
border, and agreed to pay $6.8 million for the site and pegged the deal to a $120-million tax 
break over 12 years {The Detroit News^ October 11, 1980). On the same day, GM chairman 
Thomas A. Murphy signed the commitment letter to formalize negotiations with cities. 
According to the commitment letter, GM planned to purchase 335 acres, at $18,000 an acre, 
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from Detroit for a total of $6,830,000. An additional 52 acres would be set aside for Conrail 
to build an extensive rail yard {The Detroit News, October 11, 1980). On May 1,1981, GM 
purchased the first 75 acres of the project site from Detroit and Hamtramck for $1.35 million 
(The Detroit Free Press, May 2,1981). 
Preceding the site offer to GM, the Detroit City Council approved a plan to prepare a 
465-acre site for a Cadillac assembly plant in Detroit and Hamtramck {The Detroit Fee Press, 
November 1, 1980), and Wayne County Circuit judge gave the city full title to all 1,674 
parcels {The Detroit Free Press, April 8, 1981). Also, a 12-year, 50-percent tax break for the 
proposed General Motors Cadillac assembly plant was granted by the Detroit City Council 
(The Detroit News, April 16,1981). On May 1, 1981, the city of Detroit and Hamtramck 
accepted a $600,000 deposit, in addition to the money for the land from GM (The Detroit 
Free Press, May 2,1981). Also Detroit, Hamtramck and GM officials all signed a 
development agreement explaining each party's responsibilities for completing the project 
(The Detroit Free Press, May 2, 1981). 
The city accepted GM's offer and the process of exchange proceeded without GM's 
binding commitment to build a plant (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981; Fasenfest, 1989). 
According to Mayor Young, "in terms of GM's commitment to the city, we had nothing more 
than Murphy's word" (Young and Wheeler, 1994). He had no written guarantees from GM 
even after residents were being moved out and the site was being prepared (The Detroit News, 
May 31,1981). This fact is unusual because economic exchanges usually require a deed. 
Also according to Simmel, economic exchange has a guaranteed future return, however, from 
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GM's new plant there would be no direct revenue to the city of Detroit between IS and 20 
years {The Detroit News, May 17,1981). 
Those people favorable to moving typically fell into two categories: renters, and 
people who had previously wanted to leave the area but did not have enough money. ^  
Regarding the residents of the area, by November 14, 1980, the city's Community and 
Economic Development Department had received 400 acceptances to property offers. With 
the 200 parcels the city already owned, it had a third of the land needed to complete the 
project (The Detroit Free Press,^o\Gttiotr \6, 1980). By December 9, 1980, Detroit 
previously owned 200 of the 1,600 parcels in the project area and had tentative acceptance 
from an additional 802 owners since purchase offers were sent out (The Detroit News, 
December 9,1980). By January 6, 1981, the city officials said the majority of some 1,300 
families in the area had accepted offers to buy their homes (The Detroit News, January 6, 
1981). By mid February, Moten said the city already had negotiated purchase agreements on 
1,000 of the 1,400 Poletown homes that would have to be razed to make way for the GM 
plant. Half of the remaining homes were already owned by the city, leaving less than 200 
holdouts (The Detroit News, February 12,1981). By mid March, the city of Detroit had 
acquired all but 190 of 1,674 parcels of property on the site (The Detroit Free Press, March 
14, 1981). The city controlled about 90 percent of the land by this time, and 1,028 sellers 
already had received their sale price, which had averaged $13,000 per parcel, although some 
were awaiting relocation money (The Detroit News, March 15,1981). As of May 31,1981, 
^ Telephone interview with an informant who was involved in the Poletown event. 
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of the 647 individuals and 1,031 families (a total of3,438 residents) in the project area, 633 
households had moved and received relocation claim from the city {The Detroit Free Press, 
June 29,1981). By October 6,1981, of 1,733 residential dwellings in the project area, only 
56 occupied units remain {The Detroit Free Press, October 6,1981) and by November 22, 
1981, more than 50 buildings and two dozen people remsdned {The Detroit Free Press, 
November 22,1981). 
Time was on the city's side since, except for small numbers of opposed residents, 
more and more residents were moving out (Bachelor, 1982a). One noteworthy point to be 
mentioned here is the contextual change throughout the exchange process. All of the 
residents did not accept the offer at the same time, and the number of the accepting residents 
grew over time. For instance, immediately after the announcement, the project promoters 
expected resentment, even hostility, from the 1,500 families who faced an unwanted move 
{The Detroit News, July 1,1980). Still at the point of August 5,1980, people were hostile, 
uncertain and afraid. About three months after the announcement, most of the Poletown 
residents were frustrated, angry and upset, and nobody wanted their home torn down {The 
Detroit Free Press, September 29, 1980). There were several events which made residents 
opposing the project changed their minds. There were generous relocation benefits, the 
physical difficulties of life in the area (e.g., crime, increased levels of arson and vandalism as 
people moved out), the demolition of the church, the loss of the state supreme court and 
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federal court cases—all of these contributed to a lowering of morale among opponents and a 
sense of the inevitability of the project/ 
The generosity toward residents was designed to avoid neighborhood-based 
opposition to the project and actually the lucrative property settlements and relocation 
benefits appealed to many people (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). By October 1980, the arson 
rate in the area had doubled since the project was announced. One of the Poletown residents, 
Donald Ludwig said there were two factors which contributed to the dramatic change in his 
attitude toward relocation; 
One was crime. After the city announced it would clear the plant site, the Ludwig 
noticed a marked increase in fires and vandalism. Mary Ludwig said she kept a 
rifle and a .38-caliber pistol loaded at all times. 
Then the city notified the Ludwig last fall that they would receive $16,250 for their 
67-year-old house, a $15,000 relocation allowance, a $1,500 property tax 
adjustment and a $1,000 moving bonus. 
Said Donald Ludwig: "I opposed the project until I looked at it rationally and saw 
the cancer coming into the neighborhood once the project was announced" {The 
Detroit Free Press, i\m& 29,1981: llA). 
As the days went by, an increasing number of Poletown houses was being vandalized. Some 
residents gave up the idea of living in the area. (Wylie, 1989). The demolition of the church 
took the heart out of the Poletown resistance since the church was not only a cornerstone of 
the Polish community but also its pride and joy (Wylie, 1989; City of Detroit Community & 
Economic Development Department, 1980). When the court ruled the government was in the 
right, a lot of people lost hope and gave up (Wylie, 1989). 
* Information was obtained from the telephone interview and a questionnaire with people who involved the 
Poletown event. 
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In summaiy, each of the three parties obtained an acceptance of the offer by the other 
person. GM accepted the Poletown site and the city of Detroit accepted the GM plant along 
with the tax abatement agreement. Most of the Poletown residents accepted moving out after 
some struggles, while a small number of residents resisted up to the end. 
f. Recognition of higher value 
By being exchanged, according to Simmel, objects offered are thought less valuable 
than objects obtained. By ofTering an object which is valuable to the other party, one has to 
experience the pain of parting with it (Figure 9). It is worthy of note that the isolated 
individual who sacrifices something in order to produce certain products acts in exactly the 
same way as the subject who exchanges. According to Simmel, nobody wants to work for 
starvation wages if he/she was not in a situation in which he/she preferred such wages to not 
working at all. Therefore, it is clear that at the moment of exchange, of offering the sacrifice, 
the value of the object received sets a limit up to which the value of the object offered in 
exchange can rise. Exchange occurs not because one exchanges an object with the same 
value, but because of obtaining an object perceived to have much higher value. According to 
Simmel, the relationship between values and objects are as follows: 
But this real relationship between values, which is executed and supported by 
exchange, evidently has its purpose in eventual subjective enjoyment, that is, in the 
fact that we receive a greater quantity and intensity of values than would be 
possible without exchange transactions (Simmel, 1991 ;78). 
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Simmel believed that exchange increases the sum total of value. Regarding the exchange of 
the value, the object of exchange increases the sum of value and each party offers to the other 
more than he/she possessed before. This leads us to ask: 
Research question 6: Did each of the three parties recognize the higher value of the 
offered object over that of the value of the possessed object? 
In the Poletown case, the Poletown site was valuable to GM since it provided enough 
land for the new plant and because it was close to the two other plants in the city. An 
editorial in The Detroit News stated that GM preferred building close to the old plant, to ease 
the movement from old to new, and to retain experienced employees because their work 
quality is better (JJie Detroit News, August 17, 1980). GM also had an established network 
of suppliers and an experienced work force "which you just can't put a price on" {The Detroit 
News, September 2, 1980; 3A). The editorial of The Detroit News reasoned GM's stay in 
Detroit as follows: 
. . .  o f  c o u r s e ,  G M  h a s  m a n y  p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n s  f o r  p r e f e r r i n g  M i c h i g a n .  T h e  c o m p a n y  
recognizes that this state, above all others, has the kind of workforce the company 
needs. Michiganians understand metal fabricating and production. There is no 
substitute — anywhere—for their experience and expertise {The Detroit News, 
October 19, 1980:14A). 
Besides these values, GM could get tax abatement from the city. Therefore for GM, building 
a new plant in the city had higher value over moving out. 
Regarding the city of Detroit, the mayor as well as Detroit City Council members 
thought that the public benefit of the project was that it could keep jobs in the city that would 
otherwise be lost if GM built its plant elsewhere {The Detroit News, November 4, 1980). 
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According to an editorial, "As much as it hurts to see the old destroyed—to see churches 
and businesses sold and torn down, to see a neighborhood uprooted — the project is a major 
success story at a time when the city is fighting desperately to keep fi'om losing jobs" {The 
Detroit Free Press, March 17, 1981;6A). Governor Milliken thought it was essential that 
GM's plant stay in Detroit because of Michigan's economic problems and smd that he will try 
to reconcile the desperate need for jobs with the desires of people who have lived in the 
community for years {The Detroit News, March 4,1981). Therefore, keeping GM's new plant 
in the city had a higher value than letting the plant go somewhere else even though the city 
had to demolish Poletown. 
Some of the residents in the area were happy to have the opportunity to move out 
since they thought the neighborhood was declining. The surveys conducted by the University 
of Michigan and Neighborhood Service Organization showed that most residents — over 80 
percent of the residents in both surveys — said their new residences and neighborhoods were 
better and safer. While over 60 percent of the residents cited crime and boarded-up or 
abandoned structures as problems in the Poletown, less than 10 percent cited such problems in 
their new neighborhoods (United States General Accounting Office, 1989). Therefore, the 
Poletown residents recognized the higher value in their new neighborhood. 
In summary, each of the three parties recognized the higher value of the offered object 
over that of the value of the possessed object. GM valued the Poletown site over other 
options because it was convenient for the company in terms of its location, available 
experienced working force and tax deal from the city. Detroit valued keeping the GM plant 
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more than letting it go somewhere else, since the plant could bring jobs which the city 
desperately needed. The city valued the Poletown site higher than other potential sites since it 
could keep GM from locating its new plant somewhere else. Some of the Poletown residents 
valued their new residences and neighborhood higher since they did not face many problems 
they identified in their old neighborhood. The residents who opposed to move out valued 
their neighborhood more than anything else. 
g. Satisfaction 
Figure 11 shows that after the exchange, each person values the obtained object higher 
than the object to give away. According to Simmel, by offering an object which is valuable to 
the other party, one has to suffer to part with it. However, once exchange is established, the 
received object becomes much more valuable than the object one parted with. For Simmel, 
"the final situation shows a surplus of satisfaction as compared with the situation before the 
action" (Simmel, 1991:84). This satisfaction is in proportion to sacrifice: if one sacrificed 
Object exchanged Object Person erson 
Value of object B>value of 
object A for person A 
Value of object A>value of 
object B for person B 
Figure 11. Value transfer in exchange 
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more in obtaining the desired object, one's satisfaction is higher. Therefore, for Simmel, an 
exchange is not merely trading objects but recognizing higher value after the exchange. 
Simmer s views lead us to ask: 
Research question 7; Did each of the three parties experience satisfaction for the 
exchange? 
In the Poletown case, GM and the city of Detroit and many of the residents in 
Poletown, except the members of PNC, were satisfied with the exchange. After the site was 
sold to GM on May 1, 1981, GM expressed its satisfaction in the following words: 
GM Board Chairman Roger B. Smith, also pleased that the two cities could deliver the 
initial land parcel at the promised May 1 deadline, lauded Young and Kozaren for 
withstanding severe criticism for some quarters about the project. "You have had to 
take a lot of flak to help us," Smith said, during a press conference held at GM 
headquarters in Detroit. "But you stuck for what was right and what was best for the 
city—in spite of pressures generated by perennial out-of-town critics of General 
Motors" (The Detroit News, May 2,1981:1 A). 
After he accepted checks from GM totaling $1.35 million in exchange for the Dodge 
Main property. Mayor Young stated "I have no doubt this will go down in modem history as 
one of most significant projects in urban history" {The Detroit News, May 2,1981:1 A), and 
called the plant as the most important redevelopment project in his seven-year tenure {The 
Detroit Free Press, May 2, 1981). Mayor Young stated that was a day of triumph for the 
whole city {The Detroit Free Press, May 2,1981). As Simmel said, by offering an object, one 
has to suffer to part with it. Both GM and the city of Detroit, especially the mayor, had to go 
through much hardship to obtain the GM plant. The mayor said, GM could go to 10 other 
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places for less money and less headaches but the company had chosen to stay in the city which 
shows GM's sacrifice as well {The Detroit Free Press, May 2,1981). 
Regarding the residents of the area, many of them — younger and middle aged people 
(The Detroit Free Press, June 29,1981) — said the effect of the move was positive and, over 
80 percent of the residents in the surveys were satisfied with the notification of move (United 
States General Accounting Office, 1989). In his autobiography, Coleman Young stated that: 
An overwhelming majority, eighty-four percent, reported that they were satisfied 
with their new accommodations, and the percentage was even higher among senior 
citizens, the group that had elicited the most sympathy. Furthermore, the poll 
showed that most of the residents felt they had benefited fi'om the move and had 
been treated fairly by the city. Only eight percent believed that they had not 
received adequate compensation for their homes (Young and Wheeler, 1994; 249). 
In summary, each of the three parties experienced satisfaction for the exchange. GM 
and the city of Detroit, and many of the residents in the area were satisfied with the exchange 
while a small number of the residents were dissatisfied about the relocation. 
5. Principle of exchange 
There are basic principles of exchange in Simmel's exchange theory which are helpful 
in analyzing the Poletown case, specifically the attraction, value, and power principles. 
Research questions eight to ten will examine Simmel's principles of exchange. These 
principles occur in the process of exchange with diflFerent degrees. Attraction and value 
principles were referred to broadly in the previous section. In this section those will be 
examined more in detail. 
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a. Attraction 
The attraction principle states that an exchange occurs when an actor values another's 
resources, or as Simmel put it: 
For in the first place, it is always personal energy, the surrender of personal 
substance, that is involved in interaction; and conversely, exchange is not 
conducted for the sake of the object that the other person possesses, but to gratify 
one's personal feelings which he does not possess (Simmel, 1991:82). 
For Simmel, desires are the source of all human activity and the satisfaction of needs in which 
they culminate. On the other hand, the economic system is based on an abstraction, on the 
mutuality of exchange, the balance between sacrifice and gain. In the real process of its 
development It is inseparably merged with its bases and result, desire and need (Simmel, 
1991), for Simmel argued that: 
Desire by itself cannot bring about value unless it encounters obstacles; if every 
desire could be satisfied completely without a struggle, the economic exchange of 
values would never have developed, and the desire itself would never have reached 
a high level (Simmel, 1991:89). 
Therefore, desire itself does not require value. If desire requires obstacles, and desire 
increases because of them, it brings value, as Simmel elaborated: 
Objects are not difficult to acquire because they are valuable, but we call those 
objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them. Since the desire encounters 
resistance and fhistration, the objects gain a significance that would never have 
been attributed to them by an unchecked will (Simmel, 1991:67). 
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The significance of the object for the individual is always determined by the desire for 
it, and its utility depends upon the qualities that it has. If we already possess the object, then 
its significance is not affected at all by whether there exist many or few or no other specimens 
of its kind. If one does not yet possess the object, the desire to own it has to be expressed 
before one can enter the exchange. Unless one expresses desire, one will not exert any 
influence upon the demand of the present owner and he/she will ask a price in accordance with 
his/her own or the average interest in the object (Simmel, 1991). Turner summarized 
Simmel's ideas about desire as an "attraction principle," saying that "the more actors perceive 
as valuable one another's respective resources, the more likely is an exchange relationship to 
develop among these actors" (Turner, 1991b;301). This leads us to ask the next question. 
Research question 8: Was each of the three parties attracted by another^s resources? 
In the Poletown case, by building the plant as a public-private venture, GM was 
relying on the city to use its authority to condemn and acquire private property under the 
governmental concept of eminent domain {The Detroit News, September 2,1980). Without 
Detroit's help, a GM spokesman smd, an acquisition of the needed land was almost impossible 
(TJie Detroit News, September 2,1980). Besides that, the city could make a financial package 
offer to GM on a site. For instance, the director of the Economic Development Department 
said that package might include a wide range of incentives, including tax abatements, federal 
Urban Development Action Grants and loans or grants fi-om the U.S. Economic Development 
Adniinistration {The Detroit Free Press, June 25, 1980). GM knew that there were financial 
incentives for the plant since cities and states offer a range of incentives to keep jobs, 
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including tax abatements, government bonds, and donating land for sites {The Detroit News, 
September 2,1980). Regarding the tax abatement, if the proposed tax abatement was 
approved it would save GM $5.4 million a year for up to 12 years on its city, school and 
county property tax bill, and GM would save $2.3 million a year in city property taxes alone 
{The Detroit Free Press, April 2, 1981). For instance, GM's vice president said that GM's 
position was that tax abatement makes it more economically attractive to stay in Detroit, 
however, without a tax abatement, it is not as economically attractive {Detroit News, April 2, 
1981). For corporate officials, the major influences on locational decisions include land 
availability and cost, access to markets, and availability of skilled workers (Mandell, 1975; 
Schmenner, 1980; Bachelor, 1982a). 
The city of Detroit perceived the project as an opportunity for the city to retain jobs 
and tax revenues (Bachelor, 1982a). For Detroit, to provide the plant site for GM was a big 
challenge because other aging industrial cities in the Midwest and Northeast were watching to 
see if Detroit could pull off the project as a major new effort to combat the escalating 
unemployment, decrease in population and exodus of industry afflicting such cities {The 
Detroit News, December 2, 1980). The attraction of keeping GM plant in the city of Detroit 
was outlined in The Detroit News: 
The primary benefits Detroit will gain from keeping the Cadillac plant in the city 
are economic —jobs and tax base. Construction of the plant would provide about 
4,000 temporary jobs but, more important, says Moten, are the 25,000 jobs in 
supplier firms that would stay in Detroit if Cadillac does. "We're not trying to fool 
anyone that this (new plant) represents more jobs," Moten explwns. "But if all 
those people stay employed, they're not on public assistance, the city continues to 
collects taxes and the whole local economy enjoys a ripple effect. "Property taxes 
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will go up, too, even if there's (partial tax) abatement, because the new plant will 
be on the tax rolls" (The Detroit News, September 2,1980:3A). 
GM was not only offering the new plant which would bring jobs, but it was also 
planning to continue other operations at Clark Avenue including fabrication, engine building, 
casting, purchasing, engineering, sales and general administration {The Detroit Free Press, 
June 24,1980). The new plant was assumed to employ up to 6,000 at peak production. 
According to Mayor Young, "Murphy had told me that the plant could create as many as six 
thousand jobs. He had said the magic word" (Young and Wheeler, 1994:244). Besides the 
jobs, tax revenue was another attraction for the city. The new Cadillac plant was estimated to 
cost half a billion dollar. Adding such an expensive complex to the tax rolls would 
immediately increase city and school revenues (The Detroit News, August 17,1980). 
For the city, a major attraction of choosing Poletown site was that the site contuned 
significant number of vacant parcels including a large vacant Dodge Main factory (Bachelor, 
1981; City of Detroit Community & Economic Development Department, 1980). At the same 
time the city could maintain an industrial site at Dodge Main —144 acres could be purchased 
from Chrysler for a dollar and nobody had to be relocated (Young and Wheeler, 1994). 
Regarding the residents in Poletown, the relocation benefits from the city were 
attractive for some of them. For instance: 
A 20-man relocation staflF will help residents find new homes, with a minimum of 
two referrals to homes inspected by the city. Residents may find their own 
housing, but it must be inspected and approved before city will pay relocation 
benefits. The city will pay as much as $15,000 over its purchase offer toward a 
new home. Renters are entitled to as much as $4,000 for four years or they can 
receive up to $4,000 toward a new home. Businessmen may receive the cost of 
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their property, including immovable fixtures, plus all actual moving and relocation 
costs or a fixed relocation payment equal to average net income up to $10,000. In 
addition, the city will move residents, or give $500 toward moving expenses. The 
final moving deadline is mid-to-late March {The Detroit News, September 2, 
1980:3A). 
According to the mayor, those residents were receiving fair compensation a far cry from urban 
projects of the past which leveled neighborhoods without regard to public input {The Detroit 
News, February 1,1981). Mayor Young felt that these generous sums for their homes would 
enable them to improve their standard of living (Alderman and Kennedy, 1991). Owners who 
accepted the city's offer received their money in six to eight weeks. On top of that, residents 
could receive a $1,000 bonus per dwelling unit for moving up to 90 days after receiving an 
official Notice of Displacement {The Detroit Free Press, October 1, 1980), and also if the 
taxes on the new home were higher than what was paid on the Poletown property, an 
additional bonus of $1,500 would be awarded {The Detroit News, March 23,1981). The 
following advertisement appeared in The Detroit News (March 4, 1981: IB). 
GM RELOCATION RESIDENTS 
Are You 
A Tenant or Homeowner? 
With Credit Problems? 
Employed or Unemployed? 
Low Income? 
Frustrated From Looking for your 
Next Home? 
Detroit Home Buyers Council offers 
9'/2% Financing Specially for You 
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This advertisement caught the eye of Mrs. Williams who was a working mother of two small 
children living in an apartment in Poletown. According to her: 
"I just called and told them what I wanted," she said. "The real estate man showed 
me a bunch of houses. All of them, even the ones that weren't fixed up yet, were 
really nice and in nice neighborhoods." Within a month, she found a house she can 
afford and she will move in next week. "It's a $28,000 colonial house and I got it 
for only $4,000 dovm—that's what I got in relocation funds from the city," she 
said. "And at 9'/2 percent interest, I pay only $300 a month for the whole house 
(twice what she paid for her three-bedroom Poletown flat) — that's probably what 
I would have had to pay for nice apartment somewhere" {The Detroit News, 
March 4, 1981: 1B&3B). 
Like this Mr. Williams, hundreds of Poletown residents who needed homes could not qualify 
for conventional bank loans or afford mortgage rates. The city wanted someone to help these 
people find new homes {The Detroit News, March 4, 1981). 
In summary, each of the three parties was attracted by another's resources. GM was 
attracted by the city's authority to use the power of eminent domain, and the financial package 
provided by the city. The city of Detroit was attracted by GM's plant which offered jobs and 
tax revenue. The city was also attracted by Poletovm site since it contained significant 
number of vacant parcels. For some of the residents in Poletov^, the generous relocation 
benefits were attractive. 
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h. Value 
i. Need 
According to Simmel, value is the correlate of demand. Simmel believed that in an 
exchange, high demand and scarcity make a desired object more valuable. This is expressed in 
the following formula; value = utility (demand) + scarcity (supply). In Simmel's theory: 
Only the repulsions that we experience, the difficulties of attaining an object, the 
waiting and the labour that stand between a wish and its fulfillment, drive the Ego 
and the object apart; otherwise they remain undeveloped and undifferentiated in 
the propinquity of need and satisfaction. Whether the effective definition of the 
object arises from its scarcity, in relation to demand, or from the positive effort to 
acquire it, there is no doubt that only in this way is distance established between 
the object and ourselves which enables us to accord it a value beyond that of being 
merely enjoyed (Simmel, 1991:71-72). 
Therefore, the value of an object depends upon the demand for it. It is noteworthy that since 
value is expressed only through exchange, the intensity of demand by itself does not 
necessarily increase the economic value of objects. In exchange, value becomes supra-
subjective, supra-individual, yet without becoming an objective quality and reality of the 
things themselves. The technical form of economic transactions produces a realm of values 
that is more or less completely detached firom the subjective-personal substructure. Although 
the individual buys because he/she values and wants to consume an object, his/her demand is 
expressed effectively only by an object in exchange. Therefore, according to Simmel, there is 
a profound connection between value and exchange. Regarding economic value, no matter 
how the two objects A and B have acquired their values, object A obtains an economic value 
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only because person A had to exchange it for object B. Thus value acquires its characteristics 
only through an exchange. 
ii. Obstacles 
One of Sinunel's concerns was the relationship between money and value. He 
believed that every value has to be acquired by the sacrifice of some other value. With 
obstacles, value will increase (Ritzer, 1992). According to Simmel; 
Exchange is not the mere addition of two processes of giving and receiving, but a 
new third phenomenon, in which each of the two processes is simultaneously cause 
and effect. The value that the object gains through renunciation thereby becomes 
an economic value. In summary, value develops in the interval that obstacles, 
renunciation and sacrifice interpose between the will and its satisfaction. The 
process of exchange consists in the mutual determination of taking and giving, and 
it does not depend upon a particular object having previously acquired a value for 
a particular subject. All that is needed is accomplished in the act of exchange itself 
(Simmel, 1991:90). 
Utility is the first requirement for an economic object to exist and scarcity is the second. If 
economic values are regarded as determined by supply and demand, supply would correspond 
with scarcity and demand with utility. 
According to Simmel, value is determined by the degree of desire the subject has for 
the object and the difficulty encountered in acquiring the object. "The greater the difficulty of 
obtaining an object, the greater is value" (Ritzer, 1992:174). He called an object 'scarce' if 
the process is long and complicated, requiring sacrifices in the shape of deferment, 
disappointment, work, inconvenience and renunciations. He stated the relationship between 
scarcity and exchange in the following quote: 
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There are many things that are actually scarce, which are not scarce in the 
economic sense. Whether they are scarce in the latter sense is determined by the 
degree of strength, patience and sacrifice that is necessary to acquire them by 
exchange 
— and such sacrifice presupposes a demand for the object. The 
difficulty of acquisition, the sacrifice offered in exchange, is the unique constitutive 
element of value, of which scarcity is only the external manifestation, its 
objectification in the form of quantity (Simmel, 1991; 100). 
Obstacles in exchange make desired objects more valuable, and scarcity is the external 
manifestation of value. 
iii. Objectivity and subjectivitv 
Simmel made a distinction between the "subjective" and "objective" aspects of value, 
describing subjectivity in the excerpt below; 
The characteristic feature of value, as it appears in contrast to reality, is usually 
called its subjectivity. Since one and the same object can have the highest degree 
of value for one soul and the lowest for another, and vice versa, and since on the 
other hand the most extensive and extreme differences between objects and 
compatible with equality of value, there appears to remain only the subject with his 
customary or exceptional, permanent or changing, moods and responses as the 
ground for valuation (Simmel, 1991:62-63). 
Simmel described this subjectivity and objectivity of value in economic exchange in the 
following manner: 
. . .  o b j e c t i v e l y ,  h e  h a s  g i v e n  a n  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  B ,  t h e  p r i c e  ( a )  f o r  t h e  o b j e c t  ( P ) ,  
but subjectively the value of P is greater for him than the value of a. But the sense 
of value that A attaches to P is a unit, and the dividing line between the objective 
value and the subjective surplus is no longer perceptible. Only the fact that the 
object is exchanged, that it is a price and costs a price, draws this line and 
determines the quantum of subjective value with which the object enters the 
process of exchange as an objective value (Simmel, 1991:93-94). 
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In an exchange, one is exchanging not only objects, but also the value of the possession, since 
the exchanged object has higher value than the given object (Figure 11). 
Turner summarized Simmel's approach to value, presented in the previous sections i-
iii, as the "value principle." According to Turner, "the greater the intensity of an actor's needs 
for a resource of a given type, and the less available that resource, the greater the value of that 
resource to the actor" (Turner, 1991b:301). Simmel emphasized the value of exchange and 
stated that "in whatever empirical or transcendental sense the difference between objects and 
subjects is conceived, value is never a 'quality' of the object, but a judgment upon them which 
remains inherent in the subject" (Simmel, 1991:63). Thus, value is not attached to an object 
as a fixed thing but as a subjective assessment. We are lead to ask; 
Research question 9; Did each of the three parties value a desired object because of its 
high demand and scarcity? 
In the Poletown case, GM needed a new plant to replace two old plants and the move 
was part of what GM had described as the most extensive product and facility improvement 
programs ever undertaken by a corporation anywhere {The Detroit News, June 24, 1980). 
GM's construction of a new plant was crucial to compete with other automakers. 
In terms of obstacles to value, GM sacrificed its site choice. According to Leonard R. 
Hostetter, who helped plan the proposed GM plant: 
GM has to make a number of sacrifices to build the plant in Detroit, because the 
site is smaller than those for other new plants GM has built. "It is the smallest of 
our new assembly plants," he said. "It does not provide us with as much flexibility 
and as much expansion possibilities." He said GM had to make a large 
compromise by planning the plant's rail marshaling yard for 40 acres instead of a 
preferable 90-to-120 acre site (JTie Detroit Free Press, April 4, 1981:3A). 
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The preparation costs of the Poletown site was expected to reach $190 million by the time 
clearance work was finished in 1983, and the city was supposed to pay a major share {The 
Detroit Free Press, May 1, 1981). The city of Detroit spent a large sum of money for GM's 
site and used its municipal authority to clear the site for GM. Therefore, GM valued the new 
plant site. 
Regarding the city of Detroit, GM's plant was important to Detroit because it was one 
of the few assembly plants located in the nation's automotive capital {The Detroit News, June 
24,1980). Keeping the GM plant in the city meant economic preservation for Detroit. It 
would have been a disaster if the city could not keep GM because the economic and job 
values represented by the project were uniquely high. Plant and payroll were in the city at the 
time and their loss would be grievous. Beyond that, if the proposed facility was buih, there 
could well be a gain in jobs {The Detroit News, August 17, 1980). An editorial in The Detroit 
News asked the following questions; 
What does this extraordinary project mean to Detroit? Obviously, moving a final-
assembly plant from one place to another in the city doesn't change the number of 
jobs — 6,000, including 5,400 hourly-rated production workers when the plant 
operates two shifts. Detroit's first objective is to keep these jobs in the inner city. 
The old Cadillac plant will not be closed. GM will try to "backfill" its space with 
manufacturing operations (making parts). Thus, new jobs would be created {The 
Detroit News, August 17, 1980; 18A). 
Mayor Young said the GM plant was vital to the employment and fiscal well-being of the city 
{The Detroit News, February 1, 1981). According to an editorial in The Detroit News 
(October 17,1980;8A): 
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The new GM facility is a must for Detroit. The $500 million investment would 
bolster city tax revenues and keep 6,000 jobs in the city. Further, an unknown 
number of new jobs might be created as GM attempts to locate parts-making 
activities in the old Clark Avenue and Fisher Fleetwood plants, where Cadillacs are 
now assembled. 
Because of Detroit's high unemployment rate, GM's plant was public necessity rather than 
private necessity. The Detroit Free Press, stated this point as follows; 
In any case, the argument over the project's "public necessity" is considered a 
dead issue, in light of Detroit's high unemployment rate, competition from foreign 
automakers, and what is perceived as a sincere attempt by the city to rebuild 
Detroit's tax base and secure jobs for its citizenry (The Detroit Free Press, 
October 6, 1980;21A). 
Particularly, Mayor Young was emphasizing the project's potential impact on the city's 
serious unemployment problem (Bachelor, 1982b). As Dye (1986) pointed out, the city 
prepared land for capital investment in the community which raised land values, expanded the 
labor force and enhanced the local tax base by praising jobs as a result of new investment. A 
summary of the economic benefits the city expected fi-om the GM plant is given below: 
The proposed Central Industrial Park will: 
1. Create 6,000 high income, auto assembly jobs for Hamtramck and Detroit; 
2. Provide a relatively high multiplier effect (compared to other types of 
businesses) on the local economy creating and/or maintaining an additional 
20,000 jobs in other businesses; 
3. Raise and/or maintain the personal income of area residents by nearly $464 
million annually (direct and indirect); 
4. Permanently increase the property tax base of the local community and provide 
$9 million to $18.6 million in local property tax revenue annually; 
5. Provide $27 million of individual property and city income tax revenue annually; 
6. Provide $12.5 million of state tax revenue annually; 
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7. Subsidize, through property tax revenue, local services to area residents 
stabilizing local tax rates and revenues; 
8. Reduce potential fire, security, and waste disposal costs to the local community 
by eliminating vacant, obsolete, and deteriorating properties; 
9. Create long-term, high-income job opportunities for area residents; 
10. Improve local land use and land use plarming; 
11. Result in improved resident housing; 
12. Improve living and working security in the community; 
13. Improve local aesthetics (City of Detroit Community & Economic 
Development Department, 1980: L-4 & L-6) 
As Simmel argued, the greater the difficulty of obtaining an object, the greater is its 
value. For the city of Detroit, building the GM plant was difRcult, therefore, the value of 
having it was high. The city of Detroit had to go through many obstacles. For instance, the 
commitment by Detroit and Hamtramck to assemble jointly the acreage needed for a new 
Cadillac assembly plant was an audacious undertaking, with more obstacles to success than 
reasons for assurance (The Detroit Free Press, July 2,1980). An editorial in The Detroit Free 
Press pointed out the difficulties of the city in the following manner: 
At this point the unanswered question abound: 
• Is there a way to pull together the land-acquisition, demolition and relocation 
funds needed to assemble and clear the land within the one-year time frame 
suggested by General Motors? 
• Is there acceptable alternative housing available for the people now living in the 
1,500 homes now located in the Detroit portion of the site and can it conceivably 
be found in the tight time frame being projected? 
• Are there historic sites or irreplaceable churches that will mean delay if not 
defeat for the effort? 
• Can the assembly plant site be pieced together in a way that leaves the remainder 
of the two cites relatively well-shielded from the operations? 
• Is it possible to protect the interest of those who now have homes or business 
within the area in a way that is satisfactory to them? 
Every one of these questions presents issues that would ordinarily tie even a single 
city government up in knots for years. And Detroit and Hamtramck are going to 
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try to put together the site by July of 1981. No one needs to be reminded how 
difficult it will be to pull all the pieces together {The Detroit Free Press, July 2, 
1980:8A). 
First of all, preparation of the site was a difficult task. The city of Detroit had to find a 
400- to SOO-acre parcel for the GM plant and when the Poletown site was found, it included 
about 1,500 homes, ISO businesses, several churches, a hospital and some facilities still 
maintained at the Dodge Main plant (TTie Detroit Free Press, July 1, 1980). The relocation 
was hard financially and the deadlines inconvenient. The city did not have enough money to 
cover all of the costs of preparation. 
The city had both physical and financial obstacles and a few legal snarls to deal with. 
Physically, the land acquisition was difficult. The attempt to assemble for industrial 
redevelopment so huge a block of land within a city was perhaps the most audacious effort at 
industrial renewal ever undertaken in the country (TJie Detroit Free Press, October 11,1980). 
The city also had to follow GM's time schedule which was very tight — the major portion of 
the GM site had to be cleared by the summer of 1981. Financially, the city had to assemble a 
package of federal loans and grants to produce the $199 million officials had estimated it 
would cost to acquire 1,176 parcels of land, relocate 3,438 residents and demolish the entire 
465-acre plant site (The Detroit Free Press, October 7,1980). Legally, the city was 
challenged from the PNC and residents of the site to block the project. For instance, the 
proposed Cadillac assembly plant on Detroit's east side cleared a major hurdle on December 8 
when a circuit judge refused to block the $700-million project (The Detroit News, December 
9, 1980). However, Mayor Young said efforts to build the plant were still facing many 
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obstacles {The Detroit News, December 9,1980). On March 1981, the city had to defend 
itself in the court; 
The court, on a S-to-2 vote, held that the project promises a "clear and significant" 
public benefit and that the city did not act illegally in condemning private property 
on behalf of General Motors. The city argued during the court hearing that the 
proposed Poletown plant would preserve 6,000 jobs that might be lost through the 
closing of the Clark Avenue and Fleetwood Body plants in Detroit {The Detroit 
Free Press, March 14, 1981:1 A). 
It is important to note that the PNC and residents of the project area were not the only 
ones to challenge the city. For instance, the National Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation asked the federal department of Housing and Urban Development to withdraw 
federal fiinds from the GM project until the city complies with the agreement {The Detroit 
Free Press, April 16, 1981). Some residents in Poletown were defending their homes with 
guns rather than moving out to make room for the GM plant saying "when they come, we're 
going to die on the steps of our houses" {The Detroit News, March 12, 1981:11 A). 
Therefore, the value of GM's new plant increased with the city's high demand of economy 
and many obstacles Detroit went through. 
There was no unified value among Poletown residents toward GM's new plant project 
at the beginning. It is clearly stated that most of the people were upset about their move at 
the early stage — a survey conducted for the city showed two-thirds of the people wanting to 
stay (Moberg, 1981), However, their value toward the exchange changed over the period 
according to the elements of contextual change of the process. The important point here is 
that PNC supported the construction of the plant itself, however, it questioned the need to 
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destroy the neighborhood to build it (Bachelor, 1981; Jones and Bachelor, 1993). People 
thought progress was necessary. The Rev. V.W. Nelson, pastor of Temple Faith Missionary 
Baptist Church on East Grand Boulevard, told the parishioners that everyone must suffer for 
jobs together {The Detroit News, March 15, 1981). Detroit City Councilman Clyde Cleveland 
said that people had to think about employment and the future of their children, and this 
relocation effort was the best that had ever been done for them {The Detroit News, March 23, 
1981). Thus, the residents were asked to sacrifice for the prospective economic gain which 
might not directly affect them. The sacrifice for the residents was not only psychological but 
also financial as well. For instance; 
"The artwork of the walls of the church are worth more than $35,000 (marble-
enclosed etchings and gold-flecked paintings)," said Mr. Nelson. "The city bought the 
contents of the church for $13,000, and we even have to buy back the organ, pulpit, 
piano and other things. Nobody wants to leave, but everybody has to. And we want 
the mayor to know we support him" {The Detroit News, March 23,1981:2B). 
Therefore, some residents sacrificed themselves for the progress. 
Detroit assessed Poietown as a declining community. It was not true for some 
residents in the area. According to such a resident, a house can be replaced even though one 
cannot replace the memories, however a neighborhood is one's life (Ewald, 1980), therefore 
subjective values cannot be quantified. Another resident said that good will is something you 
build up over a long time, and the city can pay for your house and your fixtures, but they 
cannot pay for good will {The Detroit News, December 25, 1980). Objectively, Poletown's 
market value was not high. According to the city assessor's office, the average market value 
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of the area's homes was about $7,000, among the lowest in the city {The Detroit Free Press, 
October 6, 1980). This is what DomhofF (1986) pointed out in conflicts between the 
community elites and specific neighborhoods because of their different value toward the land. 
Simmel stated this refusal arises only when the objects of exchange in that particular situation 
cannot be replaced by another object. 
In sunmiary, each of the three parties valued a desired object because of its high 
demand and scarcity. GM sacrificed by accepting the Poletown site, since it was not as large 
as other plants, however, the company received valuable incentives for staying in Detroit. The 
city received economic value through keeping GM plant in the city. The attitudes of residents 
in Poletown was twofold. Some residents of Poletown saw the need of progress, and 
although they had to move out from the area, the relocation money was adequate 
compensation for their loss. Most of these residents changed their value of exchange over the 
contextual change in the process. For some residents, their houses and neighborhood were 
more valuable and not replaceable, therefore there was nothing they wanted to exchange, 
c. Power 
According to Simmel, when one perceives more value in an object belonging to 
another, the other person is seen to have more power. Therefore, the differentiation of need 
goes hand in hand with the reduction of its elemental power. In economic exchange, the 
buyer has more power than the seller since the seller is more interested and eager than the 
buyer. Also, if an object is more liquid, the owner of the object has more power in social 
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exchange since people want to possess the object. Money has this liquidity and thus has 
power. 
Money can be both a cause and an effect of exchange, and has an enormous impact on 
social relations. According to Simmel, money represents pure interaction in its purest form; it 
makes comprehensible the most abstract concept; it is an individual thing whose essential 
significance is to reach beyond individualities. Money is the pure form of exchangeability in 
the developed economy (Frisby, 1984). Money mediates exchange and measures values. 
Simmel stated that money is totally indiflFerent to the objects since it is separated fi'om them by 
the fact of exchange. Therefore, what money mediates is not the possession of an object but 
the exchange of objects. Since economic value is nothing but the relativity of exchangeable 
object, money becomes more and more a symbol of economic value. Simmel argued that: 
Exchangeability is the prerequisite of economic values, through v/hich the latter 
attain their objective mutual relation. It unites in one act the distance and the 
proximity of what is to be exchanged. It has acquired in money not only its 
technically perfect means, but also a separate, concrete existence which embraces 
all its various aspects (Simmel, 1991:128). 
Simmel believed that money is valuable because it is the means for the acquisition of values. 
In the exchange relationship, money is the reified function of being exchanged (Frisby, 1981). 
Simmel described wealth in these terms: 
. . .  t h e  r i c h  m a n  g a i n s  a n  a d v a n t a g e  w d t h o u t  r e c o u r s e  t o  a n  o b j e c t  a n d  e x c l u s i v e l y  
by virtue of the fact that other people cannot spend as much money as he can. 
Wealth, indeed, is often regarded as a kind of moral merit, as is indicated by the 
term 'respectability' and by popular references to the well-to-do as 'upright 
citizens' or 'the better-class public.' The same phenomenon is shown fi'om the 
other side by the fact that the poor are treated as if they were guilty, that beggars 
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are angrily driven away, and that even good-natured people consider themselves 
naturally superior to the poor (Simmel, 1991:217-218). 
Thus, according to Simmel, being wealthy is a merit since a rich man is seen as a good person 
while a poor is seen as a bad person. This sentiment creates an environment in which a 
wealthy person has influence not only by what he/she does but also by what he/she could do. 
Simmel believed wealth brings many opportunities, and stated; 
A poor man has the fewest opportunities, because his money income is adequate 
only for the basic needs of life and allows almost no latitude in the choice of uses. 
This latitude increases with increasing income, and each unit of the growing 
income becomes more valuable to the extent that it differs from those units that are 
necessary for the satisfaction of basic and predetermined needs; that is, each 
additional unit of income includes a larger proportion of unearned increment, 
though of course this in only the case up to a relatively high level of income, 
beyond which each unit of income is equal in this respect (Simmel, 1991:218-219). 
Opportunities for the usage of money to achieve goals, then, depend on income: the 
poorer the individual, the fewer the opportunities. A small amount of money allows no 
freedom of choice, while a large amount of money allows considerable fi^eedom. At the 
individual level, Simmel, like Weber, saw money as a cause of individualization, giving people 
more freedom, autonomy, and options (Turner, 1991a). In a macro structure, Simmel 
believed that the relationship of the State to its citizens is determined by a monetary 
relationship, and the origin of this relationship was primarily in taxation. He explained this 
further: 
If social strata are primarily differentiated by their money income, then a policy 
based on the various strata is very restricted because the most divergent objective 
interests are bound up with the same money income, and therefore any measure 
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taken in the interest of one stratum unavoidably harms many interests within that 
particular stratum (Simmel, 1991:316). 
Here, Simmel pointed out if social stratification is based on income, policy making is also 
carried out based on income level. If the interests within a single stratum are diverse, one may 
interpret Simmel to say that therefore the interests between different strata must be at least as 
diverse. 
In the preface of Simmel's book The Philosophy of Money {\99\), he described 
money as "simply a means, a material or an example for the presentation of relations that exist 
between the most superficial, 'realistic' and fortuitous phenomena and the most idealized 
powers of existence, the most profound currents of individual life and history" (Simmel, 
1991 ;55). In The Philosophy of Money, Simmel said: 
the whole vast range of commodities can only be exchanged for one value, namely 
money; but money can be exchanged for any one of the range of commodities. By 
contrast with labour, which can rarely change its application, and the less easily the 
more specialized it is, capital in the form of money can almost always be 
transferred from one use to another, at worst with a loss, but often with a gain. 
The worker can hardly ever extricate his art and skill from his trade and invest it 
somewhere else. By comparison with the owner of money he is at a disadvantage 
so far as fi-ee choice is concerned, just as the merchant is. Thus, the value of a 
given amount of money is equal to the value of any object for which it might be 
exchanged plus the value of free choice between innumerable other objects, and 
this is an asset that has no analogy in the area of commodities or labour (Simmel, 
1991:213). 
Thus, money can be powerful since it can be used for any economic purpose and does not 
have limitation of choice. Money's opportunity of choice applies not only to the goods 
offered at any one time, but also to the date when it can be used. Simmel stated that: 
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Money as a pure instrument represents their highest possible synthesis because it 
has no specific quality for a specific use, but is only a tool for acquiring concrete 
values, and because the opportunities for using it are just as great at any point of 
time and for any object (Simmel, 1991:214). 
Therefore, the owners of money have superiority over the owners of commodities. Turner, 
Beeghley and Powers (1995) described Simmel's concept of money as follows; 
But once established, the use of money has the power to transform the structure of 
social relations in society. It is in seeking to understand how money has this 
power to alter social relations that Simmel's The Philosophy of Money becomes 
distinctly sociological (Turner, Beeghley and Powers, 1995:271). 
Simmel thought that the one who is less involved has an advantage. Turner named tlus the 
"power principle." According to Turner, "the more an actor perceives as valuable the 
resources of another actor, the greater is the power of the latter over the former" (Turner, 
1991b;301), adding that "the more liquid an actor's resources, the greater will be the exchange 
options and alternative and, hence, the greater will be the power of that actor in social 
exchanges" (Turner, 1991b:301). 
Simmel, however, stated that although the owner of money has superiority over the 
ownership of commodities, there were some exceptions. For instance "the refusal to sell on 
ideological grounds, boycotts and cartels, but these arise only when the objects of exchange in 
that particular situation cannot be replaced by other objects" (Simmel, 1991: 214). This leads 
us to ask: 
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Research question 10; Did each of the three parties perceive more value in an object 
belonging to another, have alternatives, and were there any 
difTerentiations regarding resources each party had? 
In the Ppletown case, GM was in a strong position since the city was economically 
desperate and did not want the company move out. This was true even before the Poletown 
case. For instance, in 1979 GM was allowed to begin preparations to shift Cadillac engine 
production to suburban Livonia because Detroit officials were afraid GM would move out of 
the state if the city council tried to block the move {The Detroit News, June 24, 1980). 
According to an editorial in The Detroit News: 
While it's possible that the city of Detroit will come up vnth an industrial site large 
enough to support the proposed new Cadillac plant, it isn't veiy likely. City property 
is just too difficult to assemble and clear to be competitive, for industrial purposes, 
with undeveloped rural and suburban land. This may be an exceptional case, since 
General Motors is obviously aware of the extraordinary pain Cadillac's departure 
would cause Detroit. And city official are likely to provide every possible incentive 
{The Detroit News, June 27, 1980:6A). 
When GM announced the new plant project, the company did not say what would 
happen if Detroit failed to find suitable site, but city officials clearly feared GM would move 
those operations elsewhere {The Detroit Free Press, June 28,1980). GM's options are 
outlined by The Detroit News in the excerpt below: 
The company has three choices. It says it will locate in Detroit if the site can be 
assembled. Failing that, it would seek a site in the far suburbs (bad news for inner-city 
workers). The last choice is somewhere else, outside metropolitan Detroit, perhaps 
even outside the state {The Detroit News, August 17, 1980:18A). 
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GM was in a strong position since the company had available alternative industrial locations, 
and since the city wanted the plant (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981; Bachelor, 1982a; Jones 
and Bachelor, 1993). The Detroit Free Press stated GM's strong position in the words: 
When and where will urban blackmail by large, multi-national corporations end? Here 
in Detroit, the General Motors Corp. demands from the city an area the size of 
downtown Detroit to build an assembly plant. Because of GM's threats to relocate 
outside the city limits, Detroit will lose one of the last remaining racially harmonious 
nei^hoThoods (The Detroit Free Press, Septembers, 1980:8A). 
GM's power was clearly rooted in its capital mobility (Jones and Bachelor, 1984; Fasenfest, 
1986). This capital mobility was a great economic resource for GM which the company could 
have a control over. GM, therefore, had more power than the city of Detroit (Bachelor, Jones 
and Wang, 1981). 
Compared to GM's economic resources, Detroit had political resources. The city 
could use the power of "eminent domain" and the "quick take" law, and GM was aware of 
that. Building the plant as a public-private venture, GM was relying on the city to use its 
authority to condemn and acquire private property under the governmental concept of 
eminent domain. According to GM's vice president, acquisition of the needed land would be 
almost impossible without Detroit's help (The Detroit News, September 2,1980). The Detroit 
Free Press (October 7, 1980:11 A) wrote concerning the quick take law: 
Despite physical and financial impediments, the city has been able to proceed on a fast 
track with the project, thanks to a new "quick-take" state condemnation act. City 
official acknowledge that the law. Public Act 87, is what enabled the city to consider 
the previously impossible task of acquiring more than 1,700 parcels and relocating 
nearly 3,500 residents to meet GM's timetable. 
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The quick take law allowed municipalities to acquire title to property before reaching 
agreement with individual owners on a purchase price. This law was first used in the 
Poletown project and made possible city's rapid acquisition of property under eminent domain 
procedures. 
Regarding the Poletown residents—poor, aging and working class residents—they 
did not have great economic and political resources (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981; Jones, 
Bachelor and Wand, 1981; Moberg, 1981; Bachelor, 1982a; Alderman and Kennedy, 1991). 
Therefore, the residents did not have any power against the world's largest manufacturing 
company and the city of Detroit. 
In summary, GM had alternatives and there was differentiation regarding resources 
each party had. GM had more power than the city of Detroit since it had economical 
resources — alternative sites for the plant and capital. In contrast, although Detroit had 
political resources — legal authority to use eminent domain — it had only small capital at 
hand. The residents of Poletown did not have any power to bare on GM and the city. 
Through the exchanges in this case, differentiation of power was clearly exhibited. 
Overall, the two newspapers reported sympathetic stories about the neighborhood but 
their editorials supported the project (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). Therefore, Poletown stories 
introduced more of the victimized residents' side than the satisfied residents. 
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6. DifTerentiation of power 
Just as Simmel pointed out the power of money, Peter Blau also stated that the main 
characteristic of being powerfiil is being wealthy (Blau, 1964). Like Simmel did, in his 
Exchange and Power in Social Life (1964), Blau also distinguished social exchange from 
economic exchange — social exchange depends upon trust whereas economic exchange 
usually requires a binding contract (Blau, 1964, 1968). He proposed that the relative 
resources of the two partners also affect their relative power. Therefore, a resource is 
"anything that 'can be used to satisfy or frustrate needs or move persons further from or 
closer to their goals'" (Sears, Peplau and Taylor, 1991: 229). When individuals are 
imbalanced in their resources, a person who has more resources will have more power. 
However, unlike Simmel, Blau elaborated the nature of power into the institutionalized power 
as well. In Blau's theory: 
Institutionalized power commands services which a superior can use to provide 
benefits to subordinates that fortify his power. Such power makes the services of 
subordinates insufficient for establishing equality with the superior once 
superior status is securely grounded in the social structure its occupant can 
demand unilateral services without endangering his superordinate position (Blau, 
1964:110). 
The concept of institutionalized power is similar in many ways to Mills' ideas of power elite 
which will be discussed in the following chapter. Blau defined power as "the ability of 
persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either 
in the forms of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment" (Blau, 
1964; 117). Like Simmel, Blau stated that a person establishes power over others by 
93 
supplying services in demand to them. Blau, then elaborated the conditions of the 
differentiation of power in social exchange from four alternatives and four types of issues in 
the schema (Table 4). 
According to Blau, a person A who needs a service a person B has to offer has the 
following alternatives; (1) A can supply B with a service that B wants badly enough to induce 
Table 4. Differentiation of power in exchange 
Alternatives to 
Compliance 
Conditions of 
Independence 
Requirements of 
Power 
Structural 
Implications 
1. Supply 
inducements 
Strategic resources Indifference to what 
others offer 
Exchange and 
distribution of 
resources 
2. Obtain elsewhere Available 
alternatives 
Monopoly over what 
others need 
Competition and 
exchange rates 
3. Take by force Coercive force Law and order Organization and 
differentiation 
4. Do without Ideals lessening 
needs 
Materialistic and 
other relevant values 
Ideology 
formation 
Source: Blau, 1964: 124 
B to offer B's service in return, (2) A may obtain the needed service elsewhere, (3) A can 
coerce B to furnish the service and, (4) A may learn to resign him/herself to do without B's 
service. However, if A is not able or willing to choose any of these four alternatives, A has no 
other choice but to comply with B's wishes (Blau, 1964). Therefore, if one can extract 
compliance in an exchange relationship, he/she has power. In other words, if one wants to 
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have power over others, he/she must prevent them from choosing any of the first four 
alternatives. 
We turn now to a discussion of Blau's conditions of independence, beginning with the 
idea that strategic resources promote independence. For instance, if individuals have 
sufficient resources that they may provide for their own needs, then they may exist without 
relying upon the support of others. Secondly, if individuals have many possible options 
available, they are more independent. An example is that if only one person has object A 
which others want, others are likely to become dependent on the person. Thirdly, the more 
methods an individual has to force his/her way on others, the more independent the individual 
is. For instance, if an individual has a high position in an organization, he/she can order 
subordinates to do something for them regardless of the will or desire of the subordinate. 
Fourthly, the less the individuals' need are, the less they are dependent on others. 
The third column in Table 4 outlines the requirements for the holding of power. The 
first major factor is indifference to the offers of one's opponent. One is therefore above 
compromising one's own point of view. The ability to prevent one's opponents from seeking 
alternative suppliers of services is a second major factor of power. Not only this, one must be 
able to prevent one's opponents from using coercion to meet their needs. Finally, power 
requires one's need for the benefits those in power have to offer. 
Blau's outline for the implications of power differentiation on social structure are 
summarized in the last column of Table 4. Societies structure themselves so as to allow 
reciprocal exchanges in order for individuals to obtain the benefits they desire. In addition. 
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there is competition among suppliers for individuals in need of services. Moreover the ability 
of an individual or group to coerce others creates, in Blau's view, the differentiation of power 
in social structures. Finally, changes in social ideas occur when society's values change. 
Blau (1964) pointed out that in general, a powerful person has wealth, more resources, 
and high-status. Blau, like Simmel, stated that a person establishes power over others by 
supplying services in demand to them, and this was what happened in the Poletown case. 
There was power differentiation among the three parties. There were different demands, 
resources, and social status in their exchange process. Rather than stating a research question, 
we will apply Blau's alternatives to explain the power difference between GM and the city of 
Detroit, and between the city and Poletown residents. 
In the exchange between GM and the city, GM was able to offer the plant to the city in 
exchange for the Poletown site (Blau's first alternative). GM had available alternative sites if 
the city could not offered the Poletown site, thus GM had power over the city in this exchange 
(Blau's second alternative). The coercive force (Blau's third alternative) was not used in the 
exchange between GM and the city other than the fact that GM hinted the possibility of 
moving out whenever the city opposed the company's plans. Neither GM nor the city was 
interested in changing their economic values, therefore Blau's fourth alternative did not apply. 
In the exchange between the city and the Poletown residents, the city offered the 
relocation benefits which enabled the residents to move into nicer houses or neighborhoods. 
This offer was accepted by some residents (Blau's first alternative), but not by all residents. 
The city used coercive force to relocate those residents who refused to accept the "peaceful" 
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term of exchange (Blau's third alternative). Alternative offers for economic development 
were not available for the city other than that from GM, therefore the city had no choice but 
to negotiate with the residents of the Poletown. The residents did not have alternative parties 
to engage in exchange either. Therefore, the difference in power in this exchange was due to 
the city's ability to use legal coercion to force the residents to comply their relocation order. 
According to Blau (1964), competition occurs thorough social integration, and it leads 
to differentiation of status in groups. When status starts to become differentiated, individuals 
who won others' respect continue to compete among themselves for positions of power and 
leadership while people who know they are inferior to those individuals are not able to 
continue the competition. Therefore, high-status members have more power than low-status 
members, however, without low-status members' compliance and support, the high-status 
members cannot maintain their power and leadership. Regarding the high-status members; 
. . .  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  a u t h o r i t y  i n  a  h i e r a r c h i c a l  o r d e r  g i v e s  o f [ i c i a l s  s o m e  
authority simply on the basis of occupying a given office, as illustrated by militaiy 
rank.... In contrast to prestige and authority structures, power structures rest not 
primarily on social consensus concerning the privileges or rights that must be 
granted to the members of various strata but on the distribution of resources with 
which compliance with demands can be enforced (Blau, 1964: 130). 
Here Blau acknowledged the institutional power which implies positional power. He used the 
term "status" like capital, and stated that sociable intercourse tends to occur mainly among the 
same status members. Under political government and formal organizations, a principle — a 
person who has the highest position in a group can conduct group's activities by his/her order, 
is underlying. This superior status provide him/her many advantages. Differentiation of 
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power originates during competition for scarce goods (Blau, 1964). Blau talked about the 
differentiation of power in imbalanced resources in exchange, and acknowledged 
institutionalized power. In the following chapter, C. Wright Mills' institutional power will be 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 5. POLETOWN AS A PROBLEM OF POWER ELITES 
Another theory which is helpful in understanding the Poletown case is that of C. 
Wright Mills' power elite theory. In this chapter, the major concepts and theory of Mills' 
power elite are presented and applied to the findings of the events through the research 
questions. Then a brief literature review of community power and the power structure of 
Detroit prior to the Poletown events are presented. 
A. Power elite theory 
1. Classic (aristocratic) elite theory vs. contemporary (radical) elite theory 
The key premise of the theory of elites is that societal power is concentrated in the 
hand of a few elite groups controlling the resources of key social institutions and that these 
elite groups are not accountable to the masses. This presumption — concentration of societal 
power in the hands of a few — overlaps with the class model. Classical elite theory assumes 
that all societies are ruled by elite and because of the masses' inherent incapability of 
governing themselves, society must be led by the elite (Berberoglu, 1990). The composition 
of the elites and the basis of their power may vary at different times and in different societies, 
however, the essence of elite rule remains unchanged. The idea of elites goes back to Italian 
scholars Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. Pareto's theory could be conceptualized using 
Figure 12. 
On the one hand, Pareto thought of elites as the highest achievers in any area of human 
activity, adding that these elites govern the masses through force and fraud. Pareto broke 
down the elite into two components: the governing and nongoveming elite. 
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Governing Elite Nongoveming Elites 
Figure 12. Pareto's elite model 
Source: Marger, 1987:53 
On the other hand, Mosca also saw a certain inevitability to the dominance of a ruling 
class in society, while Pareto relies almost exclusively on psychological variables in explaining 
elites (Marger, 1987). Mosca wrote; 
In all societies — from societies that are very underdeveloped and have largely 
attjuned the dawnings of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful 
societies — two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is 
ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all of the political 
functions, monopolizes power, and enjoys the advantages that power brings, 
whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the 
first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more of less arbitrary and 
violent (Mosca, 1939; 50). 
Below the elite, Mosca introduced a sub-elite which was made up of intellectuals, technocrats, 
civil servants, managers, and other organizational specialists who are today referred to as the 
'technostructure.' Mosca's views are represented in Figure 13. 
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Ruling Elite 
Political Class 
Subelite (technocrats, 
managers, civil 
servants) 
Masses 
Figure 13. Mosca's elite model 
Source: Marger, 1987:53 
In contrast to the classical elite theory, contemporary elite theory also emphasizes the 
power of the few to make the major decisions for society as a whole, although both versions 
of the theory envision an inevitability of elite rule. Pareto and Mosca take a conservative view 
of the elite-mass relationship seeing the masses as unable to rule themselves therefore, elites 
are both necessary and desirable. The major difference in the two versions of elite theory is 
that on the one hand, while contemporary elite theory sees the masses as manipulated and 
exploited by elites who rule in their own interest, classical elite theory sees them as apathetic, 
incompetent, and unwilling or unable to govern themselves. At the present time, because of 
its centralized power at the national level, individuals are quite unimportant. The majority of 
people do not take part in politics and especially do not have control over decision-making. 
Almost no average person has dialogue in which he/she can feel that his/her point of view will 
be effectively heard (Swan, 1984). Perhaps the most significant of the contemporary (radical) 
elite theorists is C. Wright Mills (Figure 14). 
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\ Power Elite (Tq? 
corporate executives, top 
\ officials of federal government. 
\ top militarv chiefs) 
Middle Level of Power / 
(Members of Congress, / 
state and local government / V Masses 
ofificials, labor leaders, / 
interest group leaders) / 
Figure 14. Mills' elite model 
Source: Marger, 1987:144 
Mills believed that American society is governed by a small but influential power elite 
consisting of the top layers of the three most important institutions of modem society — the 
economy, the state, and the military (Mills, 1956). Mills' power elite theory pointed out the 
relationship between sectors—not people. For this innate reason, he is given credit for 
identifying power as the organizational framework for the century as a whole (Horowitz, 
1981). Mills' most influential work is his analysis of social stratification (Chasin, 1990). 
Mills' thesis is a thought-provoking model of power in America, and in the past four decades 
much of the research on power in the United States has been promoted by his work and is 
seen as a response to his thesis (Olsen and Marger, 1993). 
Mills went beyond Mosca and Pareto, and identified organizational structure as the 
source of elite capacities for rule (Lachmann, 1990). According to Mills, there are three basic 
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levels of power in the United State: the power elite, the middle levels of power, and mass 
society. 
2. Power structure 
Figure IS shows Mills' structure of the power elite; political, economic and military 
power elite. 
Power Elite 
Political Militaiy 
Economic 
Figure 15. The three pyramids of power 
Source: Persell, 1987:364 
Mills described the emergence of the power elite in the quote below: 
What I am asserting is that in this particular epoch a conjunction of historical 
circumstances has led to the rise of an elite of power; that the men of the circles 
composing this elite, severally and collectively, now make such key decisions as 
are made; and that, given the enlargement and the centralization of the mean of 
power now available, the decisions that they make and fail to make carry more 
consequences for more people than has ever been the case in the world history of 
mankind (Mills, 1956:28 - 29). 
Mills summarized the composition of modem American society in the following words: 
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The top of modern American society is increasingly unified and often seems 
willfiilly coordinated: at the top there has emerged an elite of power. The middle 
levels are a drifting set of stalemated, balancing forces: the middle does not link the 
bottom A^th the top. The bottom of this society is politically fragmented, and even 
as a passive fact, increasingly powerless; at the bottom there is emerging a mass 
society (Mills, 1956:324) 
This triangle of power is now a structural fact, and it is the key to any 
understanding of the higher circles in America today. For as each of these domains 
has coincided with the others, as decisions in each have become broader, the 
leading men of each — have tended to come together to form the power elite of 
America (Mills, 1963:27). 
As each of these domains coincides with the other, the leading power elite in each of 
the three domains of power tend to come together and to form the power elite of America. 
And no matter what else they may be, the elite involved in a set of overlapping 'clouds' and 
intricately connected 'cliques.' Within each of the three institutions, the typical institutional 
unit has become enlarged, becomes administrative, and in the power of its decisions becomes 
centralized. According to Mills, the decisions made within the political domain determine 
both economic activities and military programs. The inner core of the power elite includes 
men of the higher legal and financial type fi'om the great law factories and investment firms. 
Mills mentioned that the corporation lawyer is a key link between each domain. According to 
Mills, when one gets a lawyer who handles the legal work of investment bankers one gets a 
key member of the power elite. 
The middle level of power is located between the power elite and masses. This middle 
level consists of organizations, local and state government, lower positions in bureaucracies, 
congress, organized labor, important state and local political official, and various pressure 
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groups. These middle levels of power are. Mills said, becoming ineffective as sources of 
power. The bottom level consists of the mass of unorganized citizens who have no influence 
on decisions at all. They are described as "politically fragmented," "passive" and "increasingly 
powerless" (Mills, 1956:324). Mills stated that almost in any community, there is a high and 
low, and most likely a big in-between. According to him, no matter what people believe, class 
structure as an economic arrangement influences their life chances depending of their positions 
in it. 
3. Definition of public and mass 
Mills believed that most Americans are quite powerless. The mass consists of the 
people in the total population, excluding the power elite, who are located at the bottom of the 
society. Mills saw the mass as a politically fragmented, passive, and increasingly powerless. 
In Mills' theory; 
The idea of a mass society suggests the idea of an elite of power. The idea of the 
public, in contrast, suggests the liberal tradition of a society without any power 
elite, or at any rate with shifting elites of no sovereign consequences. For, if a 
genuine public is sovereign, it needs no master; but the masses, in their full 
development, are sovereign only in some plebiscitarian moment of adulation to an 
elite as authoritative celebrity. The political structure of a democratic state requires 
the public; and, the democratic man, in his rhetoric, must assert that this public is 
the very seat of sovereignty (Mills, 1956:323). 
Mills believed the mass of people are passive in the face of the power exercised by the power 
elite, and argued that the United States today is not altogether a mass society, and it has never 
been altogether a community of publics. There are at least four dimensions we should 
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examine if we want to grasp the differences between public and mass. The differences 
between the public and mass are summarized on Table S. 
The public, according to Mills, lies at the root of the conception of authority by 
discussion. It is based on the hope that truth and justice will somehow come out of society as 
a great apparatus of free discussion. The primary publics are seen as either so small as to be 
swamped and hence give up, or so large as to be merely another feature of the generally 
distant structure of power, and hence inaccessible. 
Table S. Comparison of Mills' public and mass 
Community of publics Society of masses 
1. Opinion Virtually as many people 
express opinions as receive 
them. 
Far fewer people express 
opinions than receive them. 
Individuals receive impressions 
from the mass media 
2. Communication Organized public 
communications provide the 
opportunity for immediate and 
effective reply to any opinion 
expressed in public. 
It is difficult or impossible for 
individuals to answer back 
immediately or with any effect. 
3. Action Opinion can be mobilized into 
action even to prevailing 
system of authority. 
The realization of opinion in 
action is controlled by 
authorities who organize and 
control the channels of such 
action. 
4. Autonomy Authoritative institutions do 
not penetrate the public which 
therefore has autonomy of 
operations. 
The mass has no autonomy 
from institutions and this affects 
formation of opinion by 
discussion. 
Source: Mills, 1956:303-304 
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4. Power elite vs. ruling class 
Nfills deliberately used the concept of "power elite" rather than "ruling class" since, in 
his view, there was no single ruling party at the time of his writing. However, Mills was well 
aware that the locus of power varies depending on the time period. Therefore, we must 
always be historically specific. Regarding power in society. Mills explicitly rejected both 
pluralist and class theories. He thought the term 'ruling class' confuses political power 
("ruling") with economic power ("class") therefore, does not allow enough autonomy to the 
political or military orders (Alford and Friedland, 1985). Mills wrote: 
The simple Marxian view makes the big economic man the real holder of power; 
the simple liberal view makes the big political man the chief of the power system; 
and there are some who would view the warlords as virtual dictators. Each of 
these is an oversimplified view. It is to avoid them that we use the term 'power 
elite' rather than, for example, 'ruling class' (Mills, 1956:277). 
Mills argued that 'class' is an economic term and 'rule' is a political term. Therefore, 
'ruling class' implies that an economic class rules politically. Mills saw American society as 
complex in the sense that there is no single ruling class controlling society. He believed the 
power elite involves the often uneasy coincidence of economic, military, and political power. 
Therefore, the ideas of a 'ruling class,' a simple monolithic rise of'bureaucratic politician' and 
a 'military clique' was inadequate. For Mills, the source of power is found in the positions 
that the power elite hold in three major kinds of organizations' economic positions rather than 
their financial status. He suggested that "those who hold command posts in each of these 
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institutional orders have a definite autonomy but that in intricate ways important decisions are 
made which involve a measure of coalescence" (Eldridge, 1983; 83). Mills wrote that: 
It should be clear to the reader by now that we do not accept as adequate the 
simple view that high econonruc men unilaterally make all decisions of national 
consequence. We hold that such a simple view of'economic determinism' must be 
elaborated by 'political determinism' and 'military determinism'; that the higher 
agents of each of these three domains now often have a noticeable degree of 
autonomy; and that only in the often intricate ways of coalition do they make up 
and carry through the most important decisions. Those are the major reasons we 
prefer 'power elite' to 'ruling class' as a characterizing phrase for the higher circles 
when we consider them in terms of power (Mills, 1956:277). 
Therefore, unlike Marx's concept of ruling class which rests on class power. Mills said the 
changes in the American structure of power generally come about through institutional shifts 
in the relative positions of the political, the economic, and the military orders. 
5. Changes in the power structure 
According to Mills, through institutional shifts in the relative positions of the political, 
the economic, and the military orders, American power structure changes. NClls argued that 
American power relations have gone through four periods, and that we are now in a fifth 
period. 
The first period lasted roughly firom the Revolution through the John Adams 
Administration. In this period, the social, economic, political, and military institutions were 
unified in a transparent way. The individuals of each elite moved easily fi-om one role to 
another at the top of each of the major institutional orders. Mills stated that political 
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institutions were powerful until the downfall of the Congressional Caucus of 1824. Mills 
described this first period by saying: 
The important fact about these early days is that social life, economic institutions, 
military establishment, and political order coincided, and men who were high 
politicians also played key roles in the economy and, with their families, were 
among those of the reputable who made up local society (Mills, 1956:270). 
Therefore, the elite of this period were political men who had administrative experience and 
'largeness of view and dignity of character.' 
The second period lasted from the early nineteenth century to the Civil War. During 
this period, the elite became a plurality of top groups. Although they overlapped at the same 
time they were quite loosely as well. During this period, therefore, it was difficult to identify a 
clearly defined power elite. Mills described this period when the elite was at most a loose 
coalition. 
The third period began with the congressional elections of 1866 and lasted until the 
New Deal. During this period, power was concentrated, unlike the first period, in higher 
circles of economic institutions, and military power was subordinate to political power. 
According to Mills, political institutions in the United States have never formed a centralized 
and autonomous domain of power. Under the supremacy of corporate economic power, the 
power of both state and federal governments was scattered and unorganized, and the 
economic elite overshadowed the political elite. 
The fourth period took place in the 1930s which did not reverse the political and 
economic relations of the third era, however, it created competing centers of power within the 
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political arena, as well as in the corporate world itself. Although economic power was not 
replaced by the political power, it was contested and supplemented. Around this time, the 
New Deal was a system of power which was essentially a balance of pressure groups and 
interest blocs. During this period, social legislation and lower-class issues became important 
features of the reform movement. 
The fifth period began with the onset of World War II, the era with which Mills' The 
Power Elite was primarily concerned. Mills felt that "in earlier periods of its history, 
American society did in fact show considerable flexibility and diversity at all levels, but that 
this has since changed" (Giddens, 1989:327). Mills described this fifth era saying; 
the long-term trends of the power structure have been greatly speeded up since 
World War II, and certain newer trends within and between the dominant 
institutions have also set the shape of the power elite and given historically specific 
meaning to its fifth epoch (Mills, 1956:274). 
According to Mills, this was the era which a new power group composed of 
corporate, governmental, and military directors arose. The power elite of this new era was 
described by Mills as follows: 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the American elite have become an entirely 
different breed of men from those who could on any reasonable grounds be 
considered a cultural elite, or even for that matter cultivated men of sensibility. 
Knowledge and power are not truly united inside the ruling circles; and when men 
of knowledge do come to a point of contact with the circles of powerful men, they 
come not as peers but as hired men. The elite of power, wealth, and celebrity do 
not have even a passing acquaintance with the elite of culture, knowledge and 
sensibility they are not in touch with them—although the ostentatious fnnges of 
the two worlds sometimes overlap in the world of the celebrity (Mills, 1956:351). 
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Mills stated that in a society of power and wealth, knowledge is no longer an ideal but is an 
instrument of power and wealth. He links "the evolving character and composition of elites 
with technoeconomic processes and major institutional trends" (Tilman, 1984:39). 
Although Mills' fifth era was represented by three power elite institutions, it is not true 
now. For example, the military's influence today in governing circles is minuscule, and 
contemporary economic elites are distinctively powerful (Dye, 1995). 
6. Justiflcation of the theory 
Mills was writing in the early 1950s when military prestige was high following the 
Allied victory in World War II. This historical background strongly affected his writing. In 
his book The Fewer Elite (1956), Mills identified the power elite among three institutions — 
the economy, the state, and the military. Mills described the relationship between government 
and corporations in the manner below; 
The modem corporation is the prime source of wealth, but, in latter-day 
capitalism, the political apparatus also opens and closes many avenues to wealth. 
The amount as well as the source of income, the power over consumer's goods as 
well as over productive capital, are determined by position within the political 
economy (Mills, 1956:10). 
Therefore, if there is government intervention in the corporate economy, it is likely corporate 
intervention occurs in the governmental process. According to Mills, more corporate 
executives were involved with government during the preceding three decades than in decades 
prior. Mills described this historical shifl as follows: 
During the last three decades, since the First World War in fact, the distinction 
between the political and the economic man has been diminishing; although the 
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corporation managers have, in the past, distrusted one of their own who stays too 
long in the political arena. They like to come and go, for then they are not 
responsible. Yet more and more of the corporate executives have entered 
govenmient directly; and the result has been a virtually new political economy at 
the apex of which we find those who represent the corporate rich (Mills, 
1956:169). 
The economist Seymour E. Harris compared 200 high-level appointments of the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations (Rose, 1967), and found the following percentage 
distribution according to previous occupation (Table 6). 
Table 6. High-level politicians distribution according to previous occupation 
(in percentage) 
Eisenhower Kennedy 
Government 28 47 
Academic and non-profit organization 26 18 
Law 11 15 
Business, finance, and insurance 36 6 
Other 19 14 
Source; Rose, 1967:123 
Mills showed that most of the key positions in the Eisenhower Administration were 
held by businessmen or corporation lawyers (Rose, 1967). In his Power, Politics and People, 
Mills stated that since World War II it is more explicit to see the long-term tendency of 
business and government (Mills, 1963). Mills wrote: 
As each has assumed its modem shape, its effects upon the other two have become 
greater, and the traffic between the three has increased. There is no longer, on the 
one hand, an economy, and on the other, a political order, containing a military 
establishment unimportant to politics and to money-making. There is a political 
economy numerously linked with military order and decision. This triangle of 
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power is now a structural fact, and it is the key to any understanding of the higher 
circles in America today. For as each of these domains has coincided with the 
others, as decisions in each have become broader, the leading men of each—the 
high military, the corporation executives, the political directorate—have tended 
to come together to form the power elite of America (Mills, 1963:27). 
Mills foresaw the evolution of Eisenhower Administration into a "military-industrial 
complex" in these words; 
In so far as the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the enlarged and 
military state, that clue becomes evident in the military ascendancy. The warlords 
have gained decisive political relevance, and the military structure of America is 
now in considerable part a political structure. The seemingly permanent military 
threat places a premium on the military and upon their control of men, materiel, 
money, and power; virtually all political and economic actions are now judged in 
terms of military definitions of reality (Mills, 1956:275). 
The other warning about the military-industrial complex came from President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, in his official farewell speech on January 17,1961. In his speech, he pointed 
out the close association between the federal government and defense industries, saying: 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is 
new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even 
spiritual — is felt in every city, every State House, every office of the Federal 
Government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we 
must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and 
livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The 
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist 
(Eisenhower, 1961:1935). 
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When Mills wrote The Power Elite (1956), the power elite was found in the economic, the 
political, and the military domains. Mills' description of the power elite, therefore, was cast in 
the realities of the 19S0s. 
7. Deflnition of power elite 
Mills understood the concept of power as a chance which permits individuals to carry 
out their own will in a communal action even if there is opposition to the process (Wallimann, 
Tatsis and Zito, 1977). According to Mills: 
Power has to do with whatever decisions men make about the arrangements under 
which they live, and about the events which make up the history of their times. 
Events that are beyond human decision do happen; social arrangements do change 
A^thout benefit of explicit decision. But in so far as such decisions are made, the 
problem of who is involved in making them is the basic problem of power (Mills, 
1963:23). 
Any consideration of power, according to Mills, must take into account three types of power. 
The first type of power is "authority," which comes about because the subordinate accepts the 
legitimacy of the superordinate. The second type of power is "manipulation," which is 
wielded by the superordinate without the knowledge of the subordinate. The third type of 
power is "coercion," which is imposed by the superordinate without the acceptance of the 
subordinate (Mills, 1963). 
Mills stated that the history of modem society may be understood as the story of the 
enlargement and the centralization of the means of power in the economic, political and 
military domains (Mills, 1963). Mills explained the relationship of these three institutions with 
individuals in the words: 
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The life-fate of the modem individual depends not only upon the family into which he 
was bom or wluch he enters by marriage, but increasingly upon the corporation in 
which he spends the most alert hours of his best years; not only upon the school where 
he is educated as a child and adolescent, but also upon the state which touches him 
throughout his life; not only upon the church in which on occasion he hears the word 
of God, but also upon the army in which he is disciplined (Mills, 1956:6). 
These are major institutions of society which constitute the means of power within modem 
social organization. In each of the three, the typical institutional units become enlarged, 
become administrative, and, in the power of its decisions, become centralized. Within the 
institutions, the power elite possesses a great amount of resources, which are the primary 
source of the expansion of power within society. Mills argues that; 
The economy — once a great scatter of small productive units in 
autonomous balance — has become dominated by two or three hundred giant 
corporations, administratively and politically interrelated, which together hold the 
keys to economic decisions. 
The political order, once a decentralized set of several dozen states with a 
weak spinal cord, has become a centralized, executive establishment which has 
taken up into itself many powers previously scattered, and now enters into each 
and every crany of the social structure. 
The military order, once a slim establishment in a context of distrust fed by 
state militia, has become the largest and most expensive feature of government, 
and, although well versed in smiling public relations, now has all the grim and 
clumsy efficiency of a sprawling bureaucratic domain (Mills, 1956:7). 
Great power in America is concentrated in a handful of people (Hunter, 1953, 1959; DomhofF, 
1978, 1990; Olsen and Marger, 1993; Prewitt and Stone, 1993; Dye, 1995) and Mills thought 
that there is a gradation of power within each of the most powerful institutional orders of 
modem society. Power is an attribute of roles in a social system. Power adheres to 
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institutional roles and the roles give the people who occupy these roles to control over valued 
resources (Waste, 1986; Dye 1995) And in American society, money provides power which 
allows you what you want, when you want it, and how you want it, and it also provides 
freedom. Although not all power is institutionalized, great power is found only in institutional 
roles (Dye, 1976). Today most theorists acknowledge the existence of several sets of 
moderately powerful elites who represent various societal institutions and sectors of activity 
(Olsen and Marger, 1993). Mills' views lead us to ask; 
Research question 11: Did the power elite in the Foletown case rest on institutions? 
In the Poletown case, the idea formed when GM told the city that the company would 
like to relocate a major auto plant within Detroit's city limit. GM (corporation) and the city 
of Detroit (government) were the institutions played a major role together.' The city needed 
its jobs and capital desperately, and GM had power because of its control over resources — 
capital mobility (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981; Jones and Bachelor, 1984; Fasenfest, 
1986). Therefore, GM was able to set its demands early in the process when the city was 
reviewing the potential sites. The company's power could be seen in the way the process 
proceeded in the exchange. GM had something the city wanted and the corporation was not 
required to make the desired object available to Detroit, therefore the city had to pay to get it 
(Jones and Bachelor, 1984). It was GM "who conceived the project, determined its cost, 
selected the site, and imposed specific deadlines and conditions upon the city of Detroit 
regarding clearance of the property, the taking of title, and tax abatement" (Lewis, 1982: 
^ Informants identified GM and the city of Detroit as the power elite. 
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91S). For instance, the entire process was constrained by two GM deadlines; one was 
October 1, 1980 to review the progress the city made in its search for a suitable site for a new 
plant, and another was May 1,1981 to take possession of the site (Fasenfest, 1986). The time 
period from the announcement to the day the site was sold to GM was less than a year which 
was the shortest period of time in the history of the Unites States regarding the relocation of 
people under the eminent domain (Lewis, 1982). Ralph Nader, a consumer advocate who 
supported the PNC, remarked about GM's power as follows: 
"My principal concern is that General Motors Corp., the second richest corporation in 
the world, makes the decisions in Detroit, not the city government." He charged that 
millions of dollars of public tax money are being spent in Poletown "so the second 
richest corporation in the world can build a highly automated, highly robotised 
Cadillac assembly plant" {The Detroit News, March 12,1981.lA). 
Therefore, when the court ruled that it was acceptable to condemn homes and businesses for 
private enterprise, Nader called the Michigan court "a GM court" (The Detroit News, March 
14,1981). 
Compared to GM's economic resources, the city of Detroit had political resources. 
One such governmental power was used to clear the Poletown area under eminent domain 
authority with a help of the quick take law, although this authority was challenged by the 
PNC. For example, when the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the city of Detroit could 
proceed with acquiring their neighborhood for the GM plant, Ronald Reosti, attorney in the 
Michigan suit for the PNC said: 
Today's decision has an impact far broader than the city of Detroit and its residents. It 
jeopardizes the homes, churches and neighborhoods of every city where a large 
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corporation wants the property of private citizens. In essence, the public welfare has 
been subordinated to the dictates of major corporations {The Detroit News, March 14, 
1981:3 A). 
Without Michigan's new quick take law, the Poletown project could not have been 
undertaken (Moberg, 1981). Besides the Mayor's Office, Detroit's Community Economic 
Development Department (CEDD) also played key roles in relation to the project. The 
CEDD was primarily responsible for technical and financial planning, and for implementation 
of the project plant (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981; Fasenfest, 1989). 
Regarding another government power used in Poletown case, an interesting incident 
occurred in Hamtramck. A 12-year-old urban renewal lawsuit against the city of Hamtramck 
was settled on December 12, clearing the way for Hamtramck and Detroit to apply for a $3S 
million federal grant for site preparation for a proposed Cadillac plant. The cities' urgent need 
for the grant to begin demolition was instrumental in getting the sides together to settle the 
suit {The Detroit Free Press, December 13,1980). Originally, Hamtramck was not eligible 
for certain federal grants, which included a $3S million urban development action grant for 
site preparation for the GM plant because of the long-standing suit. This incident shows the 
power of the city to settle the court case quickly. Detroit and Hamtramck officials were 
working together in an effort to keep GM fi-om leaving the Detroit area. Regarding the city of 
Detroit, when the city council was discussing the GM plant, one of the council members said, 
"the city will be using its 'offices' to provide welfare for GM, in the hopes of saving jobs, 
while at the same time we're cutting back benefits to the unemployed... The economic policy 
of this country is being (dictated) by the big transnational companies and we're trapped in it" 
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(The Detroit News, August 5,1980; 14A). The Detroit Free Press stated that it seemed as if 
the Michigan Constitution, the Michigan Legislature and the Detroit City Council said it is in 
the public interest to condemn land and sell it to GM for the purpose of preserving jobs, and 
even that court should not interfere. The Detroit Free Press, in an article printed in 1981 
(November 22), took the view that the Poletown case was a story in which two large 
institutions and the people that ran them controlled events. 
Regarding the residents in Poletown, the members of PNC and some other residents 
were fighting to save their neighborhood. According to one of them, Poletown was the only 
neighborhood in this district where everybody helped each other but GM did not care about 
black or white if they were poor (The Detroit Free Press, November 16,1980). Residents in 
Poletown were powerless without any institutional power (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981; 
Moberg, 1981; Bachelor, 1982; Bukowczyk, 1986; Alderman and Kennedy, 1991). For 
instance, regarding whether the Poletown residents had any impact on GM and city's 
decision-making, there was no impact.^ Regarding their political resources, they lacked 
traditional resources of money, expertise, numbers of votes, and access to officials.^ 
In sununary, the power elite in the Poletown case rested on two institutions — 
corporation and government. GM and the city of Detroit were two key institutions. The 
residents of Poletown did not belong to the power elite institutions, therefore they were 
powerless. 
^ Telephone inteiview and a questionnaire with people who involved the Poletown events. 
^ Information gathered from an informant. 
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According to Mills, the power elite are composed of political, economic, and military 
men, and he defined the elite as people of superior character and energy. The elite are "a set 
of higher circles whose members are selected, trained and certified and permitted intimate 
access to those who command the impersonal institutional hierarchies of modem 
society"(Mills, 1956:15). Mills believed the elite are powerful in the society. In Mills'theory: 
The elite who occupy the command posts may be seen as the possessors of power 
and wealth and celebrity; they may be seen as members of the upper stratum of a 
capitalistic society. They may also be defined in terms of psychological and moral 
criteria, as certain kinds of selected individual (Mills, 1956:13). 
If the elite do not have power, they cannot be held responsible. Elites occupy the top 
positions in three hierarchies. 
. . .  t h e y  a r e  i n  p o s i t i o n s  t o  m a k e  d e c i s i o n s  h a v i n g  m a j o r  c o n s e q u e n c e s .  W h e t h e r  
they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do 
occupy such pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make a decision, 
is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do 
make" (Mills, 1956:4). 
Therefore, the elite consist of people who occupy power roles in society. In a modem 
complex society, these roles are institutionalized. The elite are the individuals who occupy 
positions of authority — the expected and legitimate capacity to direct, manage, and guide 
programs, policies, and activities of the major institutions of society—in large institutions 
(Dye, 1976). According to Mills, the power elite are composed of men whose positions 
enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary people. They are in positions 
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to make decisions having major consequences. He described the powerful elite in the 
following passage; 
By the powerful we mean, of course, those who are able to realize their will, even if 
others resist it. No one, accordingly, can be truly powerful unless he has access to 
the command of major institutions for it is over these institutional means of power 
that the truly powerful are, in the first instance, powerful. Higher politicians and 
key officials of government command such institutional power; so do admirals and 
generals, and so do the major owners and executives of the larger corporations. 
Not all power, it is true, is anchored in and exercised by means of such institutions, 
but only within and through them can power be more or less continuous and 
important (Mills, 1956:9). 
To be powerful, for Mills, means to be able to realize one's will even if one is in conflict with 
others. According to him, what makes individuals powerful is the position itself which gives 
an individual control over the activities of other individuals (Dye, 1976). Mills described this 
relationship between power and institutional authority in the following manner: 
If we took the one hundred most powerful men in America, the one hundred 
wealthiest, and the one hundred most celebrated away from the institutional 
positions they now occupy, away from their resources of men and women and 
money, away from the media of mass communication... then they would be 
powerless and poor and uncelebrated. For power is not of a man. Wealth does 
not center in the person of the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any 
personality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power, requites access to 
major institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large 
part their chances to have and to hold these valued experiences (Mills, 1956:9). 
Therefore, power is an attribute of roles in a social institution (Waste, 1986). People are 
powerful when they are in positions which give them authority and control over institutions 
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(Dye, 1976). Mills'primary interest was those structural positions within the major 
institutions of society and how power is distributed by them. We are lead to ask: 
Research question 12: Did the power in the Poletcwn case rest on higher positions? 
In the Poletown case, the idea formed when GM chairman Thomas A. Murphy (later 
Roger B. Smith) told Detroit's Mayor Coleman A. Young that he would like to relocate a 
major auto plant within Detroit's city limits {The Detroit News, July 7, 1980). For example, in 
October 1980, the Detroit City Council received a warning from both from the city and GM 
to get assurances in writing on federal loans and tax abatements on a new GM project before 
its vote. Besides the pressure from the mayor's office, GM's board chairman Thomas A. 
Murphy applied more pressure on the city council sajdng other communities are eager to have 
the plant if Detroit cant get its package together {The Detroit News, October 22, 1980). This 
demonstrates the power GM's chairman had over the city council. 
According to Mayor Young, most of the project's key decisions were basically his, 
including selection of the site, which included Chrysler Corp.'s abandoned Dodge Main plant 
in Hamtramck in addition to 1,342 households and 148 businesses in the Detroit portion (The 
Detroit News, December 2, 1980). According to Ute Detroit News (Se^itemheT 2,1980), 
there were two men behind the project who played important roles. One was David S. Potter, 
vice president of GM, who addressed the Detroit City Council on behalf of the proposed new 
Cadillac assembly plant, and the other key mover for Detroit was Emmett S. Moten Jr., 
director of Detroit's Community and Economic Development Department (CEDD). He was 
Mayor Young's man in charge of the clearing Poletown areas for GM's plant. Regarding 
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Moten, when a New York firm. Turner Construction Co., won a contract for preliminary 
work on GM plant, he was asked why the contract was going to Turner without competitive 
bids required by city charter. Moten elaborated on citing a personal judgment that Detroit 
officials would be comfortable working with Turner {The Detroit News, December 10, 1980) 
which shows his positional power. Regarding the mayor and a director of CEDD's power, 
state and federal legislation allowed them maximum discretion in combining multiple financing 
sources and enabling authority, and in judging the value and feasibility of the project (Jones, 
Bachelor and Wang, 1981; Bachelor, 1982a). 
In summary, the power in the Poletown case rested on higher positions. The power 
rested on GM's executive members and Detroit's mayor and his top staff 
Mills acknowledged that although the power elite occupy the top institutions, they are 
not omnipotent; they do not make all decisions (Isaac, 1987). Mills wrote that not all power 
is anchored in and exercised by means of these institutions, but only within and through them 
power can be more or less continuous and important. According to him, there is another 
standard item in the roster of elite values: 
MONEY is another standard item in the roster of elite values. But when we 
inquire seriously about money and how it is acquired we are again led to 
institutions and to the position persons occupy in them. For what does it mean to 
be wealthy? It means that one has a claim upon productive inceptions. For none 
of the truly "big money" comes from salaries. It is impossible to examine with any 
depth "the very rich" without also examining the modem corporation. Virtually sdl 
of the very rich families have been and still are closely connected, always legally 
and frequently managerially as well, with one or the other of the one or two 
hundred largest corporations. If our interest in the very rich goes beyond 
consumer economics, we must examine their intricate relations to such 
corporations. In brief, the relations of men to modem forms of property, to the 
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corporate institutions, determine their chances to secure big wealth and receive 
high income (\fills, 1957; 150). 
The idea of the power elite, according to Mills, is "an interpretation." "It rests upon and it 
enables us to make sense of major institutional trends, the social similarities and psychological 
affinities of the men at the top. But the idea is also based upon what has been happening on 
the middle and lower levels of power" (Mills, 1956:30). 
8. Cohesion of the power structure 
The three groups of power elite are not only similar in terms of making important 
decision but also they interlock and overlap in four important respects (Prewitt and Stone, 
1973; Rose, 1967). In Mills' view: 
The conception of the power elite and of its unity rests upon the corresponding 
developments and the coincidence of interests among economic, political, and 
military organizations. It also rests upon the similarity of origin and outlook, and 
the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant 
hierarchies. This conjunction of institutional and psycholo^cal forces, in turn, is 
revealed by the heavy personnel traffic within and between the big three 
institutional orders, as well as by the rise of go-betweens as in the high-level 
lobbying. The conception of the power elite, accordingly, does not rest upon the 
assumption that American history since the origins of World War II must be 
understood as a secret plot, or as a great and co-ordinated conspiracy of the 
members of his elite. The conception rests upon quite impersonal grounds (Mills, 
1956:292) 
Firstly, there has been a coincidence of objective interest among the three groups of 
the power elite since the onset of World War II. Mills described this coincidence of interest 
between those power elite in the following manner: 
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The shape and meaning of the power elite today can be understood only when 
these three sets of structural trends [identified above—^H.A.] are seen at their point 
of coincidence; the military capitalism of private corporations exists in a weakened 
and formal democratic system containing a militaiy order already quite political in 
outlook and demeanor. Accordingly, at the top of this structure, the power elite 
has been shaped by the coincidence of interest between those who control the 
major means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of 
violence; from the decline of the professional politician and the rise to explicit 
political command of the corporate chieftains and the professional warlords; from 
the absence of any genuine civil service of skill and integrity, independent of vested 
interests (Mills, 1956:276). 
Mills stated that the internal discipline and the community of interests are a powerful means of 
binding the power elite together. This leads us to ask the next question; 
Research question 13. Did the power elite in the Poletown case share the same interest? 
In the Poletown case, GM's and Detroit's interests coincided. First of all, GM was 
interested in relocating a major auto plant within Detroit's city limits — maintaining its 
projection options (Fasenfest, 1986). Throughout the Poletown project, GM showed its own 
institutional interests by maximizing profits (Bukowczyk, 1984). In an interview with The 
Detroit News, GM's chairman Roger B. Smith said: 
. . .  h e  b e l i e v e d  M a y o r  C o l e m a n  A .  Y o u n g  w i l l  k e e p  h i s  p l e d g e  t o  s e c u r e  a l l  t h e  
property in the 465-acre tract. "We feel that the mayor is going to come through," 
Smith said. "You know somewhere along the line the best thing is going to happen. 
And what's the best thing? To have the plant built here. There are a lot of jobs at 
stake" (Uie Detroit News, March 13, 1981:1 A). 
Regarding the Poletown demolition. Smith said that without new investment nothing would 
happen, and things had to be done that was in the best interest of everybody. He believed that 
the tax base should return to the city, and that was what the mayor was trying to do {The 
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Detroit News, March 13,1981). The city's major interest was to promote industrial renewal 
(Jones, Bachelor and Wang, 1981). The Detroit Free Press attacked GM saying, "It is a 
vicious disregard of people for the sake of profit and power. All the rhetoric from General 
Motors about concern for Detroit is a smokescreen for its own dominating interest, increasing 
profit" {The Detroit Free Press, September 5,1980:8A). However, the same newspaper's 
editorial stated: 
The interests of General Motors cannot and should not be allowed to override the 
interests of the people of the city. But there is a strong public interest in rebuilding 
our obsolescent industrial plant. There is a strong public interest in reusing the Dodge 
Main property. There is a strong public interest in retaining all the industrial jobs we 
can in a period when such jobs are perpetually in peril. There is a strong public 
interest in redeveloping the central city and avoiding urban sprawl {The Detroit Free 
Press,i\x\y2, 1980; 8 A). 
The same newspaper's editorial also said that it is in the public interest to show that an aging 
industrial city can put together the land needed to replace its industrial plant and maint^n as 
many industrial jobs as it possibly can in efficient and productive plants. Through the 
Poletown project, the interest of the city and the interest of GM simply coincided (Bachelor, 
Jones and Wang, 1981; Bachelor, 1982a). In terms of government and private joint venture, 
GM's proposed plant was not the first plant built by GM with the help of a local government, 
nor was it Detroit's first joint venture with private industry {The Detroit News, September 2, 
1980). According to The Detroit News {SepitvcLh&c 2, 1980:3A): 
City officials aren't shy about the reasons behind their efforts to nail down the Cadillac 
plant for Detroit. Moten, head of the Community and Economic Development 
Department, says: "We're fighting for our damned lives. It used to be that the private 
actor could do everything for themselves. But that's changed in the last four or five 
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years and more cities are helping industry now by assembling land and providing 'gap' 
financing. 
Prior to the Poletown project, Mayor Young was attempting to rebuild an industrial city 
within the boundaries and to accomplish that he requested Ford, GM and Chrysler if they had 
any plans to expand or build new plants, the city of Detroit be given the first opportunity 
(Alderman and Kennedy, 1991). David S. Potter, a vice president of GM, explained GM's 
situation: 
With the U.S. auto industry retrenching to meet changing market demands and stiff 
foreign competition, the SS-year-oId executive has no qualms about a proposed 
partnership in which the city of Detroit will help GM build a modem factory on a SOO-
acre site on the Detroit-Hamtramck border (The Detroit News, September 2, 
1980:3A). 
Potter said that there is no reason why industry, municipalities and the federal government 
cannot work together for good end result (The Detroit News, September 2, 1980). 
The city of Detroit was attempting to raze Poletown for GM's new plant since the city 
wanted to keep GM fi-om moving out of the city. According to the law of eminent domain, 
the court ruled as follows; 
In its ruling, the court majority held that the city had exercised its power of eminent 
domain for "the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing 
the economic base of the community," and that "if the public benefit was not so clear 
and significant, we would hesitate to sanction approval of such a project." "The 
benefit to a private interest is merely incidental," the court said (The Detroit Free 
Press, March 14,1981:11 A). 
127 
Therefore, the argument for the public-private co-operation was that it would save the jobs of 
approximately 6,000 auto workers, although technically the city was condemning and 
acquiring the property to provide the new plant site for GM {The Detroit News, January 6, 
1981). To keep GM from leaving the Detroit area, Detroit and Hamtramck officials, who had 
the same interest as Detroit, worked together. According to Richard Simmons, Detroit's 
deputy mayor, "We are attempting to accommodate the corporation and the cities of 
Hamtramck, and Detroit to revitalize this area" (The Detroit News, July 1, 1980:4A). Mayor 
Young as well as the Detroit City Council members said that the public benefit of the project 
is that it will keep jobs in the city that would otherwise be lost if GM builds its plant elsewhere 
{The Detroit News, November 4, 1980). Also a prominent Detroit attorney, Jason L. 
Honigman, made a rare lower-court appearance to argue that Detroit's condemnation of land 
for the proposed new Cadillac plant would help relieve the unemployment problem, therefore 
it would be in the public interest {The Detroit News, November 18,1980). In addition, 
according to a divided Michigan Supreme Court which upheld Wayne Circuit Judge George 
Martin's ruling, the city's condemnation of private property for a GM plant was proper 
because Detroit had a valid interest in preserving jobs and tax base {The Detroit News, April 
23,1981). According to an editorial in The Detroit News (September 11,1980:18A), 
"What's good for General Motors is definitely good for Detroit — and vice versa." In the 
Michigan Supreme Court, dissenting Justice Ryan concluded that; 
What has been done in this case can be explained by the overwhelming sense of 
inevitability that has attended this litigation fi-om the beginning; a sense attributable 
to the combination and coincidence of the interests of a desperate city 
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administration and a giant corporation willing and able to take advantage of the 
opportunity that presented itself (Ryan, 1981:481). 
In summary, the power elite in the Poletown case shared the same interest. GM and 
the city of Detroit shared almost identical interests. GM's interest was to increase profits 
through the construction of a new plant, and Detroit's interest was to boost its economy 
through GM's plant. 
Regarding the second important respect of cohesion of the power structure, the career 
pattern of the elite groups interlocks. There is an interlocking directorate of top-ranking 
military, political, governmental, and business leaders. For instance, "there are four more 
members of the corporate rich in the cabinet—two more men from General Motors; a 
leading financier and director of New England's largest bank; and a millionaire publisher fi"om 
Texas" (Mills, 1956:232). Mills stated the increase of the interchange of personnel and the 
unity of the power elite. For Mills, this interchangeability of top roles is mostly based on their 
coinciding interest. Mills wrote: 
The unity revealed by the interchangeability of top roles rests upon the parallel 
development of the top jobs in each of the big three domains. The interchange 
occurs most frequently at the points of their coinciding interest, as between 
regulatory agency and the regulated industry; contracting agency and contractor. 
And, as we shall see, it leads to co-ordinations that are more explicit, and even 
formal (Mills, 1956:288). 
There are numerous instances of the power elite who interchange commanding roles at 
the top of one dominant institution for another. A good example is as follows: 
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Alexander Haig, for example, has held top positions in private business, was 
secretary of state under Ronald Reagan as well as a 1988 presidential candidate, 
and is a retired army officer holding the rank of general. Haig is far from the only 
case of this kind; a majority of national political leaders enter public life from 
powerful and highly paid positions in business — and return to the corporate 
world later on (Macionis, 1993:516). 
Mills described this as follows; 
We refer to one man who moves in and between perhaps two circles — say the 
industrial and the military — and to another man who moves in the military and the 
political, and to a third who moves in the political as well as among opinion-
makers. These in-between types most closely display our image of the power 
elite's structure and operation, even of behind-the-scenes operations (Mills, 
1956;289). 
Mintz and Schwartz (1981) studied interlocking directorates and interest group 
formation, finding that highly placed corporate managers across the country tend to interact 
with one another regularly and exert real political power. Figure 16 shows the origins of 
individuals who sit on the board of General Motors (note that they also sit on the boards of 29 
other corporations), by mean of which General Motors is linked to 690 other corporations. In 
Mills' view; 
The top corporations are not a set of splendidly isolated giants. They have been 
knit together by explicit associations, within their respective industries and regions 
and in supra-associations such as the NAM. These associations organize a unity 
among the managerial elite and other members of the corporate rich. They 
translate narrow economic powers into industry-wide and class-wide powers; and 
they use these powers, first, on the economic front, for example with reference to 
labor and its organizations; and, second, on the political front, for example in their 
large role in the political sphere. And they infuse into the ranks of smaller 
businessmen the views of big business (Mills, 1956; 122). 
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For Mills, it was important to pay attention to the elite group interlocking to study the 
power elite. Mills' views lead us to ask; 
Research question 14: Did the power elite in the Poletown case have association with 
other power elite? 
In the Poletown case, GM had a good association with the city of Detroit. One 
editorial read: 
General Motors, as vast as its enterprises are, is our friend and neighbor. Its birthplace 
and headquarters are here. Its resources are enormous and its alternatives are many. 
Thus, the company's dramatic reaffirmation of faith in our state and our people is, 
especially in these times, a cause for pride and confidence {The Detroit News, October 
19, 1980:14A). 
After GM's aimouncement, both Detroit and Hamtramck's Economic Development 
Corporation met together to approve resolutions pledging to co-operate in making the site 
available to GM (The Detroit Free Press, July 1, 1980). When Mayor Young asked for a 
50% tax break for Poletown's GM plant, Detroit's Community and Economic Development 
Department director Emmett Moten said negotiations with GM resulted in an acquaintance of 
GM' to the city's position {The Detroit Free Press, March 17,1981). GM, in fact, had a 
network which was tied to many public officials in Michigan. For instance, the board 
members of New Detroit, Inc., a private development corporation, were Detroit Mayor 
Coleman Young; Roger Smith, the chairman of General Motors; the president of the United 
Auto Workers (UAW); and the general manager of a local television news program (Wylie, 
1981). UAW's president Douglas Fraser praised GM for showing a degree of responsibility 
by remaining in Detroit (Gaines, 1981). Mayor Young was one of UAW Union's former 
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organizers and had an easy alliance Avith them (Guzzardi, 1980), and he also had favorable 
relationships with the city's business leadership (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981). Besides 
New Detroit, the Detroit Renaissance, the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation and the 
Economic Development Corporation, and the Chamber of Commerce also had overlapping 
membership and centralized power (Wylie, 1989). GM's vice president Potter represented an 
excellent example of the interlocking power elite; interrupting his 20-year career with the 
General Motors Corp., he served the Nixon and Ford Administrations for two and a half 
years, first as assistant secretary of the Navy for Research and Development and later as 
undersecretary of the Navy {TJie Detroit News, September 2, 1980). 
In the Poletown project, Detroit officials had close relationships with state and federal 
agencies; the federal government provided the bulk of the loans and grants, and the state 
government provided essential enabling legislation and added financing (Bachelor, Jones and 
Wang, 1981; Jones, Bachelor and Wang, 1981). This heavy reliance of local officials on 
intergovernmental sources of financing and authority made the project possible. For instance 
the fiscal year 1979, Detroit received about $620 million fi-om Michigan and Washington. It 
means about two out of every five dollars of Detroit revenues came from them (Guzzardi, 
1980). 
Mayor Young's relationship with federal government was its access to the Carter 
Administration (Stuart, 1979; Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981; Jones, Bachelor and Wang, 
1981; Bachelor, 1982). This access enabled him to ensure that funds would be available to 
cover the $200 million public sector costs of the project. Mayor Young's relationships with 
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Carter administration started when he supported Carter's 1976 election campaign. Stuart 
wrote: 
Young marshaled black votes for Carter and it was Young who spoke out on 
national television in defense of Carter's controversial "ethnic purity" comments 
during the campaign, remarks that caused considerable trouble for the Democrats 
among civil-ri{^ts advocates. In the summer of 1978, he helped engineer a Carter 
statement reaffirming the responsibility of the Federal Government in the area of 
affirmative action, a statement that was released at a time when Carter's rating 
among blacks was plun^ng. And Carter has named Young vice churman of the 
Democratic National Committee (Stuart, 1979; 114). 
Young's connection to the federal government was not only the access to Carter, but also an 
access to Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Secretary Moon Landrieu 
and Assistant Secretary Robert Embry. This access enabled the city to access HUD officials 
necessary in formulating and securing approval for the grants and loan guarantees (Jones, 
Bachelor and Wang, 1981; Bachelor, 1982). Regarding Young's development director 
Emmett S. Moten, Jr., Young got Moten from his old pal. Moon Landrieu, former mayor of 
New Orleans, now President Carter's secretary of Housing and Urban Development {The 
Detroit News, November 2, 1980). Without federal aid, the city of Detroit would not be able 
to prepare the site for GM. 
Regarding Mayor Young's relationship with the state, he also had close ties with the 
administration of Republican Governor William Milliken (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). 
Governor Milliken was very successful in lobbying Reagan (Young and Wheeler, 1994). For 
example, the Reagan administration approved a key $30-million grant for the proposed GM 
plant. According to an editorial in The Detroit News, Governor Milliken had cordial relations 
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with the White House, and the early indications were that he would have access to the 
president and his advisers {The Detroit News, February 13,1981). Regarding Governor 
Milliken's new role, a news article described it in the excerpts below; 
Besides coming as good news to Detroit, the announcement reflected Republican 
Milliken's new role as conduit for federal fiinds to Detroit, replacing Democratic 
Mayor Coleman A. Young. Milliken's success in Washington was in marked contrast 
to last week's White House snub of Young, third-ranking ofScial of the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors, who was not invited to a meeting between the president and a 
group of mayors. Young was an ardent supporter of President Carter in the last 
election and during the campaign referred to Mr. Reagan as "prune face".... 
Said Milliken: "Last week my office initiated discussion of grant, informing the Reagan 
administration of its extreme importance to the economic revitalization of Detroit and 
its neighbors and urging its quick approval. "It is obvious that Secretary Pierce 
recognizes that this development is essential to maintaining the industrial base in this 
area and that the grant will permit the retention of the assembly operation in the two 
cities, which now suflFer from an unemployment rate of 18 percent" {The Detroit News, 
February 12. 1981: 2B&5B). 
It shows the importance of association since it changed the direction of politics. Previously, 
Mayor Young had a cordial relationship with the Carter Administration. Thus, prior to the 
presidential election. Councilman David Eberhard and Cockrel also suggested that the GM aid 
plan might be jeopardized if President Carter is not reelected in November. Therefore, 
Cockrel s^d the financing scheme presupposes the continued sweet relations with Moon 
Landrieu {The Detroit News, August 5, 1980). According to an editorial in The Detroit News, 
(October 17, 1980;8A): 
If the political motive for HUD's action, coming just weeks before the presidential 
election, is hard to ignore, most Detroiters can set aside their partisan differences long 
enough to welcome a necessary and timely decision.... 
HUD threw red tape out the window and said it could get along without the usually 
required environmental impact statement. Without this dispensation, months would 
135 
have been lost and Detroit would have missed General Motors' deadline for getting on 
with the project. Even now, the city has little time to spare in buying 1,362 homes and 
143 businesses, relocating 3,438 residents, and demolishing 1,176 buildings. 
According to another example of Mayor Young's association with local elites; 
Jason L. Honigman, who guessed it had been "probably 20 years" since he last 
appeared in Wayne Circuit Court, said he appeared at the request of Mayor Coleman 
A. Young. Young has retained the firm of Honigman, Miller, Schwartz and Cohn to 
help defend the city's $200-million acquisition of465 acres so that General Motors 
can build a $500-million plant on the Detroit-Hamtramck border (The Detroit News, 
November 18, 1980;2B). 
Thus, the major power elite in Poletown were associated with various resourceful people in 
Detroit. 
Regarding the residents of Poletown, they were awed by the impressive array of forces 
GM, the city, HUD, the Carter Administration, the UAW aligned against them (Bukowczyk, 
1984). Nader said his staff was filing many requests under the federal Freedom of Information 
Law to determine the relationship between Detroit, GM and two federal funding agencies, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
{The Detroit News, February 1,1981), The residents had no connection with the power 
elites.® 
In summary, the power elite in the Poletown case had associations with other power 
elites. The power elite in the city of Detroit and GM had associations with other power elites, 
while Poletown residents had no such connections. 
' This information was obtained through a telephone interview and written correspondence with individuals 
involved in the Poletown incident. 
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Regarding the third important respect of cohesion of the power structure, in many 
instances, the origins, background, and educational patterns of the power elite coincide 
causing similar psychological orientations. According to Mills, to grasp the personal and 
social basis of the power elite's unity, we have to be aware of the origin, career, and style of 
life of each of the groups whose members compose the power elite. Mills described the origin 
of the power elite in the following words: 
Their fathers were at least of the professional and business strata, and very 
frequently higher than that. They are native-bom Americans of native parents, 
primarily from urban areas, and, with the exceptions of the politicians among them, 
overwhelmingly from the East. They are mainly Protestant, especially 
Episcopalian or Presbyterian. In summary, the higher the position, the greater the 
proportion of men within it who have derived from and who maintain connections 
with the upper classes. The generally similar origins of the members of the power 
elite are underlined and carried further by the fact of their increasingly common 
educational routine. Overwhelmingly college graduates, substantial proportions 
have attended Ivy League colleges (Mills, 1956:279). 
In Mills' view, the power elite consist mainly of wealthy, white, Anglo-Saxon, 
Protestant males from old east coast families, and from the same prestigious universities. 
Koistinen (1980) pointed out the similarity of backgrounds within the power elite as follows: 
. . .  t h e  t e m p o r a r y  c i v i l i a n  m a n a g e r s  w h o  c o m e  t o  W a s h i n g t o n  t o  r u n  A m e r i c a ' s  
wars and preparations for war [holding down "the very top Jobs" as counselors to 
the president, secretaries of defense and state, secretaries of the three services, the 
chairman of the old Atomic Energy commission, and the director of the CIA, or 
advising those who hold those posts] were so alike one another in occupation, 
religion, style, and social status that, apart from a few Washington lawyers, 
Texans, and mavericks, it was possible to locate the offices of all of them within 
fifteen city blocks in New York, Boston, and Detroit. Most of their biographies in 
Who's Who read like minor variations on a single theme—wealthy parents, Ivy-
League education, leading law firm or bank (or entrepreneur in a war industry), 
introduction to government in World War 11 (Koistinen, 1980:123). 
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Although Mills described the power elite as being mainly from the upper-class, the 
contemporary military officers are more likely from lower- and lower-middle-class 
backgrounds (Dye, 1995). 
Lastly, the power elite intimately associate with each other socially and in their 
business lives. Moore's study (1979) demonstrated the extent of elite communication and 
discussion networks in the United States. He found out that almost one-third of the leaders he 
studied make up one enormous clique (Whitt, 1982). According to Mills: 
The people of the higher circles may also be conceived as members of a top social 
stratum, as a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another 
socially and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into 
account. The elite, according to this conception, feel themselves to be, and are felt 
by others to be, the inner circle of "the upper social classes." They form a more or 
less compact social and psychological entity; they have become self-conscious 
members of a social class. People are either accepted into this class or they are 
not, and there is a qualitative split, rather than merely a numerical scale, separating 
them from those who are not elite. They are more or less aware of themselves as a 
social class and they behave toward one another differently from the way they do 
toward members of other classes. They accept one another, understand one 
another, marry one another, tend to work and to think if not together at least alike 
(Mills, 1956:11). 
Thus, the social intermingling among the power elite is nothing out of the ordinary according 
to Mills. This is one characteristic of the power elite which allows one to identify this group. 
9. Exercise of the structure of power 
Mills claimed that the power elite make the important decisions, and in the process, 
they use manipulation to achieve their ends. Mills distinguished authority and manipulation — 
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authority as a power which is explicit and more or less voluntarily obeyed and manipulation is 
the power which secretly exercised and unknown to those who are influenced. 
Mills stated that manipulation is the principle means of exercising power in present 
American society. In Mills' view: 
Manipulation becomes a problem wherever men have power that is concentrated 
and willful but do not have authority, or when, for any reason, they do not wish to 
use their power openly. Then the powerful seek to rule without showing their 
powerfulness. They want to rule, as it was, secretly, without publicized 
legitimation. It is in this mixed case — as in the intermediate reality of the 
American today—that manipulation is a prime way of exercising power. Small 
circles of men are making decisions which they need to have at least authorized by 
indifferent or recalcitrant people over whom they do to exercise explicit authority. 
So the small circle tries to manipulate these people into willing acceptance or 
cheerful support of their decisions or opinions — or at least to the rejection of 
possible counter-opinions. 
Authority formally resides 'in the people,' but the power of initiation is in fact held 
by small circles of men. That is why the standard strategy of manipulation is to 
make it appear that the people, or at least a large group of them, 'really made the 
decision.' That is why even when the authority is available, men with access to it 
may still prefer the secret, quieter ways of manipulation (Mills, 1956:317). 
Mills clamed that the power elite use public relations and manipulation for their 
success instead of their knowledge. Mills described American society in the words: 
America — a conservative country without any conservative ideology — appears 
now before the worid a naked and arbitrary power, as, in the name of realism, its 
men of decision enforce their often crackpot definitions upon worid reality. The 
second-rate mind is in command of the ponderously spoken platitude. In the 
liberal rhetoric, vagueness, and in the conservative mood, irrationality, are raised 
to principle. Public relations and the official secret, the trivializing campaign and 
the terrible fact clumsily accomplished, are replacing the reasoned debate of 
political ideas in the privately incorporated economy, the military ascendancy, and 
the political vacuum of modem America (Mills, 1956:360-361). 
139 
In American society, Mills judged the mass media of communication to be powerful 
political instruments — important instruments of manipulation. In Mills' theory; 
But the media, as now organized and operated, are even more than a major cause 
of the transformation of America into a mass society. They are also among the 
most important of those increased means of power now at the disposal of elites of 
wealth and power; moreover, some of the higher agents of these media are 
themselves either among the elites or very important among their servants (Mills, 
1956:315). 
The media inform what is happening in the world. However, according to Mills, some of the 
higher agents of these media are either in the elites or veiy important among their followers. 
The power elite are more likely to use existing organizations to achieve their goals by worldng 
together with those organizations. However, if there are no such institutions, they will invent 
such machinery and use it. We are lead to ask: 
Research question IS: Did the power elite manipulate other individuals? 
In the Poletown case, there were several instances of manipulation by the power elite 
during the project.® One example was the timetable the company imposed on the city. 
Through experience GM learned that if the company imposed an immediate deadline and 
threatened alternative plant possibility somewhere else, government leaders would bend over 
backwards to accommodate the corporation. Meanwhile, opposition groups would barely 
have time to form opposing arguments (Wylie, 1989). At the time Poletown project was 
announced, there were several other places GM was planning to build its plant, and one of 
' Telephone interview with an infonnant. 
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them was in Kansas City. According to a head of the neighborhood group of the plant site in 
Kansas City: 
"The pattern is the same in every city," Rosenthal said. "GM holds a gun to the 
head of the city. It doesn't give them time to consider sound plans, forcing them 
to act prematurely, to grant what GM demands. Then, GM stands aside, letting 
the city officials take all the heat, saying 'the city needs us and we want to be good 
neighbors. GM puts politicians in an untenable position" (Wylie, 1989; 227). 
GM not only dictated key elements of the project plant, but also determined the procedures 
for carrying out that plant by posting its deadlines. This GM's deadline was also used by the 
city officials to urge them to cooperate saying these deadlines equate delay with failure (Jones, 
Bachelor and Wang, 1981; Bachelor, 1982b). According to the director of the City Planning 
Commission, his group was involved in project planning and site selection at the minimum, 
and did not conduct a thorough investigation because "it had no assurance that anything it did 
would affect GM's conditions, and because the time involved in such a study could jeopardize 
project deadlines (set down by General Motors)" (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981). GM's 
deadlines prevented a careful study of the project by city officials and reduced the scale of 
citizen participation. GM's timetable was used to force Detroit's City Council members into 
compliance by threatening to cancel the project if GM's deadlines were not met (Jones, 
Bachelor and Wang, 1981; Bachelor, 1982; Jones and Bachelor, 1984; Fasenfest, 1986) — no 
site meant no plant and presumably no jobs (Fasenfest, 1989). 
The second example of manipulation concerned the site selection. At the beginning, 
GM insisted no Michigan site outside the city was being considered (The Detroit News, June 
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27,1980). When the city council was discussing the tax abatement for the GM's new plant, 
GM's board chairman Thomas A. Murphy applied more pressure when he said in a speech 
that other communities were eager to have the plant if Detroit could not get its package 
together (The Detroit News, October 22,1980). According to Ralph Nader, GM had totally 
intimidated the city government, and this was the rawest and most blatant demolition of a 
neighborhood ever demanded by a major corporation {The Detroit News, March 12, 1981). 
The third example was the potential number of employees in the new plant. At city 
council. Councilman Cockrel asked about GM's automation when the city pointed out saving 
jobs (The Detroit News, August 5, 1980). Regarding this point, GM refused to speculate on 
exactly how many new jobs there would be because that depended on how well the backfilling 
operation was carried out {The Detroit News, August 17,1980). Through the project, the 
absolute number of workers was not announced or even mentioned. 
The fourth example concerned GM's written commitment. For instance, at the city 
council. Councilman Jack Kelley noted that plans were proceeding without a written 
commitment from GM, and asked the city whether they were confident the city could do that 
{The Detroit News, August 5, 1980). According to Moten, he did not expect the city to get a 
legally binding agreement from GM until May of 1981 {The Detroit News, December 9, 
1980). 
The last example was GM's claim that it acted as a good citizen. For instance several 
editorials in The Detroit News stated: 
While it's possible that the city of Detroit will come up with an industrial site large 
enough to support the proposed new Cadillac plant, it isn't very likely. City property 
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is just too difficult to assemble and clear to be competitive, for industrial purposes, 
with undeveloped rural and suburban land. This may be an exceptional case, since 
General Motors is obviously aware of the extraordinary pain Cadillac's departure 
would cause Detroit. And city officials are likely to provide every possible incentive 
{The Detroit News, June 27, 1980:6A). 
GM's efforts to upgrade the area north of the New Center and its attempt to locate a 
new Cadillac plant within the city attest to a strong commitment to Detroit's future 
(The Detroit News, September 11,1980:18A). 
General Motors, we should remember, doesn't have to go through a pile of 
horseradish to put up a new plant. There are jurisdictions in Michigan and elsewhere 
that would gladly do handstands to get the facility. But GM decided, knowing from 
the start it would be bucking ferocious headwinds, to press for the Detroit site to help 
its hurting hometown {The Detroit News, February 1, 1981:7B). 
However, GM used this "good citizen" tactic against the city to bargain for its new plant's tax 
abatement. According to GM spokesman, although the corporation had a responsibility to its 
stockholders, GM also recognized an obligation to the community, and thought the 50-
percent abatement appeared to be the logical way to meet both of them {The Detroit News, 
March 17,1981). Although the company had unilaterally planned to replace its older 
facilities, it maintained that the company was interested in, and even committed to remain in 
the Detroit (Fasenfest, 1989). Concerning the possibility if the city council voted no tax 
rebated, GM spokesman said that they might stay in Detroit although this is not completely 
accurate since there were other sites available. "That little 'might not' scares city official: 
there's a big stack of lost jobs and taxes behind those sofl words" (Moberg, 1981). If GM 
was so concerned about the city of Detroit, it could pay its full share of taxes, however, the 
company hinted to move out without the tax abatement. These manipulations were observed 
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in connection with the project process. GM posted the deadlines and hinted it would move 
out if the schedule was delayed and the tax abatements were not available. 
The city of Detroit used manipulation in several ways. The first significant example 
was the announcement of the availability of the numbers of potential new jobs. According to 
the city's federal-fund request, the new GM plant would provide 6,150 new jobs. However, 
GM had said it intended only to keep 3,800 employees after its Clark Street and Fleetwood 
plants were shut down. The city insisted thousands of jobs with suppliers also would be saved 
{The Detroit News, October 22, 1980). Representing the city of Detroit, Attorney Jason 
Honigman declared that the plant would provide 6,000 jobs in the city {The Detroit Free 
Press, March 4,1981). Moten and Young also claimed the new GM plant would provide 
6,000 jobs when it replaced two aging Cadillac facilities in southwest Detroit, however, this 
number was not written anywhere. In Councilman Cockrel's view. 
"The whole argument used all these years to support tax abatement—that it either 
creates new jobs or retains old ones —is something that has never been documented 
and is just kind of a game, a chicanery, as far as I can see," Cockrel declared. He 
recalled that a project planner admitted last fall that a city grant application 
erroneously claimed the project would create new jobs because Washington officials 
"like to hear that kind of thing." "The big figure initially thrown out (by city ofiicial) 
was 6,000 jobs, but now they're saying no fewer than 3,000," Cockrel said {The 
Detroit News, April 16, 1981:7B). 
Mayor Young stressed the potential plant impact on the city's unemployment problem in 
every public forum; thereby raised the manipulation of the symbol of jobs to an art form 
(Jones and Bachelor, 1993). 
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The second point was the way the city pressured the city council. In April 3,1981, the 
city council approved tax abatement for GM plant, although the staff of the council's City 
Planning Commission recommended rejecting it {The Detroit Free Press, April 3,1981). It 
was because, it appeared that if the city council did not approve it, GM was not going to build 
it. However, behind the scene, Mayor Young and Moten told council members that, "GM 
would pull out of the project if the abatement were not granted, sources said. And Young 
bluntly threatened political retaliation against those who opposed him. 'They [council 
members] came in Thursday looking like they had been shipped,' said one council staffer" 
(Wylie, 1989: 139). Emmett Moten said GM had other offers — three very strong offers, and 
the corporation was backing off and if the council did not approve it, GM would pick another 
site {The Detroit Free Press, April 3,1981). The city council was maneuvered into the 
position to approve the project plant (Fasenfest, 1989). For instance, even after Mayor 
Young conceded that the plant would not create new permanent jobs, and that claims of 
thousands of new jobs were not accurate {Jhe Detroit News, October 22,1980), the city 
council approved the site since they were under deadline pressure from GM. Councilman 
Cockrel accused GM and the mayor "of bringing 'murderous pressure' to bear on the council 
to obtain their approval, without even disclosing how and where the city would obtain the 
$200 million estimated needed for site preparation" (Rich, 1989). 
The third point was the way Moten persuaded the council members. Moten received 
several complaints, and one of them was from the council members. Moten — a former 
teacher and coach who had become a rising star in the affairs of cities — seemed to ignore it 
145 
all. He kept mo\ang like a bantam, back and forth, in and out, never stopping long enough for 
anyone to draw a bead on the GM project (Jhe Detroit News, November 2, 1980). Regarding 
his tactic; 
One tactic he employed when pressed for answers was deluge members with highly 
technical financial data or complicated explanations of the innovative schemes drafted 
by his staff. Sometimes during the many GM discussions with the council, depending 
on the toughness of council questions, he'd simply say those answers "haven't been 
worked out yet' and no one could contest him. Once, when particularly pressed, he 
promised answers "tomorrow." But he didn't show the next day. Another time, 
instead of addressing the council as a body with another set of answers, as he had 
promised, he decided he and his staff would talk separately with each council member 
{The Detroit News, November 2,1980:8A). 
People who worked with Moten described him as "disarming" and said that unless one kept 
probing, one could lose sight of the original question. According to Moten's former boss, 
Moon Landrieu; 
"A master of obscurity. When he went before city council down here and didn't 
have a rational explanation for something, he'd talk for a long time, and afterward, 
everyone would say, 'what did he say?'" In the courtroom, as elsewhere, it was 
evident that Moten's contributions to the success of the project involved not only 
what he knew and said but also how he said it (Jones and Bachelor, 1993:126). 
Lastly, city officials gave inaccurate information to the public. For instance, in the GM 
discussions, Moten insisted GM wanted one sort of tax abatement while GM was telling 
everyone it wanted another, better kind, and he reported to the council a $26-million state 
commitment of cash that Lansing denied {The Detroit News, November 2, 1980). The city 
officials had raised the ominous suggestion in public hearings that other cities were courting 
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GM to get the Cadillac plant. But GM said the corporation was not actively seeking bids 
from other cities (The Detroit News, September 2,1980). Another example of discrepancies 
of information was: 
Linda Barnes, a senior aide to Governor Milliken, refuted Moten's testimony that 
the state had promised a $25.8 million contribution toward repayment of the $60 
nullion Section 108 loan. The state had its own budget crunch and would be 
unable to help Detroit, and she said that the city already knew this. Nonetheless, 
before the month was out, the conmion council had approved diversion of some 
$60.5 million which had already been allocated to neighborhood projects for 
acquisition and clearance of land. It also authorized $51.5 million for future block 
grants to repay $130 million in federal loans, which the city had requested. Moten 
assured the council that the diversion would not affect previously approved 
projects (Rich, 1989: 188-189). 
City ofScials also exaggerated the potential benefits of the project to funding agencies 
(Bachelor, 1982a). For instance, although. Mayor Young emphasized the permanent new jobs 
as the main advantage of keeping GM's plant in Detroit, a city aid, Ernest Zachary, revealed 
that there were no permanent new jobs and told city councilmen that the words were used 
only to make a plea for federal aid sound better. He called the maneuver a psychological 
grantsmanship statement. According to Zachary, the city said there are new jobs because that 
carries more weight with the people in Washington {The Detroit News, October 22, 1980). 
Regarding the projections of city income tax revenues, it was based on 6,150 employees from 
the new plant although the project site was divided between Detroit and Hamtramck 
(Bachelor, 1982a). 
Regarding the residents in Poletown, some of the businessmen thought the relocation 
offers were unfair. According to a businessman in the area; 
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Steinhardt called the residents' offers "really generous" but said the offers made to 
businessmen "range from very low to disgraceful." In addition, he said the city is 
violating traditional condemnation procedure by refusing to either buy the 
businessmen's "moveable fixtures" or pay to have them "detached and re-attached." 
Moveable fixtures include transportable assets such as machinery, tables and 
refngerators, which are bolted to the floor and must be detached and then reinstalled 
at "great expense." Steinhardt estimated that if the city offered such an option it could 
add to the total cost of the project by as much as 30 percent. "It is a shabby and 
underhanded tactic and they know it," Steinhardt said. "They are changing the rules in 
a game that has operated with a consistent set of rules for years. This law is not on 
the books (in Michigan), but it's used by everyone across the country" (Jhe Detroit 
Free Press, November 9, 1980:15A). 
Some residents in Poletown had problems with their utility meters. According to the Detroit 
city attorney, the city will stop the wholesale removal of water meters from homes in the area 
designated for a GM plant, after the residents complaints that the meters' removal amounted 
to 'psychological warfare' to get the residents out of their homes {The Detroit Free Press, 
November 21, 1980). A resident in Poletown, Richard Hodas said that the water meter is 
normally one of the last things to go before a neighborhood is condemned, and this action 
psychologically denotes a moment of finality — that the house has been doomed (Jlte Detroit 
Free Press, November 21, 1980). The next were electrical meters and garbage collections. 
According to The Detroit News (February 21, 1981; 1 OA): 
. . .  o n e  r e s i d e n t  c o m p l a i n e d  y e s t e r d a y  t h a t  h e r  e l e c t r i c a l  m e t e r  w a s  r e m o v e d  b y  a  
Detroit Edison Co. worker and other residents charged that the city cut back on 
garbage collections. The actions, residents charged, are examples of continuing 
pressure on homeowners to sell their property to the city. Both charges were denied 
by Detroit Edison and a Detroit city maintenance department spokesman. 
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A resident in the area, Mrs. Kaczynski said, as long as they are intact, she does not think any 
meters should be taken out, and it is pure harassment which is very upsetting to the older 
persons who do not need to be constantly scared that the neighborhood is lost {The Detroit 
News, February 21,1981). A city spokesman insisted that rubbish pickups are continuing 
normally in the neighborhood {The Detroit News, February 21, 1981), When house-strippers 
descended on Poletown and Detroit city officials announced they would bring in private 
guards in three or four weeks, Poletown residents laughed in their faces, and said everything 
would be gone by then. Arthur Parker, a Poletown businessman, said the neighborhood was 
like a mouth with one tooth (The Detroit News, March 15, 1981). 
Regarding the PNC, Ralph Nader thought that Mayor Young planned to buy as much 
of Poletown as the city could, as quickly as possible. Nader said that instead of obeying the 
law the city and GM were out to achieve a fait accompli by doing the reverse. They're trying 
to bulldoze everything first, then say look what they had done — now you have to approve 
this {The Detroit News, March 15,1981). Responding to him, Mayor Young said that Nader 
is under the misguided notion that preservation of a neighborhood where half the people had 
moved out is more important than jobs {The Detroit News, March 12, 1981). However, 
Young's property-buyers pressed ahead, and the great majority of Poletown's landowners 
sold, either because they wanted to or because they saw their neighbors selling and did not 
want to be left behind {The Detroit News, March IS, 1981). A veteran city hall reporter for 
The Detroit Free Press Ken Fireman noted at the outset that: 
GM and the city had designed their project with the intent of moving it along as 
quickly as possible in order to prevent strong opposition from developing. The 
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formality of the documents presented and the speed with which things seemed to 
be being accomplished did serve to knock residents offbalance (Wylie, 1989; 61). 
The Rev. Victor W. Nelson, pastor of the church at 2386 E. Grand Boulevard, told 
about ISO residents that the jobs created by a new plant are more important than fighting to 
stay in a neighborhood that is no longer viable (Jhe Detroit News, March 23, 1981). Tom 
Olechowski, president of the PNC said, "What's happened is people have been tricked, forced 
and manipulated out of the community" {The Detroit News, March 15, 1981:12A). 
In summary, the power elite in the Poletown used manipulation. There were numbers 
of manipulations in the case. GM manipulated the city of Detroit while acting as a "good 
citizen." The city manipulated public information and the residents of Poletown felt 
psychologically manipulated by the city. 
Mills believed manipulation is the power which secretly exercised, and emphasized the 
secrecy behind which important determination occurs, saying; 
Many higher events that would reveal the working of the power elite can be 
withheld from public knowledge under the guise of secrecy. With the wide secrecy 
covering their operations and decisions, the power elite can mask their intentions, 
operations, and further consolidation. Any secrecy that is imposed upon those in 
positions to observe high decision-makers clearly works for and not against the 
operations of the power elite (Mill, 1956;294). 
According to Mills, professional celebrities and middle-level politicians are the most visible 
figures of the system. In contrast to them, the power elite are opposite; not so noticeable and 
often does not want to be. Therefore, the power of the professional celebrity is the power of 
distraction for the power elite. This leads us to ask: 
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Research question 16: Did the power elite in Poletown engage in secrecy? 
In the Poletown case, regarding the GM's new plant, GM chairman Thomas A. 
Murphy and Young met to discuss the move—the third such action by GM this year and the 
second one in Michigan—Detroit and GM official said, although they disclosed no details of 
the meeting {The Detroit News, June 24,1980), and no dollar amount had been announced by 
GM officials, but Moten estimated the total investment in property by GM and various 
governmental agencies at $750 million {The Detroit News, July 7, 1980). 
Site visits of the project area and estimation of acquisition costs began in May 1980 by 
the CEDD's acquisition staff and this was sealed from the public (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). 
When GM's new plant project was announced, the city of Detroit already had several site 
locations, however. Mayor Young was in Washington and was not available for a comment. 
According to Deputy Mayor lUchard Simmons, he had no knowledge of talks between the 
city and GM {The Detroit Free Press, June 24,1980). Regarding the plant site, Moten said 
between eight and 10 sites were under considerations {The Detroit News, June 24, 1980), but 
he reused to discuss possible sites. Moten said the city would make a firm offer to GM on a 
site within two or three weeks and would prepare a financial package soon after {The Detroit 
Free Press, June 25,1980). However, negotiations and arrangements, even those in writing 
between city hall and GM, were concealed (Bukowczyk, 1984; Wylie, 1989). Mayor Young's 
style of implementing plans for the city was criticized as follows; 
One member of the City Planning Department, who requested anonymity, 
complained that the department learned of Detroit's major development projects 
only by reading the newspaper. "It's not clear who runs the city," the employee 
said. "It might be Detroit Renaissance. It might be Max Fisher. I don't know, but 
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it sure isn't us." A Chamber of Commerce official referred to the planning 
department as the "eunuch of city hall." Many small business organizations and 
community groups in Detroit were infuriated by the mayor's closed-door decision 
making with his well-financed colleagues (emphasis added) (Wylie, 1989; 45-46). 
At a city council meeting in August 1980, Councilman Cockrel said GM president 
Elliott M. Estes should have come before the Council in person since he did not want to hear 
Moten's filtered interpretations of the deals Moten cut with GM (The Detroit News, August 5, 
1980). The city council was excluded from the process of closure of two operational GM 
plants and replaces them with new plant (Fasenfest, 1989). On October 11, 1980, GM signed 
an offer to buy the Poletown site for its new plant and agreed to pay $6.8 million for the site. 
GM also made a deal of a $120-million tax break over 12 years. Mayor Young was inspired 
wdth the agreement, however, city council members groused publicly about their role in the 
proceedings and charged that they have served as little more than a rubber stamp (The Detroit 
News, October 11,1980). In the process of discussing the tax break for GM plant, council 
members said that they wanted to see information in the city's development agreement with 
GM, a revenue sharing agreement with Hamtramck, and more detailed tax revenue projections 
before they vote on the matter {The Detroit Free Press, April 2,1981). In the same month. 
Councilman Cockrel charged that Moten's failure to provide requested data does not allow 
the council to know what it was voting on {The Detroit News, April 16, 1981), and in April 
29, 1981, the information that Detroit taxpayers will not benefit from the GM's new plant for 
15 to 20 years surprised the city council members {The Detroit News, April 30,1981). 
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Regarding the residents in Poletown, GM's plant project was a bolt from the blue for 
them. Although some people were working with Community and Economic Development 
Department closely for a couple of years prior to the plant announcement, they did not know 
anything about the project. In fact when one of them, Tom Olechowski, went to meet Moten 
on June 24,1980, Moten said that "Tom, I'm about to go into secret session to advise the 
council we're building a General Motors plant in Poletown" (Wylie, 1989: 60). This was 
before the public announcement of the project. It is clear that before the announcement, the 
project proceeded secretly. Concerning Poletown residents, "No one was around to warn 
them — because no one else knew either—when this all began to happen, years before" (The 
Detroit Free Press,'biovQnto&[ 22, 1981: 13). 
Some of them, especially the members of PNC, were fighting to save their 
neighborhood. They asked the court to halt land condemnation. At the court, Poletown 
lawyer Ronald J. Reosti warned that he would challenge the proposed financing for the city's 
$200-million costs, including a gap of at least $60 million to be obtained from unidentified 
other grants {The Detroit News, November 18, 1980). Ralph Nader wrote a four-page letter 
to Roger Smith asking Smith to attend the Poletown Neighborhood Council meeting because 
a personal appearance by the GM chairman would help to humanize General Motors (The 
Detroit News, February 1, 1981), although GM spokesman could not say if Smith would ever 
appear at a public meeting on the plant. In his letter, Nader also claimed that GM officials 
assembled the project during a series of private meetings with city, state and federal officials 
(The Detroit News, February 1,1981). 
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In summary, the power elite in the Poletown engaged in secrecy. The deals of the 
plant project were mainly discussed among people m charge, and other people were kept 
completely uninformed. 
10. Consequences of the power structure 
There are four consequences of the power structure for American society according to 
Mills. They are (1) the concerns about the impact of the power structure on the interests of 
certain groups or classes in America, (2) the concerns about the impact of the structure of 
power on the quality of politics in America, (3) the concerns about its impact on the quality of 
power relations themselves, and (4) the concerns about the impact of the power structure on 
democratic leadership (Komhauser, 1968). 
Regarding the first consequence of the power structure—the concerns about the 
impact of the power structure on the interests of certain groups or classes in America — 
Mills asserted that "the existing power arrangements enhance the interests of the major 
institutions whose directors constitute the power elite" (Komhauser, 1968:47). For Mills, the 
shape and meaning of the power elite can be understood only when these three sets of 
stmctural trends are seen at their point of coincidence. From historical point of view, while 
the political power elite were ascendant during the 1930s, the military and the corporate 
power elite are in top positions now (1950s), according to Mills. Mills made several points 
concerning today's power elite: 
Today all three are involved in virtually all widely ramifying decisions. Which of 
the three types seems to lead depends upon 'the tasks of the period' as they, the 
elite, define them. Just now, these tasks center upon 'defense' and international 
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afiairs. Accordingly, as we have seen, the military are ascendant in two senses: as 
personnel and as justifying ideology (Mills, 1956:277). 
Mills described the ascendancy of the military in the passage below: 
In so far as the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the economic order, 
that clue is the fact that the economy is at once a permanent-war economy and a 
private-corporation economy. American capitalism is now in considerable part a 
military capitalism, and the most important relation of the big corporation to the 
state rests on the coincidence of interests between military and corporate needs, as 
defined by warlords and corporate rich. Within the elite as a whole, this 
coincidence of interest between the high military and the corporate chieftains 
strengthens both of them and further subordinates the role of the merely political 
men. Not politicians, but corporate executives, sit with the military and plan the 
organization of war effort (Mills, 1956:276). 
Regarding the second consequence of the power structure — the concerns about the 
impact of the structure of power on the quality of politics in America — "the idea that the 
power system is a balancing society leads us to assume that the state is a visible mask for 
autonomous powers, but in fact, the powers of decision are now firmly vested within the 
state" (Mills, 1956:267). According to Mills, most political decisions of consequence were 
moved from local to state to federal establishment. Mills described this historical transition 
below: 
The issues of local politics, to which the individual might be supposed most alert, 
have become in some part a matter of deals between federal powers and local 
authorities. 'During the 'twenties,' says a liberal organization's leader, 'you could 
get together local pressures to squeeze Congress. During the 'thirties, you didn't 
need it so much. It was there at the center, and we got dependent on it. Then the 
war stymied political efforts... Now, just a while ago, we wanted wide support 
for a bill, but we couldn't find any. There just aren't any local organizations or 
local fire any more. They've withered away.' 
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The distance between the individual and centers of power has become greater, and the 
individual has come to feel powerless... 
The issues of politics, it is often said, are now so technical and intricate that the 
individual cannot be expected to understand them or be alert to their consequences 
(Mills, 1951:347-348). 
Mills asserted that when political power is centralized, impersonal manipulation 
replaces authority. As a result, "manipulation feeds upon and is fed by mass indifference" 
(Mills, 1951:349). Mills described the quality of politics in America in the following manner: 
By virtue of their increased and centralized power, political institutions become 
more objectively important to the course of American history, but because of mass 
alienation, less and less of subjective interest to the population at large. On the 
one hand, politics is bureaucratized, and on the other, there is mass indifference. 
These are the decisive aspects of U.S. politics today (Mills, 1951:350). 
Thus, Mills pointed out that there is a gap between the power elite and the masses, leading us 
to ask: 
Research question 17: Were the power elite in the Poletown reachable for the Poletown 
residents? 
In the Poletown case, although the residents of Poletown could legally appeal, it 
appeared as if no one heard them. This explanation will look at the Poletown case 
chronologically. Preparation of the project plant such as the site review was practiced with 
little public involvement by citizens (Bachelor, Jones and Wang, 1981). Two months after the 
GM plant's announcement, residents in Poletown anxiously awaited bulldozers, and their 
feelings were as follows; 
Not everyone agrees the 200 acres can be painlessly erased. Many people are already 
suffering from what sociologists call the "anticipatory impacts" of redevelopment 
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projects. "The anticipatory impacts are frequently the worst," one sociologist involved 
in the project said. "There is so much uncertainty and powerlessness among people 
who are used to looking out for themselves. Decisions are being made by outsiders 
who the locals feel aren't considering the locals" {The Detroit Free Press, October 6, 
1980;21A). 
Decisions were made by outsiders who did not hear residents' voices. There was no dialogue 
between the residents and GM or the city of Detroit.'" Consumer activist Ralph Nader urged 
GM to meet with the citizens of Detroit to discuss industrial design alternatives to the 
automaker's proposed new Cadillac assembly plant (The Detroit Free Press, Febmary 1, 
1981). According to the president of the PNC, Thomas Olechowski: 
We have assured them (GM) that such a meeting would be an amicable meeting of the 
minds. We've assured them we're not baiting them, that we want a genuine dialogue, 
that we think we can prove that the people can have their neighborhood and GM can 
have their plant within the same general site—if they would just use the site more 
efficiently {The Detroit Free Press, February 1, 1981:3A). 
Poletown residents thought that it was too late to save their neighborhood because most 
residents had resigned themselves to the feeling that they can't fight city hall {The Detroit 
News, February 17,1981). Concerning the alternative parking design for the new GM plant, 
letters to the editor in The Detroit News (March 5, 1981:18 A) printed one reader's point of 
view: 
Building multi-deck parking garages rather than parking lots is one of several 
alternatives that would resolve the issue. We could save jobs and the neighborhood. 
But GM and the city of Detroit refuse to negotiate over this crucial point. And by 
failing to talk it over, the residents are forced to fight for their rights in court. 
Information was obtained from the telephone interview and a questionnaire with people who involved the 
Poletown events. 
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The Gray Panthers' leader Maggie Kuhn, who came to help Poletown, also agreed with this 
point and said that to ignore these options would be a serious mistake (The Detroit News, 
March 9, 1981). She urged GM official to consider the options by saying "Nothing is ever 
lost by talking. A great deal could be lost by not talking" (The Detroit News, March 9, 
1981 ;2B). However, Young officials ruled out any meeting with opponents to discuss 
alternative designs for the plant, saying all such options were considered long ago (The 
Detroit Free Press, March 12,1981). Regarding the communication, Mayor Young admitted 
later that there was no communication between the city officials and the residents (Young and 
Wheeler, 1994). kccxiximgio The Detroit Free Press (Maxch 12, 1981:3A); 
Later in the day, the city's director of community and economic development, Emmett 
Moten, said city officials will not meet with the Poletown council or Nader to discuss 
design changes for the plant because the alternatives already have been considered and 
rejected. "I don't think it's appropriate, I don't think it's necessary," Moten said in an 
interview with the Free Press. "It's unnecessary for us to sit down with any outside 
group that wants to make a name for itself I don't see why we should give him 
(Nader) that glory." 
Richard Hodas, a vice president of the PNC, stated that the city wasn't looking into the point 
that if GM would simply modify its plant, the plant could be built and jobs could be saved 
(The Detroit Free Press, March 15, 1981:6A). 
Since there were no connections, the Poletown residents felt the distance between 
themselves and GM executives or city officials. There was a great distance between them and 
the power elites in Detroit — the distance between the power elite and the Poletown residents 
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was as far as that of heaven from hell — and even they could contact them, it was ignored. 
No one showed the residents any type of concern and it became veiy disheartening for them. 
People felt they were fighting a modem-day tank with a pitch fork." 
In summary, the power elites in the Poletown were not reachable for the Poletown 
residents. There was a distance between the residents of Poletown, and top GM executives 
and the top city officials in Detroit. The concerns of the residents were not heard, and they 
felt hopeless. 
Regarding the third consequence of the power structure — the concern about its 
impact on the quality of power relations themselves—Mills contended that the concentration 
of power took place without a corresponding shift in the bases of legitimacy of power 
(Komhauser, 1968). Mills stated that; 
Authority formally resides 'in the people,' but the power of initiation is in fact held 
by small circles of men. That is why the standard strategy of manipulation is to 
make it appear that the people, or at least a large group of them, 'really made the 
decision.' That is why even when the authority is aveulable, men with access to it 
may still prefer the secret, quieter ways of manipulation (Mills, 1956:317). 
As a consequence of the power concentration without its legitimacy of power, "men of 
power are neither responsible nor accountable for their power" (Komhauser, 1968:48). The 
power concentrated among the power elite might benefit the power elite but not necessarily 
the rest of the nation. In Mills' view: 
" Infonnation was obtained from the telephone interview and a questionnaire with people who involved the 
Poletown events. 
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Would it not be ridiculous, for example, to believe seriously that, in psychological 
fiict, Charles Erwin Wilson represented anyone or any interest other than those of 
the corporate world? This is not because he is dishonest; on the contrary, it is 
because he is probably a man of solid integrity — as sound as a dollar. He is what 
he is and he cannot very well be anything else. He is a member of the professional 
corporation elite, just as are his colleagues, in the government and out of it; he 
represents the wealth of the higher corporate world; he represents its power; and 
he believes sincerely in his oft-quoted remark that 'what is good for the United 
States is good for the General Motors Corporation and vice versa" (Mills, 
1956:285). 
Regarding the fourth consequence of the power structure — the concerns about the 
impact of the power structure on democratic leadership—Mills stated concentrated power 
America is increasingly resembling that of the Soviet system, adding that: 
Official commentators like to contrast the ascendancy in totalitarian countries of a 
tightly organized clique with the American system of power. Such comments, 
however, are easier to sustain if one compares mid-twentieth-century Russia with 
nud-nineteenth-century America, which is what is often done by Tocqueville-
quoting Americans making the contrast. But that was an America of a century 
ago, and in the century that has passed, the American elite have not remained as 
patrioteer essayists, have described them to us. The 'loose cliques' now head 
institutions of a scale and power not then existing and, especially since World War 
I, the loose cliques have tightened up (Mills, 1956:271). 
Mills believed American society is dominated by the power elite and its concentration of 
power is similar to that of the Soviet Union. We are lead to ask: 
Research question 18: Did the Poletown residents see democracy through the case? 
In the Poletown case, the case was not handled democratically (Bukowczyk, 1986). 
The president of the PNC stated that they were talking about a working-class neighborhood 
that was about to be obliterated by a factoiy that would not employ any of the residents in 
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community, and they cannot be anything but serious about the case {The Detroit News, July 
22,1980). In letters to the editor, a reader expressed himself in the words; 
Since The Detroit News favors this project so heavily, yet still believes in the 
democratic process, why don't they suggest that GM or the city of Detroit send each 
of the 800 homeowners in this area a questionnaire to get an honest vote? This area in 
Detroit is vastly different than the GM-Orion Township project area, but at least they 
had a vote. Are the Detroit and Hamtramck area people to be subjected to media bias 
and opinion without the benefit of a referendum? {The Detroit News, August 21, 
1980:18A). 
This letter showed that the residents in Poletown did not have a vote about the future of their 
neighborhood. At the second hearing, one of the attendants called upon the city ofiicials to 
hold a referendum on the question saying "Give the people a chance to vote no and let the 
democratic process work" (The Detroit News, August 6, 1980). The GM plant project raised 
many questions. For instance, the financing methods and size of the plant alone were causing 
many to take a close look at Detroit's role in a project that would uproot hundreds of poor, 
aging and working class residents of a 70-block site on the Detroit-Hamtramck border (The 
Detroit News, September 2, 1980). 
Edward Nedbala owned a small market in Poletown and his market was the state's 
biggest seller of lottery tickets. Nedbala thought the $34,000 offer from the city was a joke. 
According to him: 
"They can drop dead, too," said Nedbala, whose fnends are worried he might have a 
heart attack because he is so upset. "It's just as bad as Russia. It's confiscation. I'm 
going to move to Canada. I'm not being funny. They gave me half of what I paid for 
this place in 1947" (The Detroit Free Press, November 9, 1980:3A). 
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The only explanation why the project advanced as it was because GM had given it orders, and 
the devastation of democracy by GM was as blatant as the leveling of Poletown and Nedbala's 
market (Moberg, 1981). Chuck Mistele owned a fuel and industrial cleaning firm which was 
founded in Poletown by his great-grandfather in 1895. He said that he felt duped after all the 
time he spent working for the Central Industrial Park Citizens District Council, a group of 22 
area residents and businessmen selected by the city to help disseminate information about the 
project {The Detroit Free Press, November 9, 1980). A 64-year-old Elizabeth Marshall, lived 
on Trombly Street for 24 years, was fnghtened and said; 
"They (the city) call your house a slum and shack, and they tell you that you have to 
take what they offer," she said in a rush as her eyes filled with tears. "I don't know 
the law. I don't know what they are giving me. They tell you to sign; I don't know 
what I am signing. I don't know where I'm going to move" {The Detroit Free Press, 
December 8, 1980:11 A). 
Another resident swd that "It's like we're living in a communist country, we're told we can't 
live where we want to, that's impossible. That's why I have the feeling that we're not going 
to move, this is a free country" (Ewald, 1980: 7). 
In December 8,1980, Judge Martin rejected a bid to block GM plant. Poletown' 
Attorney Ronald Reosti said, "Martin's decision created a scary precedent for taking the 
homes of little people and giving them to a big corporation on grounds that it can do more for 
the community" {The Detroit News, December 9, 1980). When the residents of Poletown 
rallied in December 20,1980, one marcher expressed passionate feelings saying, "The Soviet 
Union is ready to invade Poland, and GM is ready to invade us" {The Detroit Free Press, 
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December 21,1980;3A). Gray Panthers' leader Maggie Kuhn said the Poletown residents 
were not receiving the kind of consideration from GM and government officials that civic 
responsibility in a democracy requires (The Detroit News, March 9,1981). Father Joseph 
Karasiewicz in Immaculate Conception Roman Catholic Church viewed the Michigan's 
Supreme court rule in favor of GM's new plant in Poletown in the following way; 
"We're fighting for a principle—the principle that 'eminent domain' does not apply 
for private business. This (the taking of privately held land for the GM plant) is not a 
public necessity. This is a diabolic precedent that makes no one safe." Father 
Karasiewicz said that if the project goes through, "any mayor, any corporation will be 
able to destroy anything they please. "When you are fighting for a principle, numbers 
don't count" (The Detroit Free Press, March 14, 1981; 11 A). 
In April 22,1981, U.S. District Judge John Feikens ruled that the city of Detroit adequately 
considered smaller site plans for the proposed GM plant. When Poletown residents lost their 
battle, one of the residents said, "'I want to know where justice is,'... 'I want to know how 
much (Feikens) got paid. The only time you get any justice in this place is if you have money 
like GM'" (The Detroit Free Press, April 23,1981:3A). 
In summary, the Poletown residents did not see democracy through the case. The 
residents of Poletown were excluded from the decision making process in the project plan, 
and they felt alienated from the holders of power.A few likened the means through which 
their neighborhood was forcefully acquired to methods used in totalitarian society where the 
public has limited access to power. These facts are consistent with Mills' view that power in 
Telephone interview with an informant. 
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America was increasingly finding its way into the hands of an elite group that were not elected 
or accountable to the public, as found in the old Soviet Union. 
B. Community power 
The major idea of theories of community power is that power reflects the dominant 
interests of all affected, or that power is applied in favor of one set of people (Fasenfest, 
1986). According to Dye (1986), communities are governed by tiny groups like that of 
nations. Communities have limited resources and politics (Peterson 1981). Within their 
limited resources, land is controlled by local elite in communities. Community power 
structures are based on landed interest such as how land values increase. Elites share the 
same value toward its growth—they believe community economic growth by capital 
investment. Therefore, the community elite is actually a "growth machine" (Molotch, 1976). 
In general, community residents also share a common interest with elites regarding the 
economic well-being of the city (Peterson, 1981). As an economic function of community 
elites, they prepare land for capital investment in the community. These investments "raise 
land values, expand the labor force, generate demand for housing as well as commercial 
services, and enhance the local tax base" (Dye, 1986: 32). To achieve its elites' goals, 
community elites typically promise jobs as a result of new investment. The community power 
literature confirms that many communities are consensual, especially regarding to policies 
which affect the local economy (Dye, 1986). 
Concerning community conflict and countereiites, the following people may combine 
to form countereiites: 
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People who alrecufy own their houses and do not intend to sell them, people 
whose jobs are secure in government bureaucracies or tenured professorships, 
people who may be displaced from their homes and neighborhoods by new 
facilities, people who see no direct benefit to themselves jrom growth, and business 
or industries who hear the new competition which growth may bring to the 
community (emphasis added) (Dye, 1986: 35). 
Although not all of the opposition to growth is upper-middle-class in character, 
"growth machine" elite are more concerned about opposition from "educated, affluent, upper-
middle-class, 'growth management' homeowners than they are about opposition from 
minority, low-income neighborhood groups" (Dye, 1986: 36-37). Interests of community 
elites are developmental policies which are mainly determined by private market forces 
because of their dominant position in areas (Dye, 1986). Sometimes, there are conflicts 
between the community elites and specific neighborhoods because of their different values 
toward the land. Domhoff argues: 
Neighborhoods are something to be used and enjoyed in the eyes of those who live 
in them. However, they are possible sites of further development for the 'highest 
and best use' in the eyes of those who run the growth machine. This conflict 
between 'use value' and 'exchange value' is a basic one in most successful cities 
as the downtown interests try to expand (emphasis added) (DomhofF, 1986: 63). 
Therefore, interests and values of community sometimes differ between community elites and 
neighborhoods. In general, neighborhoods are stable and apolitical. Neighborhoods are likely 
to lose when they try to fight with community elites (DomhofF, 1986). According to Logan 
and Molotch: 
Ordinarily there is relative peace. Community groups usually mobilize only when 
their own particular turf is threatened. Lacking overall interest in the use of the 
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metropolis as a whole, they are not a source of ongoing resistance. And because 
of relative weakness, urban community organizations are always vulnerable to 
cooptation by those with larger and more stable resources (DomhofT, 1986:64). 
Weak citizens do not have extra resources to invest in politics when there is a conflict with 
conununity elites (Thomas, 1985; Domhoff, 1986). Other factors such as the openness or 
elitism of the local decision-making structure make neighborhood organizations fail (Thomas, 
1985). 
According to community power literature, communities have limited resources and 
politics. For instance, in the Poletown case, the city of Detroit could not have the GM plant 
without financial support from state and federal governments. Within their limited resources, 
land is controlled by local elites for capital investment and they usually promise jobs as a result 
of new investment. This is exactly what GM and the city emphasized for the new plant. 
Concerning the conununity conflict and counterelites, people who already own their homes 
and do not have intention to sell them, and people who see no direct benefit to themselves 
fi-om growth, are likely to be counterelites. The Poletown residents who did not want to 
move out might fit into this category. They were happy about their homes and neighborhood, 
and did not see any direct benefit from the GM plant. Regarding the community elites, they 
were more afraid of an opposition group from educated, affluent upper middle-class 
homeowners than an opposition group from a minority, low-income neighborhood group. In 
the Poletown case, the opposition group was not highly educated nor were its members part 
of affluent upper middle-class homeowners. In a conflict between community elites and a 
specific neighborhood, it is likely that the values of residents and that of community elites are 
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dififerent. In the Poletown events, the opposition residents' 'use value' of Poletown and that 
of the city's 'exchange value' were different. Therefore, ideas of community power literature 
helped to interpret the case. 
C. Power structure in Detroit 
In 1978, The Detroit News with a consultation from a sociologist Charles Kadushin 
studied influential people, who use power in social, political and economic arenas, in Detroit. 
The paper defined power as the ability to make things happen or not happen, and some of the 
findings reflected the ideas of Mills very closely. For instance, they found two existing power 
circles in Detroit. One consisted of traditional leaders made up mostly of people with private 
wealth, education and position, consisting of people one would expect to run things; auto 
magnates, former board chairmen, bank presidents, top retail merchants, and heads of local 
utilities. The other was a newer group which included many blacks who derived power mainly 
from access to public funds and management of people. This group was composed of people 
from working-class backgrounds and they held resources of people — not things, and were 
politicians, labor leaders, lawyers, ministers and other professionals (Kadushin, 1978). While 
individual power was increasingly derived from organizational positions, power was also 
becoming rooted in organizations — corporate, government and community service. The 
second group was well and thoroughly connected to the first group. Detroit power was 
vested less in individuals and more in the positions they had, with many key decisions with 
broad impact decided by a handful of people in government and business. The traditional 
leaders who still held great power, were wealthy, usually Eastern-educated whites with clout 
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seen as their birthri^t. The study identified the top 47 power holders and users in Detroit, 
among them were; Roger B. Smith, executive vice president of General Motors; Elliott M. 
Estes, president of General Motors (McGill and Young, 1978a) — who later played 
significant roles in Poletown case; and Coleman A. Young, mayor of Detroit (listed among the 
top seven men of the key power positions in 1978 Detroit). These seven men were powerful 
in their own right, however, when they united, they controlled the lion's share of Detroit 
power. They knew "formal corporations and free-wheeling union halls, job-safe bureaucrats 
and pressured executives, black and whites, city and suburbs, the gilt-edged and the rough-
trimmed, those who drive luxury cars and those who build them" (McGill and Young, 1978b). 
Naturally, these seven men had the strongest links between power circles in Detroit. They 
dealt regularly with people in the both circles and also they were respected in both circles 
(McGill and Young, 1978b). In Kadushin's view: 
Basically, almost all 47 persons who hold Detroit power have at least one-third of 
their partners in common, and the proportion of overlap for many at the very top 
of the power list is even greater. The Detroit power world is very small. 
When the pattern of partners in conunon in extended to include fnends of fnends, 
it is clearly evident that Detroit leadership regularly interacts with one another at 
an astounding rate (Kadushin, 1978). 
These powerful people in Detroit shared similar backgrounds with the American national elite 
with one exception, race. They shared similar values — they saw economic issues, education 
and housing as major local problems — and had a consensus about Detroit's problems 
(Kadushin, 1978). 
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The coalition building in Detroit began after the 1967 riots with the formation by the 
city's business leaders into New Detroit Inc. These leaders were from General Motors, Ford, 
Burroughs, Chrysler and Fisher (Stuart, 1979). Regarding Coleman Young, mayor of 
Detroit, The New York Times Sunday Magazine reported about him as the new black power in 
1979. He believed that it was necessary to have political coalitions to improve blacks in 
particular and society as a whole. In the article Young stated that "What is good for the rich 
people of this city is good for the poor people of this city" (Stuart, 1979: 110). The article 
stated that the most repeated criticism of Young was that "he is too cozy with business, giving 
too much incentive to stay in the city through lucrative tax-abatement and joint-venture 
programs, and that he is not sensitive enough to neighborhood problems" (Stuart, 1979:112). 
Young was able to win the trust and support of the city's business elite besides his supporters 
from blacks and liberal labor unions (Anton, 1981). Since Young had a close association 
with Carter Administration, federal money was pouring into Detroit for use in joint ventures 
with the private sector (Stuart, 1979). Regarding federal money, in 1970's mayors had 
authority to decide how federal money will be spent. Although many people sought federal 
ud, only the mayor could build and coordinate the coalitions which required to be successful 
in the search. This authority to the mayors took power from the hands of the staff of city 
department, private community groups, and federal officials (Anton, 1981). 
According to Anton's study (1981), Detroit's institutional structure was concentrated 
and highly organized which produced a small number of elites who easily exchanged 
information and opinions among themselves. An informal structure of influence was apparent 
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in the city. Because the city's economy was concentrated, it was rather easy for small 
numbers of economic elite to consult on matters of major public concern among themselves 
(Anton, 1981). Interlocking ownership structures and political leadership was presented in 
Detroit (Fasenfest, 1989). Mayor Young had not only strong alliance with the city's 
economic elite but also had network of ties to city neighborhood groups and a bureaucracy 
which could pull together when necessary (Anton, 1981). 
This study of power structure in Detroit found a power elite which is similar to Mills' 
ideas of power elite — individual power is derived from organizational positions; power is 
rooted in organizations such as corporate and government; a handful of people in government 
and business make many key decisions with broad impact; the group has strong links with 
power circles in Detroit; the group members share backgrounds similar to the American 
national power elite. The study identified top executives of GM and the mayor of Detroit 
(Coleman A. Young) among the power elite in the city. 
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study presented an application of sociological theory to the events that occurred 
in an ethnically diverse community of Detroit known as Poletown, and focused on examining 
the nature of the exchange carried out among the three parties of the Poletown case from the 
view points of both exchange and power elite theories. Significant results not previously 
explored in the literature were obtained by analyzing and interpreting the case in terms of 
Georg SimmePs elements and principles of exchange, and C. Wright Mills' characteristics of 
power elites. This dissertation presented a comprehensive application of SimmePs exchange 
theoiy to organizations at the community level, and included a detailed study of community 
power structures from the standpoint of Mills' power elite theory. 
Throughout the Poletown events, Simmel's elements and principles of exchange as 
well as Mills' characteristics of the power elite were easy to recognize. In the Poletown case, 
GM's desire to build a new plant was the first step for the exchange with the city of Detroit. 
GM wanted to replace its two existing plants in Detroit with a new plant. Easy access from 
the old plants and acquiring experienced workers were GM's major desires. GM was 
attracted by the city's authority to use the power of "eminent domain" and the "quick take" 
law to make room for GM's plant site. GM was also attracted by the city's financial package 
for the new plant. The city of Detroit was facing economic hardship at the time, and had a 
high unemployment rate. Therefore, when GM approached the city with the new plant 
project, the city jumped at GM's ofTer because it could see the potential economic gain 
through GM's new plant. The residents of Poletown were living peacefiilly until they heard of 
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GM's project announcement. Prior to the announcement, some of the residents were working 
to revitalize the area with the cooperation of the city, and some residents desired to move to 
better areas and the generous relocation benefits from the city were attractive for them. 
GM identified the city of Detroit as a potential possessor of the site while the city 
identified GM as a possessor of potential jobs. Therefore, GM offered a new plant to Detroit 
and the city offered the plant site to GM although it did not own the area at the time. The city 
offered the relocation benefits to the residents and in return the residents offered their homes. 
Mills' analysis would point out that there were two power elites in the Poletown case; one 
was GM (a corporation); and another was the city of Detroit (a government), and these 
institutions held great amounts of resources. On the one hand GM had economic resources 
—capital mobility—and on the other hand the city had political resources — legal 
authorities. The power elite was to be found in the top positions of authority in large 
institutions: within GM in the top tier of executives, and witlun the city in its mayor and his 
executive staff. The idea of the project was formed by GM chairman Thomas A. Murphy, and 
the mayor of Detroit, Coleman A. Young, and his right-hand man Emmett S. Moten, Jr., the 
director of Detroit's Community and Economic Development Department, carried the GM 
plant project through. GM and the city shared the same interests: GM to increase its profit 
through the construction of a new plant in the city, and Detroit to reinvigorate its economy. 
The power elite in both GM and Detroit were well connected with other power elites. 
GM's executives were connected with the mayor through other organizations, and the mayor 
had networks with other business leaders in Detroit. Mayor Young had a close association 
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with the federal government — Carter Administration and HUD executives, and close ties 
with the state government. On the other hand, Moten had a cozy association with the 
Secretary of HUD since Moten worked for him previously. The Poletowners had no such 
connections. 
GM sacrificed the Poletown site in lieu of the incentives offered by Detroit. Though 
the Poletown site was not as large as other GM plant sites, the city's offers were very 
attractive. The city of Detroit compared the values of keeping GM's plant inside the city as 
opposed to letting GM go elsewhere. The city compared the value of using Poletown as a 
GM plant site to the value of keeping Poletown as a residential area, and decided that 
promoting the urban economy through GM plant construction was more valuable. The city 
encountered many obstacles in the process of preparing the site for GM, for example having 
to meet GM's tight timetable, seeking grants, and also facing legal challenges from the PNC 
and residents in Poletown. The Poletown residents compared the benefits of moving out from 
the area as opposed to staying, and while some residents valued the relocation benefits, others 
did not. 
GM accepted the Poletown site, and the city of Detroit accepted GM's conditions 
such as the strict timetable and the tax abatement while some Poletown residents accepted the 
city's offer because it enabled them to move out to a nicer area. Other residents refused to 
sell as they valued their homes and neighborhood more than anything. After the exchange was 
established, GM was seen to value the Poletown site more than other options, while the city 
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valued keeping the GM plant in the city more than letting it go elsewhere. The residents who 
accepted the city's incentives to move valued their new neighborhood higher than Poletown. 
The deals in the exchange were quantified by the money value in every aspect. GM 
had more money than the city, and as Simmel stated, money was the cause and the effect of 
exchange in the Poletown case. Also the negotiation process displayed clear power 
differentiations among the actors. For example, in the exchange between GM and the city, the 
company used the city's desperate economic situation as leverage to force its demands. On 
the other hand, in the exchange between the city and the residents, Detroit used its legal 
authority to demolish the Poletown area while the residents did not have any such power. 
The power elite saw fit to exercise their power through secrecy and manipulation. For 
instance, GM was able to manipulate the city because it had other potential sites available. On 
the other hand, with its power the city controlled information to the public. The two power 
elites controlled the exchange process between themselves. 
Throughout the Poletown events, the residents felt their voices were not heard and 
experienced distance since they had no dialogue with the power elite. Poletown residents 
were excluded from the decision making process and felt powerless, and — consistent with 
Mills' theory — many residents thought that the principles of democratic government were 
ignored. 
Simmer s and Mills' theories approach the Poletown case from different perspectives 
and offer contrasting and complementary interpretations. The processes between the city and 
GM were an exchange, in Simmel's view, and follow specific rules. Alternatively, fi:om Mills' 
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point of view, the Poletown case can be seen in terms of the power elite making important 
decisions among themselves, with the residents of Poletown being left out in the cold. 
Between the two power elites, an exchange relationship was much more successfully 
formulated than between the elite (the city) and non-elite (residents). From Simmel's point of 
view, it can be explained that the exchange between two elite groups followed precisely his 
ideas of exchange. On the other hand. Mills would point out the similar characteristics of the 
power elite which helped to control the events of the case. The exchange between Detroit 
and the Poletown residents can be better explained by Mills' power elite theory, for Detroit 
oflFered the Poletown site to GM when it did not own the land, while by Simmel's logic one 
can offer only what one possesses. Mills covered this point by saying the elites in the city had 
power through legal authority of condemnation. According to both Simmel and Mills, the 
defeat of the PNC can be explained by its lack of resources. Therefore, SimmePs exchange 
theory and Mills' power elite theory complement each other in the analysis and interpretation 
of the Poletown case. 
A. Recommendations for further study 
In the Poletown events, there was contextual change that affected residents during the 
exchange process in ways which none of the exchange theorists pointed out. As Simmel 
stated, an exchange occurs when individuals compare the value of an offer and find it higher 
than what they have. In the Poletown events, the comparison factor changed over the time. 
The relocation benefits proposed by the city were the first offer the value of which the 
residents could compare with the value of their property. During the period for which certain 
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residents were rejecting the city's offer, several physical contextual changes occurred. One 
big factor which made residents change their minds was the physical situation of the area. 
After the plant announcement, the area experienced arson and vandalism. It was physically 
hard for residents to stay in the area. Their neighborhood environment changed during this 
time. Psychologically, some residents changed their minds after realizing their neighbors had 
moved out already. This contextual change needs more study, since the comparison of value 
is made between what the other party offers and what one is going to give up, depending upon 
the context where the exchange takes place. 
Throughout the events in and surrounding Poletown, power differentiation between 
GM and the city of Detroit was the central element of contention. GM and the city had huge 
resources; GM's being economic, and the city's being political. GM could not have buih the 
Poletown plant without the city's authority and there was even some power differentiation 
among the power elite. Mills' theory and other elite theories deal with the different levels of 
power but the theory does not deal deeply with the power differentiation among the power 
elite. The power differentiation among the power elite is a subject that is open for further 
investigations. 
Concerning the methodology used in this study, the major facts were collected from 
two newspapers, however, the study found that information obtained through the newspapers 
present an incomplete picture of the Poletown events. For instance, the information that the 
residents had no access to the power elites was obtained through other publications and a 
telephone/questionnaire inquiry. The depiction of the Poletown neighborhood by the 
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newspapers was one-sided, while the study from the city reported both positive and negative 
sides objectively. Also, although the editorials of both newspapers supported the GM project, 
the stories about Poletown were sympathetically reported by the reporters. The general 
stories were biased more in favor of victimized residents' stories, and therefore the 
information regarding the residents who accepted the city's offer without struggle was 
obtained through other sources. Newspaper content analysis might be applicable if the 
analysis is quantitative searching, for example, frequency of words. A study such as the 
Poletown case could not capture the whole picture through a reliance on newspapers sources. 
It is unreasonable to generalize, however, that case studies using newspaper content analysis 
method cannot yield accurate results. It can, however, be said that in order to obtain a 
complete picture of the case, newspapers should not be the exclusive source. 
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APPENDK A. CHRONOLOGY OF POLETOWN PROJECT 
March 18,1980 
April 4, 1980 
Early part of 1980 
Late June, 1980 
June 30,1980 
July 9,1980 
July, 1880 
August 4, 1980 
October 1,1980 
October?, 1980 
October 10,1980 
October 11,1980 
October 11,1980 
October 15,1980 
October 20,1980 
October 21,1980 
October 31,1980 
: Michigan's new condemnation law passed the legislature. 
; Republican Governor William Milliken signed into law the Uniform 
Condemnation Act. 
; GM approached the city of Detroit about the possibility of finding a 
site for a 3 million square foot plant which would be used to replace its 
aging Cadillac and Fisher Body Plants. 
: Mayor Coleman Young and GM chairman Thomas Murphy 
announced that a new $500 million Cadillac plant would buih in the 
center of Detroit — on a site including the northern third of Poletown. 
: The Poletown Neighborhood Council (PNC) was formed. 
: The first public meeting. 
; Boundaries of the project area, labeled the Central Industrial Park, 
were approved by the Detroit City Council. 
; Detroit City Council and the public hearing 
: GM's deadline for review of the progress. 
: GM was reported to want tax abatement guarantees before it was 
willing to undertake any project. 
: The long-awaited written offer was received from GM. 
: The city council, realizing the degree to which it was being ignored or 
bypassed, claimed they were being forced into a position in which they 
were threatened like a rubber stamp. 
; CEDD and GM signed an agreement calling for the terms and price 
under which GM would be granted the site. 
; The draft Environmental Impact Statement was released, indicating 
that the city had adequately considered other possible sites and 
recommending approval of the project. 
; The city council's planning commission approved the project, despite 
its concern about real risks to the city in terms of financing and human 
impact. 
: GM predicted future automation might mean the new plant's work 
force would be significantly trimmed. Mayor Young conceded to the 
city council that (1) a new plant would not create new permanent jobs 
(2) claims of "thousands of jobs" were not accurate (3) an original 
payback estimate of 15 years presented to the city council did not take 
a tax abatement into consideration. 
: The city council approved the project. The U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development authorized the city to draw on its 
$60.5 million in Section 108 loan guarantees. PNC immediately filed a 
suit in Wayne County Circuit Court charging that city officials had not 
adequately considered alternative sites or plans and that condemnation 
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November 1,1980 
November 3,1981 
November, 1980 
November 17, 1980 
Nov. & Dec. 1980 
December 8, 1980 
January 5,1981 
In early Feb. 1981 
February 20,1981 
March 3, 1981 
March 3,1981 
March 9,1981 
March 10,1981 
March 11,1981 
March 13,1981 
March 15,1981 
March 16, 1981 
of private property for the project violated the state constitution's 
definition of eminent domain because a private corporation would be 
the chief beneficiary of the project. 
: City council meeting 
; The mayor signed a resolution condemning Poletown and authoriang 
it to be turned over to GM. 
: PNC filed a suit in Wayne County Circuit Court charging that city 
officials had abused their authority by giving inadequate consideration 
to alternative sites or plans, and that their actions did not serve "public 
purpose" as required by state law, because a private corporation would 
be the primary beneficiary of the project. 
: Hearings began and continued for over 2 weeks. 
; Poletown residents picketed City Hall and the Economic Development 
Corporation. 
: Third Judicial Circuit Court of Miclugan ruled that the use of the 
power of eminent domain for the Central Industrial Park Project served 
a public purpose. PNC immediately appealed the decision to the State 
Court for an appeals court bypass. 
; Consumer advocate Ralph Nader sent an attorney. Gene Stilp, to 
Detroit. 
: Residents began to receive ninety-day eviction notices. 
; The State supreme Court had issued an injunction preventing any 
demolition in Poletown prior to its ruling on the constitutionality of the 
GM project (the first institutional response to the neighborhood's 
crisis). 
: The state Supreme Court vowed fast ruling in GM-Poletown case. 
: PNC delegation met with Governor William Milliken. 
; The Nader staff initiated a nation-wide postcard campaign asking 
sympathetic friends and others to send a card to GM chairman Roger 
Smith. 
; Nader announced to the press that a federal suit would be filed on 
behalf of Poletown resident under the National Environmental 
Protection Act. 
; PNC delegation met with William Lukens, the acting director of the 
Michigan Commerce Department. 
; The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the city acted legally when it 
employed the power of eminent domain to take land for the GM 
Cadillac Plant. 
: PNC suffered a devastating defeat when the Michigan Supreme Court 
ruled against the PNC on every issue that had been brought before the 
court. 
: GM agreed to accept a 50%, 12-year reduction in their taxes. 
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March 27, 1981 : PNC's vice president, Richard Hodas, filed an objection to the city's 
taking his property to the Circuit Court. 
April 2,1981 ; The city council voted for the Tax abatement. 
April 10, 1981 ; Residents appealed to the Governor for protection from arson and 
vandalism. 
April 13, 1981 : The city council voted to rezone Poletown for industrial use. 
April 15, 1981 : The city council approved the second step required in order to grant 
GM a tax abatement. 
April 17, 1981 : GM slipped from second to third on the Fortune 500 list and 
Poletown residents returned to Judge Feikens's Court with a suit 
claiming violations of the Clean Air Act, the National Historic 
Preservation Act, and the Environmental Protection Act during 
demolition. 
April 23, 1981 ; Judge Feikens ruled that the city had acted responsibly in choosing to 
clear the Poletown site for GM and that the federal government did 
nothing wrong in releasing funds prior to completion of the EIS. 
April 30, 1981 : The Michigan Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal that charges 
Detroit officials misinformed Poletown residents and illegally deprived 
them of their right to challenge the city's condemnation of their homes. 
May 1,1981 : The Poletown site was sold to GM. 
May 4,1981 : Work began in the Poletown area. 
May 5,1981 ; Judge Feikens handed down his ruling on Poletown's second suit. 
May 7,1981 : The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hodas, and the case was sent 
back to the lower court, but Judge David Yokes of the Wayne County 
Circuit Court ruled in favor of the city. 
May 10,1981 : Over 1,600 people came to the Immaculate Conception Church to 
participate in its last mass. 
May 11,1981 : Wayne Circuit Court ordered Immaculate Conception Church would 
stay of the wrecker's ball until June 17. 
May 22,1981 ; GMs annual stockholder's meeting — fifty Poletown residents 
picketed. 
June 16,1981 : At the PNC meeting, city official informed PNC members that if they 
remained on the church premises after 16 of June, they would be 
trespassing and could be arrested. 
June 30,1981 : The Nader team left Detroit. 
July 13, 1981 : Twelve protesters in the church were arrested. 
July 14,1981 ; Demolition of Immaculate Conception Church started 
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APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE 
Who opposed the Poletown project? 
Who were the members of PNC? (e.g., elderly, Polish, long lived residents in the area, etc.) 
How many people were willing to accept moving out when they heard the aimouncement of 
the project? 
What events made residents opposing the project change their minds (e.g., learn about the 
eminent domain and quick take law. Council's approval of the project, 
arson/vandalism/looting, church sold out, relocation benefits, Court decision, etc.)? 
Why did some people fight GM/city of Detroit? (What were their reasons? Why did they 
oppose?) 
Did the members of PNC consider their status of multi-ethnic working class as a 
disadvantage in this conflict? 
Did the residents of Poletown have any impact on GM & city's decision-making? 
Who were the power elite? 
Did the residents have any connection with the power elites? 
Did the residents feel the distance between themselves and GM executives/city officials? 
Did the residents feel alienated from the holders of power? 
Do you think the minutes of the PNC meetings might shed light on the intentions of the 
residents? 
Are there other people I might communicate with concerning these questions? 
Are there other resources I should make use of? 
How much has it worked out as GM expected? (e.g., are people in Detroit/area better off, 
more jobs, etc.)? 
If we could start all over, how should things have been done? 
